UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI EASTERN DIVISION

D’ANDRE TEDDY WILFORD, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 4:21 CV 1333 MTS ) ST. LOUIS COUNTY JUSTICE CENTER, ) et al, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This matter is before the Court on the motion of plaintiff D’Andre Teddy Wilford, an inmate at the St. Louis County Justice Center, for leave to commence this civil action without prepaying fees or costs. Having reviewed the motion and the financial information submitted in support, the Court has determined to grant the motion, and assess an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See

. Furthermore, based upon a review of the complaint, the Court finds that the complaint should be dismissed pursuant to

(e)(2)(B).

(b)(1) Pursuant to

(b)(1), a prisoner bringing a civil action in forma pauperis is required to pay the full amount of the filing fee. If the prisoner has insufficient funds in his prison account to pay the entire fee, the Court must assess and, when funds exist, collect an initial partial filing fee of 20 percent of the greater of (1) the average monthly deposits in the prisoner’s account, or (2) the average monthly balance in the prisoner’s account for the prior six-month period. After payment of the initial partial filing fee, the prisoner is required to make monthly payments of 20 percent of the preceding month’s income credited to his account.

(b)(2). The agency having custody of the prisoner will forward these monthly payments to the Clerk of Court each time the amount in the account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is fully paid.

Plaintiff has not submitted a prison account statement. As a result, the Court will require plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $1.00. See Henderson v. Norris,

(8th Cir. 1997) (when a prisoner is unable to provide the Court with a certified copy of his prison account statement, the Court should assess an amount “that is reasonable, based on whatever information the court has about the prisoner’s finances.”). If plaintiff is unable to pay the initial partial filing fee, he must submit a copy of his prison account statement in support of his claim. Legal Standard on Initial Review This Court is required to dismiss a complaint filed in forma pauperis if it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.

(e)(2). An action is frivolous if it “lacks an arguable basis in either law or fact.” Neitzke v. Williams,

(1989). An action fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted if it does not plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v.

Twombly,

(2007). A claim is facially plausible when the plaintiff “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009). Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw upon judicial experience and common sense.

. The court must assume the veracity of well-pleaded facts, but need not accept as true “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements.”

at 678 (citing Twombly,

). This Court must liberally construe complaints filed by laypeople. Estelle v. Gamble,

(1976). This means that “if the essence of an allegation is discernible,” the court should “construe the complaint in a way that permits the layperson’s claim to be considered within the proper legal framework.” Solomon v. Petray,

(8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Stone v. Harry,

(8th Cir. 2004)). However, even pro se complaints must allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon,

(8th Cir. 1980). Federal courts are not required to assume facts that are not alleged, Stone,

, nor are they required to interpret procedural rules so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel. See McNeil v. United States,

(1993). The Complaint Plaintiff, D’Andre Teddy Wilford, filed the instant complaint pursuant to

against the St. Louis County Justice Center, Unknown Correctional Officer Berry and Unknown Correctional Officer Dyson on November 10, 2021. Plaintiff claims that he was assaulted by another inmate at the St. Louis County Justice Center on November 5, 2021 when “they”1 left the inmate out of his cell during “clean-up.” Plaintiff asserts that the inmate hid behind a post and physically assaulted him, causing damage to

his nose, lip, temple and right arm. He states that he was given Tylenol for his injuries. Plaintiff seeks 4.5 million dollars in damages in this lawsuit. Discussion The complaint is subject to dismissal. Plaintiff’s claims against St. Louis County Justice Center are legally frivolous because the Justice Center cannot legally be sued. Ketchum v. City of West Memphis, Ark.,

(8th Cir. 1992) (departments or subdivisions of local government are “not juridical entities suable as such.”).

1Plaintiff does not indicate who purportedly left the inmate who attacked him out of his cell, nor does he state the significance of this fact in his allegations. Although plaintiff has named two correctional officers as defendants in this action, he has not indicated how these individual correctional officers purportedly violated his rights. Liability under § 1983 requires a causal link to, and direct responsibility for, the alleged deprivation of rights. Madewell v. Roberts,

(8th Cir. 1990); see also Martin v. Sargent,

(8th Cir. 1985) (claim not cognizable under § 1983 where plaintiff fails to allege defendant was personally involved in or directly responsible for incidents that injured plaintiff); Boyd v. Knox,

(8th Cir. 1995) (respondeat superior theory inapplicable in § 1983 suits). In the instant action, plaintiff has not set forth any facts indicating that defendant Berry or Dyson were directly involved in or personally responsible for the alleged violations of his constitutional rights. As a result, his allegations against these defendants are subject to dismissal. Even if plaintiff had made specific allegations against defendants Berry and Dyson, his claims would still be subject to dismissal in this lawsuit because Plaintiff has failed to allege the capacity under which he is bringing his claims against these defendants. Thus, the Court must assume he is suing defendants Berry and Dyson in their official capacities. Egerdahl v. Hibbing

Community College,

(8th Cir. 1995); Nix v. Norman,

(8th Cir. 1989) Plaintiff’s official capacity claims are actually “against the governmental entity itself.” See White v. Jackson,

(8th Cir. 2017). Thus, a “suit against a public employee in his or her official capacity is merely a suit against the public employer.” Johnson v. Outboard Marine Corp.,

(8th Cir. 1999). See also Brewington v. Keener,

(8th Cir. 2018) (explaining that official capacity suit against sheriff and his deputy “must be treated as a suit against the County”); Kelly v. City of Omaha, Neb.,

(8th Cir. 2016) (stating that a “plaintiff who sues public employees in their official, rather than individual, capacities sues only the public employer”); and Elder-Keep v. Aksamit,

, 986 (8th Cir. 2006) (stating that a “suit against a public official in his official capacity is actually a suit against the entity for which the official is an agent”). A local governing body such as St. Louis County can be sued directly under § 1983. See

Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,

(1978). To prevail on this type of claim, the plaintiff must establish the municipality’s liability for the alleged conduct. Kelly,

. Such liability may attach if the constitutional violation “resulted from (1) an official municipal policy, (2) an unofficial custom, or (3) a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise.” Mick v. Raines,

(8th Cir. 2018). See also Marsh v. Phelps Cty.,

(8th Cir. 2018) (recognizing “claims challenging an unconstitutional policy or custom, or those based on a theory of inadequate training, which is an extension of the same”). Thus, there are three ways in which plaintiff can prove the liability of St. Louis County. First, plaintiff can show that St. Louis County had an unconstitutional policy. “Policy” refers to “official policy, a deliberate choice of a guiding principle or procedure made by the

municipal official who has final authority regarding such matters.” Corwin v. City of Independence, Mo.,

(8th Cir. 2016). See also Russell v. Hennepin Cty.,

, 847 (8th Cir. 2005) (“A policy is a deliberate choice to follow a course of action made from among various alternatives by the official or officials responsible…for establishing final policy with respect to the subject matter in question”). For a policy that is unconstitutional on its face, a plaintiff needs no other evidence than a statement of the policy and its exercise. Szabla v. City of Brooklyn, Minn.,

(8th Cir. 2007). However, when “a policy is constitutional on its face, but it is asserted that a municipality should have done more to prevent constitutional violations by its employees, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a ‘policy’ by demonstrating that the inadequacies were a product of deliberate or conscious choice by the policymakers.”

. Alternatively, plaintiff can establish a claim of liability based on an unconstitutional “custom.” To do so, plaintiff must demonstrate:

1) The existence of a continuing, widespread, persistent pattern of unconstitutional misconduct by the governmental entity’s employees;

2) Deliberate indifference to or tacit authorization of such conduct by the governmental entity’s policymaking officials after notice to the officials of that misconduct; and

3) That plaintiff was injured by acts pursuant to the governmental entity’s custom, i.e., that the custom was a moving force behind the constitutional violation.

Johnson v. Douglas Cty. Med. Dep’t,

(8th Cir. 2013). Finally, plaintiff can assert a municipal liability claim against St. Louis County by establishing a deliberately indifferent failure to train or supervise. To do so, plaintiff must allege a “pattern of similar constitutional violations by untrained employees.” S.M. v. Lincoln Cty.,

(8th Cir. 2017). A plaintiff does not need to specifically plead the existence of an unconstitutional policy or custom. Crumpley-Patterson v. Trinity Lutheran Hosp.,

, 591 (8th Cir. 2004). However, at a minimum, the complaint must allege facts supporting the proposition that an unconstitutional policy or custom exists. Doe ex rel. Doe v. Sch. Dist. of City of Norfolk,

, 614 (8th Cir. 2003). Here, there are no facts supporting the proposition that plaintiff’s constitutional rights were violated due to an unconstitutional policy or custom. He has failed to articulate any unconstitutional policy or custom allegedly implemented by the correctional officers employed by St. Louis County. He also fails to present any facts indicating that St. Louis County failed to train its employees. Instead, plaintiffs complaint focuses on one instance where he was assaulted by an inmate not employed by St. Louis County. As such, plaintiffs official capacity claims against defendants must be dismissed. See Ulrich v. Pope Cty.,

(8 Cir. 2013) (affirming district court’s dismissal of Monell claim where plaintiff “alleged no facts in his complaint that would demonstrate the existence of a policy or custom” that caused the alleged deprivation of plaintiff's rights). Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that plaintiffs motion to proceed in forma pauperis, Doc. [2], is GRANTED. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action is DISMISSED pursuant to

(e)(2)(B). IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel, Doc. [3], is DENIED AS MOOT. An Order of Dismissal will accompany this Memorandum and Order. Dated this 30th day of November, 2021. Lge UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE