State of Missouri v. Pierre Clay
State of Missouri v. Pierre Clay
Opinion of the Court
The State appeals the trial court’s holding that the right to bear arms set out in article I,-section 23 of the Missouri Constitution is violated by section 571.070.1,
The legislature has the authority to adopt laws, except when expressly prohibited by the constitution, and section 23 is
I. FACTUAL AND- PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Pierre Clay was stopped on January 26, 2015, for a traffic violation and found to possess a revolver. Police ran his record and arrested him after discovering he had a prior felony conviction. On February 25, 2015, Mr. Clay was charged by information with possession of marijuana in violation of section 195.202 and with unlawful possession of a firearm in violation of section 571.070.1(1). Section 571.070.1 prohibits persons previously convicted of a felony from possessing firearms, stating:
A person commits the crime of unlawful possession of a firearm if such person knowingly has any firearm in his or her possession and ... [sjuch person has been convicted of a felony under the laws of this state, or of a crime under the laws of any state or of the United States which, if committed within this state, would be a felony[.]
§ 571.070.1(1).
Mr. Clay does not deny that he comes within the scope of section 571.070.1 because he is a prior offender, having been convicted previously of the nonviolent felony of unlawful use of a weapon. But he moved to dismiss the unlawful possession charge, claiming that article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution prohibits the legislature from criminalizing his possession of a firearm. The trial court agreed and dismissed the, firearms possession count prior to issuance of this Court’s opinions in Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, and McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892. The State appeals. Because this appeal involves the validity of a state, statute, this Court has exclusive appellate jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 24.04(b)(1) permits a criminal defendant to raise “[a]ny defense or objection which is capable of determination without trial of the general issue ... before trial by motion.” “Whether a statute is constitutional" is reviewed de novo; Statutes are presumed constitutional and will be found unconstitutional only if they clearly contravene a constitutional provision.” State v. Vaughn, 366 S.W.3d 513, 517 (Mo. banc 2012) (internal citations omitted).
Ill ARTICLE I, SECTION 28, AS AMENDED, DOES NOT BAR REGULATION OF FIREARMS BY NONVIOLENT FELONS
Mr. Clay claims that article I, section 23, as amended in August 2014, bars the legis.-lature from regulating the possession of firearms by nonviolent felons. This Court disagrees.- The people of Missouri adopted Amendment 5 on August 5, 2014. Prior to that amendment, article I, section 23 of the Missouri Constitution stated:
That the right "of every citizen to keep and bear arms, in defense of his home, person, and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of-concealed weapons.
That the right of every citizen to keep and bear arms ammunition, and accessories typical to the normal function of such arms, in defense of his home, person, family and property, or when lawfully summoned in aid of the civil power, shall not be questioned; but this shall not justify the wearing of.concealed weapons. The rights guaranteed by this section shall be unalienable. Any restriction on these rights shall be subject to strict scrutiny and the state of Missouri shall be obligated to uphold these rights and shall under no circumstances decline to protect against their infringement. Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent .the general assembly from enacting general laws which limit the rights of convicted violent felons or those adjudicated by a court to be a danger to self or others as result of a mental disorder or mental inñrmity.
Art. I, sec. 23 (new language in bold italics, deleted language struck through).
A. The Pre-Amendment 5 Version of Article I, Section 23 Permitted Regulation of Firearms’Possession by Felons
This Court recently interpreted article I, section 23 in two cases: Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, and McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, The defendants in both' of those cases argued, as Mr. Clay argues here, that in authorizing the legislature to regu-íate the possession of firearms by violent felons, Amendment 5 must be read to prohibit the legislature from regulating the possession of firearms by nonviolent felons. This Court did, not-reach that issue in Merritt or McCoy because the crimes with which the defendants in those cases were charged occurred before the adoption of Amendment 5. This Court rejected those defendants’ argument that Amendment 5 applied retroactively and held that, to the contrary, the legislature’s authority to regulate firearms must be determined under the version of article I, section 23 that was in effect at the time of their crimes. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 810, 812; McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 893-95.
In both Merritt and McCoy, this Court further held that because cases such as District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637 (2008), and McDonald v. City of Chicago, Illinois, 561 U.S. 742, 791, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894 (2010), have recognized that the right to bear arms is a fundamental right, strict scrutiny must be used in analyzing the constitutionality of any regulation of that right. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812-13; McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 895-96.
While most commonly courts apply strict scrutiny by determining whether a law was narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest, in other cases, depending on the extent the regulation burdens a particular right, the courts look to whether a regulation imposes “reasonable, non-discriminatory restrictions” that serve “the State’s important regulatory interests” or whether the encroachment is “significant.”
Most important here, while Heller declined to'expressly determine which scrutiny level and test applied, it stated that whatever the level, its ruling “did not east doubt on such longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill.” Heller, 554 U.S. at 626-27, 128 S.Ct. 2783; accord, McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786,130 S.Ct. 3020.
While, unlike Heller and McDonald, Merritt and McCoy explicitly did apply strict scrutiny, they similarly held that it was unnecessary for 'them to determine which strict scrutiny test applies to the right to bear arms because section 571.070.1’s restriction on the possession of weapons by felons survives even the most stringent formulation of the strict scrutiny-standard in that it is narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 814; McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 897. The State has a compelling governmental interest in “ensuring public safety and reducing firearm-related crime .-.. [and] [prohibiting felons from possessing firearms is narrowly tailored' to
B. Amendment 5 did not Substantially Change the Right to Bear Anns
Mr. Clay- argues that the analysis in Merritt and McCoy does not apply here because the adoption of Amendment 5 worked a substantial change in article I, section 23 and that section how bars, any regulation of the right of nonviolent felons to possess firearms. This Court already rejected this argument in Dotson, 464 S.W.3d 190. The plaintiffs in Dotson argued that the ballot title for Amendment 5 was legally insufficient because it omitted any description of the language being added to the constitution concerning strict scrutiny, possession of ammunition and equipment, and ‘ other language and because it did -not inform the voter that the amendment substantially changed the laws regulating the right to bear arms.
Dotson rejected this argument precisely because it found that Amendment 5 did not substantially change article I, section 23 but rather 'simply set out “a declaration of the law as it would have been declared by this Court.after McDonald mandated that the fundamental right to bear arms applied to the states.” Id. at 192—93,. 197, n. 5, , While the ballot title did not detail all .of the additions to and deletions from article I, section 23, this Court found these details, were not central, features of the constitutional amendment and the language in Amendment 5 did not mislead voters into thinking they were adding a new right to the Constitution. The amendment, rather, was an expression or declaration of existing rights;, it simply enshrined the status quo as to the right to bear arms.
Article I, section 23 does not support this argument. It would have been simple for the people to include language in Amendment 5 prohibiting the legislature from regulating possession of firearms by nonviolent felons. The amendment could, for instance, have said, “The legislature is prohibited from regulating the. possession of firearms by nonviolent felons” or “The legislature may regulate the possession of firearms by violent felons and those adjudicated to have certain mental disorders but may not regulate the possession of firearms by others.” But, it did not. The amendment did not address nonviolent felons specifically in article I, section 23.
The only specific groups of citizens addressed by Amendment 5 are those who are “convicted violent felons or those adjudicated by a court to be a danger to self or others as a result of a mental disorder or mental infirmity.” Amendment 5 makes explicit that the clarification of the application of strict scrutiny and the - other changes adopted cannot be construed to prohibit regulation of arms by such persons. The amendment simply is silent as to others. This does not mean that regulation of the possession of arms by others is not permitted. Were that the case, the amendment would have been very short indeed and would not have needed to address the level of scrutiny to be applied to regulations of the right to bear arms, for there .could be no such regulation. Instead, Amendment 5 sets out the. standard of scrutiny for regulation of arms possessed by persons other than convicted violent felons and persons with certain mental disorders or infirmities—such regulations maybe adopted but will be subject to strict scrutiny.
This analysis follows not only from the language used in article I, section .23 as amended by Amendment 5 but also from general principles of constitutional construction.
[T]he Constitution is not a grant' but a restriction upon the powers of the legislature. Consequently, the General As-semblyhas the power to do whatéVer is necessary to perform its functions except as expréssly restrained by the Constitution. Deference due the General Assembly requires that doubt be resolved against nullifying its action if it is possible to do so by any reasonable construction of that action or by any reasonable construction of the Constitution.
Liberty Oil Co. v. Dir. of Revenue, 813 S.W.2d 296, 297 (Mo. banc 1991) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).
This Court reached a similar result in analyzing the previous version of article I, section 23 in Brooks v. State, 128 S.W.3d 844, 847-48 (Mo. banc 2004). At issue in Brooks was whether an act adopted by the legislature authorizing the wearing of concealed weapons violated the portion of the previous version of article- I, section 23, which stated that Missourians have the right to bear arms but “this shall not justify the wearing.of concealed weapons.” This Court held that this section did not
Similarly, here, Amendment 5 did not bar the General Assembly from adopting laws regulating possession of firearms by nonviolent felons. It does state that such laws are subject to strict scrutiny. “That strict scrutiny applies ‘says nothing about the ultimate validity of any particular law; that determination is the job of the court applying’ the standard.” Dotson, 464 S.W.3d at 197, citing Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 115 S.Ct. 2097,132 L.Ed.2d 158, (1995).
This Court already has subjected section 571.070.1 to strict scrutiny ill Merritt and McCoy and found that section 571.070.1 is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest in protection of the public. This Court already has determined in Dotson that Amendment 5 worked no substantial change' in article I, section 23. This Court here has clarified that the specific grant of authority in Amendment 5 to adopt laws regulating the possession of firearms by convicted violent felons does not affect the right of the legislature to adopt laws regulating the right of others to possess firearms where, as here, those laws pass strict scrutiny.
IV. CONCLUSION
Missouri’s constitution does not prohibit the' legislature from restricting nonviolent felons’ right to possess firearms. Section 571.070.1 survived strict scrutiny review under the prior version of article I, section 23, and this Court already has held that Amendment 5 did not substantially change article I, section 23. The statutory bar is valid. The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.
. Statutory citations are to RSMo Súpp. 2013 except where otherwise indicated.
. “The settled rule of construction in this state, applicable alike to the Constitutional and statutory provisions, is that, unless a different intent is evident beyond reasonable question, they are to be construed as having a prospective' operation only,”. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812 (internal citations omitted). As Amendment 5 does not spell out a clear and explicit intent to apply retroactively, the amendment applies prospectively only.- Mer ritt, 467 S.W.3d at 812; McCoy, 468 S.W.3d at 895.
. By contrast, the ■ United States Supreme Court in Heller and McDonald recognized that the right to bear arms is fundamental, but declined to identify the appropriate level of scrutiny of laws regulating the right to bear arms. See, e.g., Heller, 554 U.S, 570, 128 S.Ct. 2783, 171 L.Ed.2d 637; McDonald, 561 U.S. 742, 130 S.Ct. 3020, 177 L.Ed.2d 894.
. See, e.g., Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 505, 125 S.Ct. 1141, 160 L.Ed.2d 949 (2005) (racial classifications must be “narrowly tailored measures that further compelling government interests”); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342, 353, 92 S.Ct. 995, 31 L.Ed.2d 274 (1972) (durational residence laws must be “necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest”); and Kramer v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 627, 89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969) ("[I]f a challenged state statute grants the right to vote to some bona fide residents of requisite age and citizenship and denies the franchise to others, the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.”). Compare these statements of the test with Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434, 112 .S.Ct. 2059, 119 L.Ed.2d 245 (1992), which heid that "reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions” on the rights of voters are justified if “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify the restriction.” (internal quotation omitted). See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 504, 85 S.Ct. 1678, 14 L.Ed.2d 510 (1965) (White, J concurring) (“Where there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating. interest which is compelling. But, such statutes, if reasonably necessary for the effectuation of a legitimate and. substantial state interest, and not arbitrary or capricious in application, are not invalid, under the Due Process Clause.”) (internal citations omitted). See also Grutter, 539 U.S. at 326-21, 123 S.Ct. 2325 and Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237, 115 S.Ct. 2097, 132 L.Ed.2d 158 (1995) (strict scrutiny is not “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”); Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict .in Pact: An Empirical Analysis of Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 Vand. L. Rev! 793, 808 (2006).
. This Court rejects any suggestion-that for the law to survive strict scrutiny this Court must' in each case de novo reconsider and itself evaluate the strength of studies about the use of weapons by felons before it can . determine whether restrictions on the right of ■ felons to bear arms are sufficiently narrowly tailored. This Court very recently held that the law in question is narrowly tailored and is consistent with this country's tradition of limiting weapons in the hand of felons. No new evidence or changed law has been identified that calls for reevaluation of that determination.
. The ballot title asked voters, "[S]hall the Missouri Constitution be amended to include a declaration that the right to keep and bear arms is a [sic] unalienable right and that the state government is obligated to uphold that right?” Dotson, 464 S.W.3d at 196.
.For instance, Dotson held, over vigorous separate opinions addressing these very is- ■ sues—see 464 S,W.3d at 215-21 (Teitelman, J., dissenting); id. at 205-10 (Stith, J., concurring)—that the deletion of language regarding concealed weapons did not change the legislature's authority to regulate concealed . weapons that existed -prior to the amendment and that the addition of -the right to ammunition and accessories was not so material that its omission from the ballot title made it unfair or insufficient. Id. at 196-99. This Court further stated:
[T]he fact that this right [to bear arms] is "fundamental” from a legal perspective does not mean that it is improper for the voters to add a declaration that the right is "unalienable.” Similarly, the fact, that the state always has had the obligation to uphold and protect this right together with the rest of the constitution does not mean it is*537 improper for the voters to add a declaration that this is so.
Dotson, 464 S.W.3d at 200.
. Mr. Clay argues that article I, section 23 now requires a "robust” strict scrutiny review of any restriction on the right to bear arms because the word "unalienable” was added to the constitution. But the concept of inalienability is distinct from strict scrutiny review. No one suggests that the right to bear arms is alienable. The question here is whether preventing nonviolent felons from possessing firearms violates the inalienable right. Mr. Clay cites no case requiring a more robust review of. the right to bear arms because it is inalienable, and in any event, there is no more robust test than strict scrutiny.
Dissenting Opinion
The principal opinion holds that the section 571.070.1, RSMo Supp. 2013, ban on the possession of firearms by convicted felons is constitutional as applied to nonviolent felons because the restriction is narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest in public safety. The State certainly has a compelling interest in public safety. I respectfully dissent, however,
As the principal opinion notes, this Court recognized that under "the former version of article I, section 23, the right to bear arms was considered a fundamental right and that restrictions on that right were subject to strict scrutiny. State v. Merritt, 467 S.W.3d 808, 812-13 (Mo. banc 2015); State v. McCoy, 468 S.W.3d 892, 895-96 (Mo. banc 2015). McCoy and Merritt both held that the section 571.070.1 ban on the possession of firearms by felons was constitutional because it was narrowly tailored to accomplish the compelling state interest in ensuring public safety and reducing gun crime. Because Merritt and McCoy applied strict scrutiny and article I, section 23 now expressly requires strict scrutiny, the principal opinion concludes that Merritt and McCoy are dispositive of this case. The logic of this position is flawless, but the' conclusion is faulty. The problem is that the State never demonstrated that categorically and permanently restricting the fundamental constitutional right of nonviolent felons is narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state interest in public safety. There are at least-three deficiencies in the-argument that permanently abrogating the constitutional rights of nonviolent felons to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and their families is narrowly tailored to achieve the State’s compelling interest-in public safety.
I. The studies and data offered by the State are insufficient
To survive strict scrutiny, the statutory ban on the possession of firearms by convicted nonviolent felons must be narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest in public safety. . To determine whether section 571.070.1 is narrowly .tailored to prevent gun crimes, this Court must “look at what kinds of [gun crimes] have been shown to exist and what kinds of [gun crimes] the [firearms possession ban] will ameliorate.” Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 217 n. 27 (Mo. banc 2006) (holding .that provision requiring photo identification- to vote was not narrowly tailored to serve the compelling state interest in preventing voter fraud). The studies and data offered by the State do not demonstrate that permanently banning convicted nonviolent felons from possessing a firearm will ameliorate any gun crimes, whatsoever..
The State has provided very limited data indicating that convicted felons tend to commit more crimes than the general population. None of the studies, data or articles cited by the State differentiate between the rate and types of gun- crimes committed by those with no prior convictions relative to' individuals with prior nonviolent, or violent convictions. The, State does not show that any of the studies or
II. The ever-expanding scope of nonviolent felonies
The principal opinion asserts that “context ■ matters” when- courts apply strict scrutiny.. If context matters,, then this Court should consider the fact that the list .of.nonviolent and impersonal regulatory offenses is a long one and it.grows every year.
III. Improper Applications of Case Law
In Merritt and McCoy, this Court relied on State v. Eberhardt, 145 So.3d 377 (La. 2014), to support the conclusion that section 571.070.1 survives strict scrutiny. In this case, the State once again cites Eberhardt to support its argument that restricting the constitutional rights of nonviolent felons is narrowly tailored to serve the' interest in public safety. The statute at issue in Eber-hardt, which imposed a 10-year ban on firearms possession by individuals who committed specifically enumerated dangerous and potentially dangerous felonies was permissible even under strict scrutiny. The Eberhardt court reasoned that history, consensus, ■ and “simple common sense” were sufficient to demonstrate that the targeted firearms restriction survived strict scrutiny review. Id. at 385.
The problem is that the statute at issue in Eberhardt -is radically different .from section 571.070.1. First, unlike the categorical ban in section 571.070.1, the statute at issue in Eberhardt was narrowly tailored in that it banned the possession of ■firearms by dangerous felons. Given that the asserted State interest' is protecting the public from gun crime, it follows that a narrowly tailored restriction on constitutional gun rights will focus on those with a demonstrated propensity to engage in violent or dangerous offenses, which pose a risk to public safety. While delinquent taxpayers may disregard the law, one cannot plausibly assert that their conduct is evidence of a propensity to engage in conduct that poses a risk to public safety.
Second, unlike the permanent ban imposed by section 571.070.1, the Louisiana statute was further limited because it imposed a 10-year ban following completion of the sentence. In contrast, the ban imposed by section 571.070.1 is permanent. Accordingly, the young woman whose youthful impetuousness led her to place an illegal bet on a horse race will be, as a mature and. law-abiding citizen, forever barred from possessing a firearm for purposes of defending herself and her family. The statute at issue in Eberhardt was narrowly tailored because it contained additional, targeted criteria for assessing an individual’s propensity to engage in violent or dangerous behavior. The Louisiana statute is narrowly tailored because, unlike' section 571.070.1, it separates the murderers and rapists from the delinquent taxpayers and off-track bettors.
I would hold' that section 571.070.1, as applied to convicted nonviolent felons, violates-article T, section 23 of'the Missouri Constitutiort. '
. . It is instructive to compare the sparse justifications offered by the State in this case with the extensive and detailed record in cases where the government justified a policy that was-subject to strict scrutiny, For instance, in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 327, 123 S.Ct. 2325, 156 L.Ed.2d 304 (2003), the Supreme Court held that an áffirmative action policy in law school admissions was narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state, interest in obtaining educational benefits from a racially diverse student body. The record in Grutter included' academic studies and extensive ex- ' pert testimony ■ on both sides of -the issue. .This is not to say that strict scrutiny-is satisfied only when the State relies.on scientific studies and extensive expert testimony. But when, as in this case, the asserted State interest is preventing a specific social problem, strict scrutiny requires the State to demonstrate that its chosen method of restricting , fundamental constitutional rights is in fact narrowly tailored to achieve that purpose. At the very least, the State should be able to direct courts to facts that are relevánt'and reliable. ' ■ ’ '■
. For instance, the State cites a "study” that purports to show a “20% to 30%” reduction in risk" for unspecified later "criminal activity” dtle to the denial of "handgun purchases to convicted felons.” There is no indication of what "criminal activity” was reduced and, obviously, the study looked, at the denial of handgun purchases rather than a permanent and categorical ban on firearms possession by nonviolent felons, The authors of this study actually concede that the sample size was too small to determine "some potentially important differences in risk for later criminal activity” or whether the differences noted "occurred'by chance.”
.There are dozens upon dozens of .these types of nonviolent felony offenses. For instance, ' section 260.208 provides that an applicant for a p'ermit to operate a solid waste processing facility commits a class D felony by failing to notify the director of the department of natural resources that he or she has previously been convicted of an offense involving price-fixing or some other offense • related to the restraint-of trade. Section 143.1003 provides that one commits a class C felony by disclosing the name or address of contributors to the Missouri National Guard Trust Fund. Section 285.306 provides that an employee who fails to fill out a federal-tax withholding form commits a class-D felony. Section 313.660 makes it a class C felony to bet on k horse race while outside the enclosure of a licensed horse racing track.-• ■ " •
Reference
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- STATE of Missouri, Appellant, v. Pierre CLAY, Respondent
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