Shinneman v. Cerner Corporation
Trial Court Opinion
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI
WESTERN DIVISION CHRISTOPHER SHINNEMAN, )
) Plaintiff, )
) v. ) Case No. 4:24-cv-00026-RK
) CERNER CORPORATION; ORACLE ) CORPORATION, )
) Defendants. )
ORDER Before the Court is Defendant Cerner Corporation (“Defendant Cerner”) and Defendant Oracle Corporation’s (“Defendant Oracle”) (collectively, “Defendants”) motion to sever, Defendant Cerner’s motion to compel arbitration, and Defendant Oracle’s motion to dismiss, all filed contemporaneously. (Doc. 5.) The motions are fully briefed. (Docs. 6, 11, 13.) After careful consideration and for the reasons explained below, the Court ORDERS that (1) Defendants’ motion to sever is GRANTED; (2) Defendant Cerner’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED; (3) Defendant Oracle’s motion to dismiss is DENIED; and (4) the case is STAYED pending arbitration.
Background and Procedural Posture1 Plaintiff filed his Complaint in Jackson County, Missouri, on November 29, 2023, asserting seven counts of employment discrimination against Defendants: (1) discrimination under the Missouri Human Rights Act (“MHRA”); (2) retaliation under the MHRA; (3) hostile work environment under the MHRA; (4) interference and/or retaliation under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”); (5) discrimination under the Americans with Disability Act (“ADA”); and (6) two counts of retaliation under the ADA. (Doc. 1-1 (Amended Complaint).) Defendant Cerner
On April 9, 2018, prior to Plaintiff’s first day of employment, Plaintiff and Defendant Cerner entered into the “Cerner Mutual Arbitration Agreement” (“Arbitration Agreement”). (Doc. 6-1 at 11-14.) Plaintiff and Defendant Cerner agreed the Arbitration Agreement would apply to claims “relating to [Plaintiff’s] employment with Cerner, including . . . discrimination, harassment, retaliation . . ., disability or other accommodation, or termination of employment.” (Id. at 11.) Under the Arbitration Agreement, Plaintiff and Defendant Cerner acknowledged that “arbitration is the only forum for resolving” such claims. (Id.)
Defendants removed the action to this Court on January 10, 2024, under federal question jurisdiction. (Doc. 1.) Defendants now move to sever Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Cerner from his claims against Defendant Oracle pursuant to Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, arguing that only the claims against Defendant Cerner are subject to the Arbitration Agreement, and that the Court should therefore sever the claims to allow for arbitration of the claims against Defendant Cerner. (Doc. 6 at 4-5.) Defendant Cerner asserts that after severing Plaintiff’s claims, the Court should stay the proceedings against Defendant Cerner and compel arbitration of those claims. (Id. at 11-12.) Defendant Oracle moves the Court to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it for failure to state a claim for relief, arguing that Plaintiff fails to allege facts establishing an employer-employee relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant Oracle to pursue his claims under the MHRA, FMLA, and ADA against Defendant Oracle.
Because Defendant Cerner’s motion to compel arbitration and Defendants’ motion to sever demand intertwined analyses, the Court considers those motions collectively, and then turns to Defendant Oracle’s motion to dismiss.
I. Defendant Cerner’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and Defendants’ Motion to Sever
Arbitration agreements are enforceable under federal law in federal court. See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract”). Accordingly, under 9 U.S.C. § 3, a party may seek a stay of a federal lawsuit “upon any issue referable to arbitration under an agreement in writing for such arbitration.” Furthermore, any “party ‘aggrieved’ by the failure of another party ‘to arbitrate under a written agreement for arbitration’ may petition a federal court ‘for an order directing that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement.’” Rent-A-Center, W., Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63, 68 (2010) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4). Federal law liberally favors arbitration. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 339 (2011). And indeed, “upon being satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration . . . is not in issue, the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.” 9 U.S.C. § 4. Ultimately, the party seeking to compel arbitration “bears the burden of proving that there was a valid and enforceable [arbitration] agreement.” Duncan v. Int’l Markets Live, Inc., 20 F.4th 400, 402 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Pursuant to Rule 21, “the court may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party [or] sever any claim against a party.” Severance is committed to the Court’s sound discretion. Simon v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., No. 4:17-cv-0152-DGK, 2017 WL 6276187, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2017) (citation omitted).
Defendant Cerner argues that the Arbitration Agreement is valid and enforceable as to Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Cerner. (Doc. 6 at 11-15.) Plaintiff does not dispute the enforceability or applicability of the arbitration agreement; rather, Plaintiff argues that Defendant Cerner waived its right to enforce arbitration by moving to sever the claims against it in this case. (Doc. 11 p. 5.)
A party may waive its contractual right to arbitration in a number of ways, “including by substantially invoking the litigation machinery rather than promptly seeking arbitration.” Breadeaux’s Pisa, LLC v. Beckman Bros. Ltd., 83 F.4th 1113, 1117 (8th Cir. 2023) (cleaned up). A party waives its right to arbitrate where the party: “(1) knew of an existing right to arbitration; [and] (2) acted inconsistently with that right[.]” Id. (citations omitted). Any doubts concerning waiver of arbitrability should be resolved in favor of arbitration. McCoy v. Walmart, Inc., 13 F.4th 702, 704 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Plaintiff asserts that Defendant Cerner’s motion to sever requires the Court to “take a deep look into the substantive claims, anticipated evidence, and defenses of this case, [and by] doing so, [Defendant Cerner] has invoked the litigation machinery in this case and acted in a manner contrary to the pursuit of arbitration.” (Doc. 11 at 6.) The Court disagrees.
“When a complaint contains both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, the [Federal Arbitration Act] requires courts to ‘compel arbitration of pendent arbitrable claims when one of the parties files a motion to compel, even where the result would be the possibly inefficient maintenance of separate proceedings in different forums.’” KPMG LLP v. Cocchi, 565 U.S. 18, 22 (2011) (cleaned up). See also Anderson v. Hansen, 550 F. Supp. 3d 725, 733 (E.D. Mo. 2021) (severing and staying one arbitrable claim while permitting plaintiff’s other non-arbitrable claims to proceed before the district court); McAllister v. St. Louis Rams, LLC, No. 4:16-cv-172, 2017 WL 3333892, at *1 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 4, 2017) (staying litigation only between two parties who were bound by an arbitration agreement, but permitting claims between parties not subject to arbitration agreement to proceed before the district court). “[C]ourts must examine a complaint with care to assess whether any individual claim must be arbitrated.” Cocchi, 565 U.S. at 22.
Defendant Cerner’s motion to sever rests on its assertion that Plaintiff’s claims against it are improperly before the Court as they are exclusively subject to arbitration, whereas the claims against Defendant Oracle are non-arbitrable. (Doc. 6 at 10-11.) Defendant Cerner therefore moves the Court to sever Plaintiff’s claims such that the Court can then order Plaintiff to arbitrate his claims against Defendant Cerner pursuant to the Arbitration Agreement. (Id.) The Court finds that in moving to sever, Defendant Cerner did not act contrary to its right to enforce arbitration. To the contrary, Defendant Cerner’s contemporaneous motions to sever and compel arbitration are consistent with its right to pursue arbitration. Therefore, Defendant Cerner has not waived its right to enforce the Arbitration Agreement.3
For the reasons set out in Defendant Cerner’s motion to compel arbitration—and to the extent Plaintiff does not argue otherwise—the Court finds the Arbitration Agreement is valid and
II. Defendant Oracle’s Motion to Dismiss
Under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party may move to dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim for relief. In order to avoid dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). This standard “simply calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of [the claim].” Id. at 556. However, the plausibility pleading standard requires the plaintiff show more than just a mere possibility that the relief sought is in fact obtainable. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court must accept the plaintiff's specific factual allegations as true and construe them in favor of the plaintiff, but it is not obligated to accept as true the plaintiff's legal conclusions. Buckley v. Hennepin Cnty., 9 F.4th 757, 760 (8th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted).
Defendant Oracle argues that Plaintiff fails to allege facts which establish an employer- employee relationship between Plaintiff and Defendant Oracle, and therefore, the Court should dismiss the claims against it.4 (Doc. 6 at 14-15.) The MHRA, FMLA, and ADA all require, inter alia, that Plaintiff plead facts which demonstrate an employer-employee relationship in order to state a claim for relief. Withers v. Johnson, No. 4:11-cv-669-DPM, 2013 WL 3338678, at *1 (E.D. Ark. July 1, 2013) (plaintiff must establish employer-employee relationship to sustain FMLA and ADA claims); Payne v. Serv. Cos., Inc., No. 20-786-CV-W-GAF, 2020 WL 12689591, at *2 (W.D. Mo. Dec. 21, 2020) (applying the same to MHRA claims).
Where, as here, a plaintiff alleges employment discrimination claims based on the same set of facts against more than one defendant-employer, either the “joint employer” or “single employer” theory of liability may be necessary to determine whether sufficient integration exists between the defendant-employers. Payne, 2020 WL 12689591, at *2. A “single employer” relationship exists “where two nominally separate entities are actually part of a single integrated enterprise so that, for all purposes, there is in fact only a ‘single employer.’” Osborne v. Nixa Fire Prot. Dist., No. 20-3041-CV-SRB, 2020 WL 3317610, at *2 (W.D. Mo. June 18, 2020) (quoting Walton v. Edge Med. Prof. Servs., LLC, 442 F. Supp. 2d 731, 749 (W.D. Mo. 2006)). “By contrast, the ‘joint employer’ relationship consists of no single integrated enterprise. Rather, the analysis assumes the existence of separate legal entities which have chosen to handle jointly important aspects of their employer-employee relationship.” Id. (quoting Walton, 442 F. Supp. 2d at 749). This Circuit applies the same factors when analyzing either a single or a joint employer relationship: (1) the degree of interrelation of operations between the entities; (2) the degree of centralized control of labor relations; (3) the degree to which the entities share common management; and (4) the degree of common ownership or financial control. Pulitzer Pub. Co. v. N.L.R.B., 618 F.2d 1275, 1278 (8th Cir. 1980); see also Payne, 2020 WL 12689591, at *2 (applying the joint employer test to MHRA claims); Lenk v. St. Louis Pub. Sch., No. 4:18 CV1296 DDN, 2019 WL 1773139, at *4 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 23, 2019) (applying the joint employer test to ADA claims); Richardson v. Patkar Hosp., LLC, No. 4:07CV1722 TCM, 2008 WL 1777446, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2008) (applying the joint employer test to FMLA claims).
Plaintiff alleges that he “began his employment with Defendant Cerner on or about April 30, 2018,” and that “Defendant Oracle Corporation . . . has acquired Defendant Cerner Corporation.” (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 4, 17.) Plaintiff further alleges that “[a]t all relevant times, Plaintiff was an employee of Defendants,” and “[a]t all times relevant herein, Plaintiff was employed by Defendants as a Support Technician at 2800 Rock Creek Pkwy, Kansas City, MO 64117.” (Id. at ¶¶ 7, 16) (emphasis added). Plaintiff’s Complaint does not allege precisely when Defendant Oracle acquired Defendant Cerner (a point of contention between the parties in their arguments in support of and in opposition to dismissal).5 However, because Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Oracle “has
Defendant Oracle relies on Livingston v. Rehabcare Group East, Inc., No. 4:16CV362 JCH, 2016 WL 3276945 (E.D. Mo. June 15, 2016), to support its argument that Plaintiff failed to allege well-pleaded facts establishing an employer-employee relationship. In Livingston, the plaintiff alleged she was hired by RehabCare (a defendant) and she was assigned to work at a facility owned by MGM (another defendant). Id. at *3. The district court concluded that defendants met their burden of showing MGM was fraudulently joined because in plaintiff’s motion to remand, plaintiff argued that MGM was “an employer” under the MHRA; however, she did “not plead or assert that MGM was her employer.” Id. (emphasis added). Instead, plaintiff attempted “to rely on a Oracle’s acquisition of Defendant Cerner was complete. See James, Inc. v. Moates, No. 2:13-CV-2049, 2014 WL 348588, at *3 (W.D. Ark. Jan. 31, 2014) (“While some matters of public record may be appropriate to take into consideration at [the motion to dismiss] stage of the proceedings, . . . judicial notice of a fact is only to be taken when that fact is not subject to reasonable dispute.” (cleaned up)). The Court therefore disregards materials submitted outside of the pleadings for purposes of this motion to dismiss.
Upon review of Oracle’s motion to dismiss and the Complaint, the Court concludes dismissal is not appropriate at this time. It is apparent from Plaintiff’s Complaint that his theory of liability against Defendant Oracle will require him to establish that Defendants were a single employer or that they were his joint employers.7 While discovery could later prove otherwise, at this stage, Plaintiff has plausibly pled that Defendant Oracle acquired Defendant Cerner and was his employer for purposes of the MHRA, FMLA, and ADA. Plaintiff asserts that Defendants (meaning both Defendant Cerner and Defendant Oracle) employed him as a Support Technician during the relevant time periods, and Defendants engaged in specific acts of discriminatory conduct both during and following his termination, including, inter alia, abusive verbal treatment regarding requests for accommodations, failure to follow previously agreed upon accommodations and work restrictions, wrongful termination, and failure to provide paystubs and COBRA continuation notices after his termination. (Doc. 1-1 at ¶¶ 39-56, 60.) For these reasons, Defendant Oracle’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss is DENIED.
III. Stay of Claims Against Defendant Oracle
Having concluded that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Cerner must be stayed pending arbitration pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 3, and that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Oracle are not subject to dismissal at this time, the Cout considers whether it should enter a stay as to Plaintiff’s
Upon consideration of the foregoing factors, the Court finds a stay of the claims against Defendant Oracle is appropriate. Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants involve common questions of law and fact, which is displayed by Plaintiff’s grouping of Defendants together as to almost the entirety of his factual allegations (excluding that Defendant Cerner initially hired Plaintiff), as well as all seven counts in the Complaint. In short, Plaintiff does not differentiate his claims as to Defendants. It also appears that should the Court permit the claims against Defendant Oracle to proceed while Defendant Cerner’s claims are arbitrated, the Court and arbitrator would inevitably be asked to render rulings on the same legal and factual matters, including hearing from the same witnesses and considering the same evidence. The result is a high risk of inconsistent rulings. See US Bancorp Invs., Inc. v. Signature Bank, Inc., No. 5-3418-CV-S-RED, 2005 WL 8159162, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Oct. 31, 2005) (“[T]he claims are so intertwined the risk of inconsistent verdicts is apparent.”). Likewise, because Plaintiff’s claims turn on the same operative facts, a ruling from the arbitrator on the claims against Defendant Cerner may impact the outcome of this litigation between Plaintiff and Defendant Oracle. Filson, 553 F. Supp. 2d at 1093; J.B. Hunt Transp, Inc.
Finally, staying the claims against Defendant Oracle is unlikely to prejudice any party. “Prejudice may result from lost evidence, duplication of efforts, use of discovery methods unavailable in arbitration, or litigation of substantial issues going to the merits,” and a delay in seeking to compel arbitration does not, by itself, constitute prejudice. Dumont Tel. Co., 962 F. Supp. 2d at 1081-82 (finding no prejudice would result from staying litigation pending arbitration because there was no indication that evidence would be lost, the case was still young and parties had conducted little to no discovery, and parties had not litigated substantial issues before the court). While the parties have engaged in court-mandated mediation, it does not appear the parties have engaged in substantial written or oral discovery, and the only motions which have been filed are those contemplated by this Order. In this case, the Court finds the risk of inconsistent rulings outweighs any potential prejudice that could result from delays imposed by a stay. Haarslev, 2023 WL 2782313, at *9. Accordingly, the Court ORDERS that Plaintiff’s claims against Defendant Oracle are STAYED pending the outcome of the arbitrable issues between Plaintiff and Defendant Cerner.
Conclusion Therefore, the Court ORDERS that (1) Defendants’ motion to sever is GRANTED; (2) Defendant Cerner’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED; (3) Defendant Oracle’s motion to dismiss is DENIED; and (4) the case is STAYED pending arbitration.
IT IS SO ORDERED. s/ Roseann A. Ketchmark ROSEANN A. KETCHMARK, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DATED: May 23, 2024
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.