Supreme Court of Missouri, 1944

Kammeyer v. City of Concordia

Supreme Court of Missouri · Decided April 3, 1944 · Gantt

179 S.W.2d 76; 352 Mo. 742; 1944 Mo. LEXIS 542 (South Western Reporter, Second Series)

Counsel

Raymond E. Martin and W. Raleigh Gough for appellants. (1) The participation of Herbert F. Duensing in the contract rendered the tax bills void. Sec. 4798, R.S. 1939; 46 C.J. 1037-1038 (Secs. 308-309); 43 C.J. 714 (Sec. 1197); 2 Dillon, Munic. Corp., Sec. 773; 6 Williston, Contracts, 4895 (Sec. 1735); State ex rel. Streif v. White (Mo. App.), 282 S.W. 147; State ex rel. Smith v. Bowman, 184 Mo. App. 549 , 170 S.W. 700; Nodaway County v. Kidder, 344 Mo. 795 , 129 S.W.2d 857 , 861 (12), 862 (21); Githens v. Butler County (Mo. Sup.), 165 S.W.2d 650 , 652 (1-3); Sec. 7206, R.S. 1939; Sec. 7182, R.S. 1939; City of Jackson v. Houck (Mo. App.), 43 S.W.2d 908 , 911 (5); Gast v. Langston (Mo. App.), 15 S.W.2d 353, 356 (4); Gratz v. Kirkwood, 182 Mo. App. l.c. 589, 166 S.W. 319. (2) The proceedings antedating the letting of the contract were so far deficient as to render the contract void. Sec. 7403, R.S. 1939 (Laws 1939, p. 848); Sec. 7182, R.S. 1939; Galbreath v. Newton, 30 Mo. App. l.c. 394; Clapton v. Taylor, 49 Mo. App. l.c. 126; Excelsior Springs v. Ettenson, 120 Mo. App. l.c. 223-224, 96 S.W. 703; Thrasher v. City of Kirksville (Mo. Sup.), 204 S.W. 804; McCormick v. Moore, 134 Mo. App. 669 , 114 S.W. 40; City of Independence v. Nagle, 134 Mo. App. 601 , 114 S.W. 1129; Haegele v. Mallinckrodt, 46 Mo. 577 ; Kansas City ex rel. Neill v. Askew, 105 Mo. App. 84 , 79 S.W. 483; McQuire v. Wilson (Mo. App.), 187 S.W. 612; Youmans v. Everett, 173 Mo. App. 671 , 160 S.W. 274; Hillig v. City of St. Louis, 337 Mo. 291 , 85 S.W.2d 91 ; Heman v. Gilliam, 171 Mo. 258 , 71 S.W. 163; Excelsior Springs v. Ettenson, 120 Mo. App. 215 , 96 S.W. 701; City of Maplewood v. Martha Inv. Co. (Mo. App.), 267 S.W. 63; Hund v. Rackliffe, 192 Mo. 312 , 91 S.W. 500; McCoy v. Randall, 222 Mo. 24 , 121 S.W. 31; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Hayward, 248 Mo. 280 , 154 S.W. 140. (3) The delay in performance of the contract invalidated the tax bills. Neill v. Gates, 152 Mo. 585 , 54 S.W. 460; Hund v. Rackliffe, 192 Mo. 312 , 91 S.W. 500; McCoy v. Randall, 222 Mo. 24 , 121 S.W. 31; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Hayward, 248 Mo. 280 , 154 S.W. 140; Paul v. Burress, 152 Mo. App. 39 , 132 S.W. 330; Paxton v. Bonner, 172 Mo. App. 479 , 157 S.W. 986; Casteel v. Dearmont, 221 Mo. App. 1217 , 299 S.W. 816 . (4) There were numerous miscellaneous defects in the proceedings leading up to the issuance of the tax bills. Secs. 7533 and 7534, R.S. 1939. (5) The conspiracy to stifle and prevent free competitive bidding and the actions taken thereunder render the tax bills void. Ruckles v. Pryor, 351 Mo. 819 , 174 S.W.2d 185 ; Sec. 4483, R.S. 1939. (6) The city was properly joined as a party defendant. All necessary parties were in the case. Sec. 1136, R.S. 1939. (7) The court had jurisdiction of the case as an action for a declaratory judgment. The availability of relief in some other "general" type of proceeding is no objection to a declaratory action. Secs. 1126, 1127, 1128, 1129, 1130 and 1137, R.S. 1939; State ex rel. K.C. Bridge Co. v. Terte, 345 Mo. 95 , 131 S.W.2d 587 ; State ex rel. Pub. Serv. Comm. v. Padberg, 346 Mo. 1133 , 145 S.W.2d 150 ; State ex rel. Clay County State Bank v. Waltner, 346 Mo. 1138 , 145 S.W.2d 152 ; Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, pp. 315, 317-327-331, 342-346; Woollard v. Schaffer Stores Co., Inc., 272 N.Y. 304 , 5 N.E.2d 829 ; "Declaratory Judgments: Experience Under the Uniform Act," Laurance M. Hyde, 26 Washington U. Law Quarterly 468; Sec. 1131, R.S. 1939. (8) A declaratory action will lie to determine validity as well as to obtain a construction. Secs. 1126 and 1127, R.S. 1939; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932 , 130 S.W.2d 945 ; Vincent Realty Co. v. Brown, 344 Mo. 438 , 126 S.W.2d 1162 ; State ex rel. K.C. Bridge Co. v. Terte, 345 Mo. 95 , 131 S.W.2d 587 ; School District of K.C. v. Smith, 342 Mo. 21 , 111 S.W.2d 167 . (9) The availability of the remedy is not defeated because "fact questions" will have to be determined. "Declaratory Judgments: Experience Under the Uniform Act," Laurance M. Hyde, 26 Washington U. Law Quarterly 468; State ex rel. Clay County State Bank v. Waltner, 346 Mo. 1138 , 145 S.W.2d 152 ; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932 , 130 S.W.2d 945 . (10) There was no misjoinder of parties plaintiff. "Declaratory Judgments: Experience Under the Uniform Act," Laurance M. Hyde, 26 Washington U. Law Quarterly, 468; Sec. 1136, R.S. 1939; Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, 255-276; 1 C.J.S. 1049 (Sec. 18 (d) aa); 30 C.J.S. 589-590 (Sec. 151b). (11) There was no misjoinder of causes of action. Sec. 1127, R.S. 1939; Ruckels v. Pryor, 351 Mo. 819 , 174 S.W.2d 185 ; 30 C.J.S. 590. Francis G. Hale, Horace F. Blackwell and Ike Skelton for respondents; Blackwell Sherman and Lawson Hale of counsel. (1) The amended petition, wihch states that it is a "Petition for Declaratory Judgment," and the content and the prayer thereof is for a declaratory judgment only. State ex rel. v. C. A. Railroad Co., 265 Mo. 646 , 178 S.W. 129. (2) Whether a court will render a declaratory judgment rests in the sound judicial discretion of the court. Sec. 1131, R.S. Mo. 1939; "Declaratory Judgments: Experience Under the Uniform Act," Laurance M. Hyde, 26 Washington U. Law Quarterly 468; 1 C.J.S. 1055 (Sec. 18 (c) (cc)); Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932 , 130 S.W.2d 945 . (3) The amended petition fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. Donovan v. Boeck, 217 Mo. 70 , 116 S.W. 543; 47 C.J.S. 47 (Sec. 92 (3)); State ex rel. v. Chicago Alton R. Co., 265 Mo. 646 , 178 S.W. 129; Sec. 849, R.S. Mo. 1939; 47 C.J.S. 51 (Sec. 98 (e)); Haydon v. St. Louis S.F.R. Co., 117 Mo. App. 76 , 93 S.W. 933, aff. 222 Mo. 126 , 121 S.W. 15; Boynton v. Boynton, 186 Mo. App. 713 , 172 S.W. 1175; Moskovitz v. Reynolds (Mo. App.), 248 S.W. 618; Palmer v. Marshall (Mo. App.), 24 S.W.2d 229; Bragg v. Specialty Shoe Machinery Co., 225 Mo. App. 902 , 34 S.W.2d 184 ; Woody v. First Nat. Bank (Mo. App.), 54 S.W.2d 422. (4) The court has no jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act of the cause of action attempted to be stated in the amended petition. The cause of action stated is not within the purpose and scope of the Declaratory Judgment Act. Vincent Realty Co. et al. v. Brown et al., 344 Mo. 438 , 126 S.W.2d 1162 ; Sec. 1137, R.S. Mo. 1939; Declaratory Judgments, Anderson, p. 10; 16 American Jurisprudence 281, Sec. 7; Borchard on Declaratory Judgments, p. 4; 1 C.J.S. 1022 (Sec. 18 (3)); State ex rel. v. Terte, 345 Mo. 95 , 131 S.W.2d 587 ; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932 , 130 S.W.2d 945 ; City of Joplin v. Jasper County, 349 Mo. 441 , 161 S.W.2d 411 ; "Declaratory Judgments: Experience Under the Uniform Act," Laurance M. Hyde, 26 Washington U. Law Quarterly 468. (5) Appellants have a full, complete and adequate existing remedy aside from a declaratory judgment. 1 C.J.S. 1027, 1028, 1029 (Sec. 18 (d) (8)); O'Meara v. New York Life Ins. Co., 237 Mo. App. 409 , 169 S.W.2d 116 ; "Declaratory Judgments: Experience Under the Uniform Act," Laurance M. Hyde, 26 Washington U. Law Quarterly 468; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Jones, 344 Mo. 932 , 130 S.W.2d 945 . (6) The action is brought to try determinative issues of fact, instead of to obtain a declaration of legal rights and relationships. 1 C.J.S. 1031 (Sec. 18 (10)); Heller v. Shapiro, 208 Wis. 310 , 242 N.W. 174, 87 A.L.R. 1201; 16 American Jurisprudence 294, Sec. 20; "Declaratory Judgments: Experience Under the Uniform Act," Laurance M. Hyde, 26 Washington U. Law Quarterly 468. (7) A judgment in this case will not terminate uncertainty or insecurity for all the parties because the declaratory judgment sought is to enable a number of appellants to bring a suit for restitution. Sec. 1131, R.S. Mo. 1939; Declaratory Judgments, Anderson, p. 176; "Declaratory Judgments: Experience Under the Uniform Act," Laurance M. Hyde, 26 Washington U. Law Quarterly 468; 1 C.J.S. 1022. (8) There is a misjoinder of parties plaintiff and of causes of action. Declaratory Judgments, Anderson, p. 270; "Declaratory Judgments: Experience Under the Uniform Act," Laurance M. Hyde, 26 Washington U. Law Quarterly 468; 1 C.J.S. 1050 (Sec. 18 (14) (d) (bb)); State ex rel. v. Chicago Alton R. Co., 265 Mo. 646 , 178 S.W. 129; 47 C.J.S. 47 (Sec. 92 (3)).

Opinion of the Court

*745 GANTT, J.

Actiomfor judgment ruling void tax bills issued by the City of Concordia to pay for the construction of a sewer. The five plaintiffs sue for themselves and others similarly situated. Three of them (Kammeyer, Elevator Co. and Heitmeyer) have not paid the tax bills. Two of them (Lindemann and Hartwig) have paid the tax bills. Plaintiffs dismissed as to defendants Dickey Clay Mfg. Co. and the Commercial Bank of Lexington, Mo. The other defendants are the City of Concordia, • Walkenhorst, City Clerk, Herbert F. Duensing, Mayor, and George Duensing, Jr., brother of the mayor.

The W. P. A. furnished all labor and certain material for the construction of the sewer. The city furnished other material. It awarded to George Duensing, Jr., the contract to furnish said material.

In substance the amended petition alleged that the Duensings and others; unknown to plaintiffs, entered into a conspiracy to defraud the property owners affected by the construction of the sewer. It also alleged that said persons committed thirty-two fraudulent acts in carrying out the conspiracy. It prayed for a declaratory judgment ruling that the tax bills are void and for such other declaratory relief as may be proper.

Defendants’ demurrer to the petition was sustained. On plaintiffs’ refusal to further plead, the court dismissed the petition. Plaintiffs appealed. The amount .involved gives this court appellate jurisdiction.

The prayer of the petition proceeds on the theory that the action is under the declaratory judgment act. The prayer is not controlling. The facts alleged in the petition classify the action. Under said facts the action is in equity to cancel tax bills. The prayer *746 for a ruling that the tax bills are void does not limit the authority of the chancellor, who could and no doubt would, if he ruled the bills void, give full relief by cancellation.

Of course, payment cancels a tax bill. If cancelled, the bill no longer exists. Absent the bill, there is nothing to hold void and cancel. It follows that the plaintiffs Lindemann and Hartwig, having paid the tax bills against their property, are without interest in the particular controversy. If so, it must' be ruled that the demurrer was well taken as to said plaintiffs. The other plaintiffs may maintain a class suit for cancellation of the unpaid tax bills. [Ruckels et al. v. Pryor et al., 351 Mo. 819, 174 S. W. 2d 185.]

The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with directions to sustain the demurrer as to the plaintiffs Lindemann and Hartwig, and overrule the demurrer as to the other plaintiffs.

All concur.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.