R.M.A., by his next friend, appeals the circuit court's judgment dismissing with prejudice his petition alleging Defendants, the Blue Springs R-IV School District ("School District") and the Blue Springs School District Board of Education ("School Board"), unlawfully discriminated against him on the grounds of his sex in violation of section 213.065 1 of the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA). Because R.M.A.'s petition alleges facts that (if taken as true, as required by the standard of review) establish the elements of a claim under section 213.065, the judgment of the circuit court is vacated, and the case is remanded. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 10, of the Missouri Constitution.

Background

In October 2014, R.M.A. filed a charge of discrimination with the Missouri Commission on Human Rights ("Commission") alleging he was discriminated against in a public accommodation on the grounds of his sex. In July 2015, the Commission issued a notice of right to sue, which terminated its administrative proceedings. Then, following an unsuccessful attempt to obtain relief via a writ of mandamus, 2 R.M.A. filed suit in October 2015 against the School District and the School Board (collectively, "Defendants"). R.M.A.'s petition alleges his "legal sex is male" and that, by denying him "access to the boys' restrooms and locker rooms," Defendants have discriminated against him in the use of a public accommodation "on the grounds of his sex" in violation of section 213.065.2.

In November 2015, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The motion asserts two grounds for dismissal: (1) the MHRA does not cover claims based on gender identity and (2) Defendants are not "persons" as defined by section 213.010(14) and used in section 213.065.2. From September 2015 through May 2016, both R.M.A. and Defendants made numerous filings with the circuit court regarding Defendants' motion to dismiss. Then, in June 2016, the circuit court sustained Defendants' motion to dismiss without explanation and entered judgment dismissing R.M.A.'s petition with prejudice. This timely appeal follows.

Analysis

Appellate courts review "a trial court's grant of a motion to dismiss ... de novo." Ward v. W. Cty. Motor Co., Inc., 403 S.W.3d 82 , 84 (Mo. banc 2013). "A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted is an attack on the plaintiff's pleadings." In re T.Q.L. , 386 S.W.3d 135 , 139 (Mo. banc 2012). "Such a motion is only a test of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's petition." Id. "When considering whether a petition fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, this Court must accept all properly pleaded facts as true, giving the pleadings their broadest intendment, and construe all allegations favorably to the pleader." Bromwell v. Nixon , 361 S.W.3d 393 , 398 (Mo. banc 2012). "The Court does not weigh the factual allegations to determine whether they are credible or persuasive." Id. "Instead, this Court reviews the petition to determine if the facts alleged meet the elements of a recognized cause of action...." Id. (quotation marks omitted).

Here, R.M.A. asserts he has stated a claim under section 213.065.2, which, in relevant part, provides: "It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person, directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person ... advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any place of public accommodation ... or to segregate or discriminate against any such person in the use thereof on the grounds of ... sex...." Therefore, the elements of a public accommodation sex discrimination claim under section 213.065 are:

(1) plaintiff is a member of a class protected by section 213.065;

(2) plaintiff was discriminated against in the use of a public accommodation (as defined by section 213.010); and

(3) plaintiff's status as a member of a protected class was a contributing factor 3 in that discrimination.

Cf. Midstate Oil Co., Inc. v. Mo. Comm'n on Human Rights , 679 S.W.2d 842 , 846 (Mo. banc 1984) (holding elements of an employment sex discrimination claim under section 213.055 are: "that complainant [ (1) ] was a member of a class protected by § 296.020.1; [ (2) ] that she was discharged; and [ (3) ] that a gender-related trait - pregnancy - was a factor in respondent's decision to discharge her").

As is often said, Missouri is a fact-pleading state. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-Am. Marine Supply Co. , 854 S.W.2d 371 , 379-80 (Mo. banc 1993). But the facts that must be pleaded are the ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. Scheibel v. Hillis , 531 S.W.2d 285 , 290 (Mo. banc 1976). Ultimate facts are those the jury must find to return a verdict for the plaintiff. Johnson v. Auto Handling Corp. , 523 S.W.3d 452 , 463 (Mo. banc 2017) (concluding "a not-in-MAI instruction must follow substantive law by submitting the ultimate facts necessary to sustain a verdict") (quotation marks and alteration omitted).

There is no Missouri Approved Instruction (MAI) for submitting a plaintiff's public accommodation claim under section 213.065 to a jury. But MAI 38.01(A), which applies to employment discrimination claims under section 213.055, can be made applicable with only minor modifications. Using MAI 38.01(A) as the starting point, therefore, a verdict director in this case would state (in substance if not in form):

Your verdict must be for plaintiff [R.M.A.] if you believe:

First, defendants [School District and School Board] denied plaintiff full and equal use and enjoyment of the males' restroom and locker room facilities at defendants' school, and

Second, plaintiff's male sex was a contributing factor in such denial, and

Third, as a direct result of such conduct, plaintiff sustained damage.

With these elements identified, the analysis required to resolve R.M.A.'s appeal is simple and straightforward. 4 This analysis, of course, requires a faithful application of the standard of review. See, e.g., In re T.Q.L. , 386 S.W.3d at 139 ("[T]his Court assumes that the allegations set forth are true and liberally grants the plaintiff reasonable inferences based on those allegations."). 5

The first element is the defendants denying the plaintiff "full and equal use and enjoyment" of a public accommodation. § 213.065.1. R.M.A. alleges Defendants have denied him (and, in 2015 when the petition was filed, were continuing to deny him) "access to the boys' restrooms and locker rooms." Petition at ¶ 31, R.M.A. v. Blue Springs School R-IV Dist. (No. 1516-CV20874) (Cir. Court Jackson County, Sept. 25, 2015). See also id. at ¶ 27 (alleging "Defendants refused to give R.M.A. access to the boys' locker room and restrooms when he requested such access while attending Delta Woods Middle School"); id. at ¶ 40 (alleging Defendants "refused to give him access to the boys' locker rooms"); id. at ¶ 42 (R.M.A. "has been required to use separate bathrooms from other boys on a daily basis and has been denied access to the boys' locker room if he wishes to participate in boys' P.E. or athletic activities."). A school's restrooms and locker rooms constitute public accommodations as defined in section 213.010(15)(e). 6 Thus, R.M.A.'s petition alleges facts sufficient to satisfy this first element.

The second element is the plaintiff's membership in a protected class. Section 213.065 protects the following classes: "race, color, religion, national origin, sex, ancestry, or disability," and the petition specifically alleges that "R.M.A.'s legal sex is male." Petition at ¶ 25. Accordingly, R.M.A.'s petition pleads facts sufficient to satisfy the second element. 7

The third element is that plaintiff's sex 8 was a contributing (or motivating) factor in the denial of his use of a public accommodation. § 213.065.2. R.M.A. alleges he was "discriminated against in his use of a public accommodation on the grounds of his sex." Petition at ¶ 50. See also id. at ¶ 35 ("Defendants have discriminated and continue to discriminate against Plaintiff R.M.A. based on his sex."); id. at ¶ 43 ("Plaintiff received different and inferior access to public facilities because of his sex."). As a result, R.M.A.'s petition pleads sufficient facts to satisfy the third element. 9

The fourth, and last, element is damages. R.M.A. alleges that, as "a direct result of the unlawful conduct of Defendants ..., Plaintiff R.M.A. has suffered damages." Id. at ¶ 51. This is sufficient to meet the fourth element.

This same simple and straightforward analysis has also been utilized in federal court. For instance, in Wrightson v. Pizza Hut of Am., Inc. , 99 F.3d 138 (4th Cir. 1996), the plaintiff, a heterosexual male, alleged "his homosexual male supervisor and other homosexual male employees at Pizza Hut subjected him to a 'hostile work environment' in violation of Title VII." Id. at 139 . The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim, and the plaintiff appealed. Id. at 139 . The Fourth Circuit reversed, and in doing so held:

[W]hile it is true Title VII does not afford a cause of action for discrimination based upon sexual orientation, Wrightson does not allege that he was discriminated against because he is heterosexual. He specifically alleges in his complaint that he was discriminated against "because of his sex, male." The unequivocal allegation that he was discriminated against "because of his sex," which, for purposes of Rule 12(b)(6) must be accepted as true, is alone sufficient to withstand Pizza Hut's motion to dismiss [.] Of course, even had Wrightson alleged that he was discriminated against both because he was heterosexual and because he was male, he would still state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). [A] cause of action lies even though the discrimination against the employee is not "solely" because of the employee's sex, as long as the employee's sex was a cause of the discrimination.

Id. at 143-44 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).

The same is true here. R.M.A.'s petition alleges he is a member of a protected class, he was discriminated against in the use of a public accommodation, his status as a member of a protected class was the basis for the discrimination he suffered, and he sustained damages, as required by section 213.065. At this stage of the proceedings, that is all that is required of R.M.A; therefore, the circuit court should have overruled Defendants' motion to dismiss.

Defendants also argue that, even if the Court finds they engaged in impermissible discrimination on the grounds of sex, they cannot be held liable under section 213.065 because neither Defendant is a "person" under the MHRA. This Court disagrees.

Section 213.065.2 provides: "It is an unlawful discriminatory practice for any person , directly or indirectly, to refuse, withhold from or deny any other person ... any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, services, or privileges made available in any place of public accommodation ... on the grounds of ... sex." (Emphasis added.) The definition of the term "person," as used in chapter 213, is set forth in section 213.010(14), which provides a person "includes one or more individuals, corporations, partnerships, associations, organizations, labor organizations, legal representatives, mutual companies, joint stock companies, trusts, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, receivers, fiduciaries, or other organized groups of persons."

Defendants assert that, because section 213.010(14) does not specifically list "school district," "school board," or, more generally, a "subdivision" of the state, neither of them is a "person" as defined in section 213.010(14) and used in section 213.065. 10 This argument fails because the definition of "person" in section 213.010(14) expressly states that it " includes " the individuals and entities listed therein, not that it is limited to them. The state and its political subdivisions need not be explicitly listed to be encompassed in a statute if "an intention to include them is clearly manifest, as where they are expressly named therein, or included by necessary implication." Carpenter v. King , 679 S.W.2d 866 , 868 (Mo. banc 1984). That is the case here. ( Cf. § 1020(12), RSMo 2016.)

"The provisions of a legislative act are not read in isolation but construed together, and if reasonably possible, the provisions will be harmonized with each other." Bachtel v. Miller Cty. Nursing Home Dist., 110 S.W.3d 799 , 801 (Mo. banc 2003) . "In determining the intent and meaning of statutory language, the words must be considered in context and sections of the statutes in pari materia , as well as cognate sections, must be considered in order to arrive at the true meaning and scope of the words." State ex rel. Evans v. Brown Builders Elec. Co., 254 S.W.3d 31 , 35 (Mo. banc 2008) (quotation marks omitted). The MHRA's protections against discrimination in access to public accommodations plainly extend to accommodations owned by the state or its subdivisions . See, e.g., § 213.010(15)(e) (providing a "public accommodation" includes "Any public facility owned ... by or on behalf of this state or any agency or subdivision thereof...."). 11 And the MHRA plainly prohibits discrimination by the state or its subdivisions on the basis of sex. 12 See § 213.070 ("It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice ... (3) For the state or any political subdivision of this state to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, [or] sex...."). Accordingly, the state and its subdivisions - including the School District and the School Board - are "persons" as defined by section 213.010(14) and used in section 213.065.

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the circuit court is vacated, and the case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Draper, Russell, Breckenridge and Stith, JJ., concur; Fischer, C.J., dissents in separate opinion filed; Powell, J., concurs in opinion of Fischer, C.J.

DISSENTING OPINION

Zel M. Fischer, Chief Justice

I respectfully dissent. The principal opinion holds the analysis is simple and straightforward: the circuit court erred by dismissing R.M.A.'s petition because he alleges his legal sex is male and that Defendants discriminated based on his sex. This analysis is simple and straightforward, but it is also incorrect. R.M.A. alleged he is a biological female whose legal sex is male. R.M.A. alleged Defendants discriminated unlawfully by barring him from the boys' restrooms and locker room because he "is transgender and is alleged to have female genitalia." The MHRA prohibits sex discrimination and does not bar discrimination based on transgender status. The petition, therefore, fails to state a claim of unlawful sex discrimination under the MHRA. The judgment should be affirmed. 1

Standard of Review

When reviewing a judgment dismissing a petition for failure to state a claim, all allegations in the petition are assumed to be true and are construed in favor of the plaintiff. Metropolitan St. Louis Sewer Dist. v. City of Bellefontaine Neighbors , 476 S.W.3d 913 , 915 (Mo. banc 2016). "If the petition sets forth any set of facts that, if proven, would entitle the plaintiffs to relief, then the petition states a claim." Id. (internal quotation omitted).

R.M.A.'s Petition

R.M.A. alleged he "is a female to male transgender teenager who was born as a female child and transitioned to living as male" while in the fourth grade. R.M.A. alleged Defendants unlawfully discriminated "based on his sex." Specifically, R.M.A. alleged Defendants prevented him from using the boys' restrooms and locker room because he "is transgender and is alleged to have female genitalia."

When assessing whether a petition states a cause of action, all allegations are taken as true. The principal opinion takes some allegations as true, while ignoring those contradicting its preferred conclusion. The principal opinion takes as true R.M.A.'s allegation that his "legal sex is male" while ignoring R.M.A.'s allegation he is a biological female who has "transitioned to living as a male." Similarly, the principal opinion notes R.M.A. alleged discrimination "based on his sex" while ignoring his allegation Defendants discriminated against him because he "is transgender and is alleged to have female genitalia." Taking all of R.M.A.'s allegations as true, the petition alleges Defendants engaged in unlawful discrimination by barring R.M.A., a biological female who transitioned to living as a male and self-identifies as male, from using the boys' restrooms and locker room because he is transgender. By focusing on R.M.A.'s allegation that his "legal sex" is male while ignoring the allegation he is biologically female who transitioned to living as a male and self-identifies as male, the principal opinion implicitly, and without analysis, incorrectly extends the MHRA beyond biological sex to include claims of discrimination based on transgender status. 2

The MHRA prohibits discrimination on grounds of biological sex

"This Court's primary rule of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent as reflected in the plain language of the statute at issue." Laut v. City of Arnold , 491 S.W.3d 191 , 205 (Mo. banc 2016) (internal quotations omitted). When the plain language and legislative intent are clear, this Court is bound by the statutory language. Goerlitz v. City of Maryville , 333 S.W.3d 450 , 455 (Mo. banc 2011). "This Court must enforce statutes as written, not as they might have been written." City of Wellston v. SBC Commc'ns, Inc. , 203 S.W.3d 189 , 192 (Mo. banc 2006).

Section 213.065.2 of the MHRA prohibits discrimination in any place of public accommodation "on the grounds of ... sex." The MHRA does not define the word "sex." When there is no statutory definition, the plain and ordinary meaning of a statutory term can be derived from the dictionary. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Dir. of Revenue , 438 S.W.3d 397 , 400 (Mo. banc 2014).

The word "sex" means "one of the two divisions of [organisms] esp. human beings respectively designated male or female." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2081 (1993). It also means the "sum of morphological, physiological, and behavioral peculiarities of living beings that subserves biparental reproduction with its concomitant genetic segregation and recombination ... that is typically manifested as maleness or femaleness." Id. Additionally, the word "sex" refers to "the sphere of interpersonal behavior esp. between male and female," the "phenomena of sexual instincts and their manifestations," and "determin[ing] the sex of an organic being." Id. Each of these definitions is premised either directly or indirectly on "sex" as a biological classification of individuals as male or female. None of these definitions state or imply the word "sex" is defined by the fact a person self-identifies as one sex or the other or has transitioned to living as a member of the opposite sex. The plain, ordinary meaning of the word "sex" refers to the biological classification of individuals as male or female. 3 The MHRA, therefore, prohibits discrimination based on the biological classifications of male or female and does not extend to the separate concept of transgender status. Cf. Pittman v. Cook Paper Recycling Corp. , 478 S.W.3d 479 , 482 (Mo. App. 2015) (holding the "clear meaning" of the phrase "discrimination because of ... sex" refers only to discrimination based on the fact the plaintiff is male or female and does not extend to claims of discrimination based on sexual orientation). 4 The Petition Fails to State a Claim

To determine whether R.M.A.'s petition states a claim of unlawful sex discrimination under the MHRA, this Court must determine whether the petition invokes "principles of substantive law [that] may entitle the plaintiff to relief." Lynch v. Lynch , 260 S.W.3d 834 , 836 (Mo. banc 2008) (internal quotation omitted). The substantive principles of law within the MHRA define the word "sex" as biological sex. Consequently, the petition survives a motion to dismiss only if it alleges that, as a biological female, R.M.A. was deprived of a public accommodation available to biological males.

R.M.A. makes no such allegation. Instead, R.M.A. alleges he is a female who has transitioned to living as a male, and that the Defendants discriminated against him based on his sex by preventing him from using the boys' restrooms and locker room. R.M.A. does not allege that, as a biological female, he was barred from any public accommodation afforded to biological males. Instead, R.M.A.'s allegation of discrimination distills to an acknowledgement that the Defendants excluded him from the boys' restrooms and locker room because he is biologically female. If, as the principal opinion reasons, the relevant allegation is that R.M.A.'s "legal sex" is male, 5 then the majority will have ignored the crux of the petition while discarding the substance of the MHRA. The logical upshot is that the majority is presumably willing to hold the MHRA prohibits schools from maintaining separate restrooms and locker rooms for male and female students. The alternative, of course, is to accept all of R.M.A.'s allegations as true, apply the plain language of the MHRA, and hold R.M.A.'s petition fails to state a claim of sex discrimination.

It is not this Court's role to "question the wisdom, social desirability, or economic policy underlying a statute as these are matters for the legislature's determination." Turner v. Sch. Dist. of Clayton , 318 S.W.3d 660 , 668 (Mo. banc 2010) (internal quotations omitted). Rather, this Court's role is to declare the meaning of the language used in the MHRA consistent with legislative intent. 6 The General Assembly has spoken, and R.M.A.'s petition fails to state a claim of unlawful sex discrimination under the MHRA. The principal opinion errs in concluding otherwise. The judgment should be affirmed.