IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI NORTHERN DIVISION

NAJAE JORDAN, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) No. 4:21-CV-1242 HEA ) WESLEY BELL, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

NAJAE JORDAN, et al., ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) No. 4:24-CV-844 HEA ) JASON LEE GROVES, et al., ) ) Defendants. )

OPINION, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER In these consolidated cases, Jordan, et al. v. Groves, et al., Case No. 4:24-CV-884 HEA (“Groves”) and Jordan, et al. v. Bell, et al., Case No. 4:21-CV-1242 HEA (“Bell”), this matter is before the Court on Defendants Jason Groves’s and Jeffrey Lakebrink’s Joint Motion to Dismiss, which was filed in Groves before the cases were consolidated. [Groves Dkt., Doc. No. 9]. After the cases were consolidated and Groves was administratively closed, the motion was docketed in Bell. [Bell Dkt., Doc. 101]. Plaintiffs Najae Jordan and Deja Holland oppose the motion, which is fully briefed and ripe for review. For the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.

I. Facts and Background A. The Bell Lawsuit On August 11, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a civil rights Petition in state court against

Defendants Wesley Bell; the City of Bellefontaine Neighbors (the “City”); the Village of Riverview (the “Village”); Police Officers Jason Groves, Jeffrey Lakebrink, and Michael Pedroli; and City Attorney Christopher Graville. [Bell Dkt., Doc. No. 1-1]. According to the Petition, Defendants Groves, Lakebrink, and Pedroli

violated Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights when they wrongfully detained, searched, arrested on August 11, 2016, and subsequently charged Plaintiffs with multiple municipal violations. [Id. at 4-13]. Plaintiffs’ cases proceeded to trial on December

11, 2019, and on December 13, 2019, the jury returned verdicts of not guilty on all counts. [Id. at 13]. In the Bell Petition, Plaintiffs asserted civil rights claims under

and 1985, as well as state law claims for abuse of process and malicious prosecution. [Id. at 13-37].

On August 12, 2021, the state court issued a clerk note that no summons would be issued because Plaintiffs did not submit service fees or a special process server form with their Petition. [Bell Dkt., Doc. 1-4 at 1]. On September 16, 2021, Plaintiffs

filed a request for special process server, asking the state court to issue summonses for Defendants Bell, the City, and the Village, but Plaintiffs did not request summonses for the remaining individual Defendants. [Id. at 1, 71]. Defendants Bell,

the City, and the Village were subsequently served. [Id. at 1]. On October 15, 2021, Defendants Bell and Graville filed a Notice of Removal with the consent of the City, the Village, and Pedroli. [Bell Dkt., Doc. 1]. In the

Notice of Removal, Defendants Bell and Graville noted that Defendants Groves and Lakebrink had not been served with process. [Id. at 3]. In this Court, Plaintiffs did not request summonses for Defendants Groves and Lakebrink until February 1, 2023, which was nearly 18 months after Plaintiffs filed their Petition in state court.

[Bell Dkt., Doc. 29]. Defendants Groves and Lakebrink were served on February 9, 2023. [Bell Dkt., Docs. 38, 39]. Defendants Groves and Lakebrink moved to dismiss the claims against them

for failure to properly effectuate service under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5). [Bell Dkt., Doc. 42]. Finding that Plaintiffs had failed to establish good cause or excusable neglect, the Court granted the motion to dismiss and dismissed Defendants Groves and Lakebrink from the Bell action without prejudice on January

1, 2024. [Bell Dkt., Doc. 50]. B. The Groves Lawsuit On June 18, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in this District against

Defendants Groves and Lakebrink, alleging essentially the same claims that they alleged against the two defendants in the Bell lawsuit. [Groves Dkt., Doc. 1]. In the Original Filing Form, Plaintiffs indicated that Groves was the same or substantially

similar to Bell. [Groves Dkt., Doc. 1-3]. In July 2024, Plaintiffs moved to consolidate Bell and Groves. [Bell Dkt., Doc. 55; Groves Dkt., Doc. 14]. After careful review of the parties’ briefs and the record

in both cases, the Court found that the cases involved common issues of law and fact, and the cases were consolidated. [Bell Dkt., Doc. 67; Groves Dkt., Doc. 18]. The matter is now before the Court on Defendants Groves’s and Lakebrink’s Joint Motion to Dismiss. [Groves Dkt., Doc. 9; Bell Dkt., Doc. 101]. They argue that

the Groves Complaint should be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) because it is duplicative of the claims Plaintiffs brought against them in Bell. [Groves Dkt., Doc. 10 at 3-4]. Alternatively, Defendants Groves and Lakebrink

contend that Plaintiffs’ claims against them are barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. [Id. at 4-6]. Finally, Defendants Groves and Lakebrink argue that, because the Groves Complaint does not specify whether Plaintiffs are suing them in their official or individual capacities, Plaintiffs’ §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against

them should be construed as official-capacity claims. [Id. at 6-7]. Because an official-capacity claim against a public employee is merely a claim against a public employer, Defendants Groves and Lakebrink argue that the official-capacity claims

against them are actually claims against the Village. [Id.]. As such, they contend, the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims brought against them in their official capacities in Groves should be dismissed as duplicative of the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims against the

Village in Bell. [Id.]. Plaintiffs oppose the motion. [Groves Dkt., Doc. 13]. They argue that the claims against Defendants Groves and Lakebrink in Groves are not duplicative of

the claims brought against them in Bell because, while Plaintiffs sued Defendants Groves and Lakebrink in their official capacities in Bell, Plaintiffs are suing Defendants Groves and Lakebrink in their individual capacities in Groves. [Groves Dkt., Doc. 13]. Plaintiffs also contend that their claims in Groves are timely due to

Missouri’s savings statute,

, which allows the refiling of an action within one year after a claim has been dismissed without prejudice, so long as the original action was filed within the relevant statute of limitations period. [Bell

Dkt., Doc. 87]. In their reply, Defendants Groves and Lakebrink acknowledge that Plaintiffs filed their underlying Petition in state court within the applicable statutes of limitations. [Bell Dkt., Doc. 104 at 1]. They contend, however, that Missouri’s

savings statute does not apply to Plaintiffs’ § 1983, § 1985, and abuse of process claims because those claims are not specifically enumerated in Missouri’s statutes of limitations,

to 516.370. [Id. at 3-5]. Defendants Groves

and Lakebrink also argue that after the 90-day period to timely serve them expired in Bell, the tolling ending, and the applicable statutes of limitations resumed. [Id. at 1-3]. As a result, they assert, the claims reasserted against them in Groves are

time-barred regardless of whether Missouri’s savings statute applies. [Id. at 2-3]. II. Legal Standard To survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, “a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal,

(2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,

(2007)). When analyzing a motion to dismiss, “a court must accept the allegations contained in the complaint as true and make all

reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Martin v. Iowa,

(8th Cir. 2014). However, courts “need not accept as true a plaintiff’s conclusory allegations or legal conclusions drawn from the facts.” Glick v. W. Power

Sports, Inc.,

(8th Cir. 2019). The complaint must allege sufficient facts to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly,

(citing 5 C. Wright & A. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1216 at 235-236 (3d ed. 2004)). “Where the allegations show on the face of the complaint

there is some insuperable bar to relief, dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate.” Benton v. Merrill Lynch & Co.,

(8th Cir. 2008) (citing Parnes v. Gateway 2000, Inc.,

(8th Cir. 1997)). III. Discussion A. Whether the Claims in Groves Are Duplicative

“[T]he rule against duplicative litigation seeks to promote judicial economy and to protect parties from vexatious and duplicative litigation over the same subject matter.” Kezhaya v. City of Belle Plaine, Minn.,

(8th Cir. 2023)

(citing Curtis v. Citibank, N.A.,

(2d Cir. 2000)). “[T]he rule against duplicative litigation permits the dismissal of a duplicative action while the first action remains pending.”

(citing Curtis,

). “The analysis considers whether the parties to the actions are the same and whether the claims arise

from the same nucleus of operative fact.”

(citing Scholz v. United States,

(7th Cir. 2021)). Here, Defendants Groves and Lakebrink were dismissed from the Bell action

without prejudice on January 1, 2024. [Bell Dkt., Doc. 50 at 7]. Because the parties to the Groves action are not the same as the parties to the Bell action, the rule against duplicative litigation does not apply. See Kezhaya,

. As to Defendants Groves’s and Lakebrink’s argument that, because the

Groves Complaint does not specify whether Plaintiffs are suing them in their official or individual capacities, the Court should construe Plaintiffs’ §§ 1983 and 1985 claims as official-capacity claims that are actually claims against the Village, their

argument is foreclosed by a recent en banc decision in which the Eighth Circuit overturned its “clear statement rule” and adopted the “course of proceedings” test for determining whether a § 1983 defendant is being sued in his individual or official

capacity. S.A.A. v. Geisler,

(8th Cir. 2025). In its decision, the Eighth Circuit offered a non-exhaustive list of factors that courts must consider as part of the course of proceedings test, including how early the plaintiff indicates they

intend to pursue individual capacity claims and whether the plaintiff seeks punitive damages.

. Here, Plaintiffs stated that they are seeking punitive damages in the Groves Complaint, [Groves Dkt., Doc. 1 at 31], and in their Memorandum in Response to

the Joint Motion to Dismiss, Plaintiffs specified that they are suing Defendants Groves and Lakebrink in their individual capacities, [Groves Dkt., Doc. 13 at 1-2]. Considering these factors, the Court finds that Plaintiffs intend to sue Defendants

Groves and Lakebrink in their individual capacities in the Groves action. See Geisler,

. Thus, the Court will not dismiss the §§ 1983 and 1985 claims in Groves as duplicative. B. Whether Plaintiffs’ Claims in Grove Are Time-Barred

The Missouri five-year personal injury statute of limitations applies to claims brought pursuant to

and 1985. See Chandler v. Presiding Judge, Callaway Cnty.,

(8th Cir. 1988) (Missouri’s personal injury

statute of limitations,

, applies to § 1983 claims); Kaster v. State of Iowa,

(8th Cir. 1992) (personal injury statute of limitations applies to § 1985 claims). Missouri’s five-year statute of limitations

applies to abuse of process claims. Corley v. Jacobs,

(Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that “[a]n action for abuse of process comes within the general statute of limitations applicable to ‘injuries done to the person,’” and in

Missouri, “this provision is found in Section 516.120(2) RSMo 1986,” the predecessor to § 516.120(4)). “Borrowing Missouri’s statute of limitations also requires borrowing Missouri’s tolling statutes,” Chandler,

(citing Chardon v. Fumero

Soto,

(1983)), “and operation of these tolling rules is ‘governed by state law,’”

(citing Wilson v. Garcia,

(1985)). The Missouri savings statute provides that “[i]f any action shall have been commenced within the

times respectively prescribed in sections 516.010 to 516.370, and the plaintiff therein suffer a nonsuit, . . . such plaintiff may commence a new action . . . within one year after such nonsuit suffered. . . .”

. “Missouri no longer requires due diligence in serving a party to save a claim

from being time barred by limitations.” In re Estate of Klaas,

, 908 (2000) (citing Ostermueller v. Potter,

(Mo. banc 1993); and Keys v. Nigro,

(Mo. Ct. App. 1996)). “Diligence is not a factor

in determining when an action is commenced, nor is it necessary to invoke the savings statute. . . .”

at 908-09 (citing Keys,

). “A civil action is commenced by filing a petition with the court.” Ostermueller,

(citing Mo. Sup. Ct. R. 53.01). Here, Defendants Groves and Lakebrink acknowledge that Plaintiffs filed their original Petition in state court within the applicable statutes of limitations, and

they do not dispute that Plaintiffs filed the Groves Complaint within one year of the nonsuit. [Bell Dkt., Doc. 104 at 1]. Relying on Luney v. SGS Auto. Servs., Inc.,

(8th Cir. 2005), however, Defendants Groves and Lakebrink argue that Missouri’s savings statute does not apply to Plaintiffs’ § 1983, § 1985, and abuse of

process claims because they are not specifically enumerated in Missouri’s statutes of limitations. Defendants’ reliance on Luney is misplaced. In Luney, the court stated that the plaintiff’s argument that she should be

permitted to refile her cause of action under

failed “because the Missouri Savings Statute only applies to actions prescribed in sections 516.010 to 516.370 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. Her actions, filed under Title VII, were not contained within those provisions.” Luney,

. While the

language in Luney is not inconsistent with Defendants’ argument, the better interpretation “is that the savings clause does not apply because a claim under Title VII does not ‘borrow’ the limitations periods prescribed in sections 516.010 to

516.370 of the Missouri Revised Statutes.” See Hubler v. Nevada R-5 Sch. Dist., No. 06-5088-CV-SW-DW,

, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2007). “This reading is consistent with the Luney holding and is in harmony with the text of the

savings statute itself.”

“By its own terms, the Missouri Savings Statute describes its scope as applying to any action commenced within the times prescribed in §§ 516.010 to 516.370, not the actions prescribed therein.” Id. The Court finds the

reasoning in Hubler persuasive, and Defendants Groves’s and Lakebrink’s attempt to distinguish it is not convincing. Indeed, they specifically cite

multiple times in their argument that the claims in the Groves Complaint are time-barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. [Groves Dkt., Doc. 10 at

4-6]. Because Plaintiffs’ §§ 1983 and 1985 claims borrow Missouri’s statute of limitations, Chandler,

(explaining that the five-year statute of

limitations found in

applies to § 1983 claims); Kaster,

(personal injury statute applies to § 1985 claims), they also borrow Missouri’s savings clause, see Chandler,

(“Borrowing Missouri’s statute of limitations also requires borrowing Missouri’s tolling statutes.”), which is

found in

, see

(applying to any action “commenced within the times respectively prescribed in sections 516.010 to 516.370”). But see Charron v. Conley, No. 4:07CV627 CEJ,

, at *3 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 6, 2008) (finding, without support, that § 516.230 does not apply to suits brought under § 1983).

Because abuse of process is a state law claim, it already has its own Missouri statute of limitations, and it is the same personal injury statute of limitations found in § 516.120. See State ex rel. BP Prods. N. Am. Inc. v. Ross,

(Mo. banc 2005) (explaining that unlike § 516.140, which “expressly lists the claims to which it applies,” “the catchall provision of section 516.120(4) prescribes a five-year statute of limitations for ‘any other injury to the person or rights of others, not arising on contract and not herein otherwise enumerated’” (quoting

(4))). While “abuse of process” is not referenced by name in § 516.120, Plaintiffs’ “abuse of process [claims] come[] within the general statute of limitations applicable to ‘injuries done to the person,’” see Corley,

(citing Am. Jur. 2d. ABUSE OF PROCESS, § 24 (1962)), which is “found in Section 516.120(2) RSMo 1986,” see id. (citing the predecessor to

(4) (2024)), their abuse of process claims also fall within the scope of Missouri’s savings statute, see

(4) (general statute of

limitations for personal injury claims), 516.230 (applying to any action “commenced within the times respectively prescribed in sections 516.010 to 516.370”). Defendants Groves and Lakebrink also argue that, even if Missouri’s savings

clause applies, after Plaintiffs failed to timely serve them in Bell within the 90-day period required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m), the tolling ending, and the applicable statutes of limitations resumed. Thus, they contend that the claims

reasserted against them in Groves are time-barred regardless of whether the savings statute applies. The Court disagrees. Plaintiffs’ failure to timely serve Defendants in Bell does not prevent Plaintiffs

from invoking Missouri’s savings statute in Groves because “Missouri no longer requires due diligence in serving a party to save a claim from being time barred by limitations.” See In re Estate of Klaas, 8 S.W.3d at 908. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs timely commenced the action in state court within the applicable statutes

of limitations by filing the original Petition on August 11, 2021, and “refiled within the savings statute’s one-year limitation period, the [Groves Complaint] is not barred by the statute of limitations.” See Ostermueller,

;

. IV. Conclusion Because the Court finds that the rule against duplicative litigation does not apply and that the Groves Complaint was timely filed, the Court will deny

Defendants Groves’s and Lakebrink’s Joint Motion to Dismiss. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants’ Joint Motion to Dismiss,

[Groves Dkt., Doc. 9; Bell Dkt., Doc. 101], is DENIED. Dated this 31*' day of March, 2025.

HENRY EDWARD ni UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

14