Susan F. Bridegan v. Gary L. Turntine

SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc

SUSAN F. BRIDEGAN, ) Opinion issued June 27, 2023

) Appellant, ) )

v. ) No. SC99700

)

GARY L. TURNTINE, )

) Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JACKSON COUNTY

The Honorable John M. Torrence, Judge Susan Bridegan (“Bridegan”) filed a lawsuit in the Jackson County circuit court, alleging she suffered injuries as the result of a motor vehicle accident with Gary Turntine (“Turntine”). At the time of the accident, Bridegan was an uninsured motorist prohibited from collecting noneconomic damages pursuant to section 303.390. 1 Bridegan challenged the constitutional validity of this provision, claiming its bar to her recovering noneconomic damages violates her right to a jury trial as protected by article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court repeatedly rejected Bridegan’s argument. Bridegan appeals, and this Court has jurisdiction pursuant to article V, section 3 of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

Background

In April 2019, Bridegan and Turntine were involved in a collision when Turntine ran a red light near the intersection of Main Street and Interstate 49 in Grandview, Missouri. Bridegan filed her Petition in October 2019 alleging that, as a result of the accident, she suffered injuries to her head and spine, pain and suffering, and mental anguish. In his Answer, Turntine asserted, as an affirmative defense, that section 303.390 bars Bridegan from collecting noneconomic damages, i.e., damages for pain and suffering and mental anguish, because she was an “uninsured motorist” 2 at the time of the accident. which the alleged tortfeasor: (1) operated the vehicle under the influence; (2) was convicted of involuntary manslaughter; or (3) was convicted of second-degree assault. § 303.390.1. Additionally, the prohibition does not apply to passengers of the uninsured motorist involved in the accident. § 303.390.5.

Bridegan moved to strike Turntine’s affirmative defense, arguing section 303.390 violated her right to trial by jury protected by article I, section 22(a) of the Missouri Constitution. The circuit court overruled Bridegan’s motion and subsequent motion for reconsideration. The parties then mutually agreed to proceed to a bench trial. At the beginning of trial, Bridegan once again renewed her motion to strike Turntine’s affirmative defense as unconstitutional, and the circuit court once again overruled her motion. Bridegan then asked the circuit court to find Turntine liable and award her $10,737 for medical bills incurred as a result of the accident. 3 Bridegan did not offer evidence of noneconomic damages or ask the circuit court to make a finding that she had, in fact, sustained such damages or in what amount. In June 2022, the circuit court entered judgment in favor of Bridegan, awarded her economic damages for her medical bills, but again overruled her renewed motion to strike Turntine’s affirmative defense regarding section 303.390. 4 Bridegan timely appealed.

Standard of Review

“This Court reviews constitutional challenges de novo.” Lewellen v. Franklin, 441 S.W.3d 136, 143 (Mo. banc 2014). “A statute is presumed valid and will not be held unconstitutional unless it clearly contravenes a constitutional provision.” Rentschler v. Nixon, 311 S.W.3d 783, 786 (Mo. banc 2010). As the challenger, Bridegan has the burden of proving section 303.390 “clearly and undoubtedly contravenes the [Missouri] [C]onstitution.” United C.O.D. v. State, 150 S.W.3d 311, 313 (Mo. banc 2004).

Analysis

This Court need not address Bridegan’s constitutional argument challenging the validity of section 303.390 because she failed to preserve that question for appellate review. To properly preserve a constitutional question, the party seeking to raise the question must:

(1) raise the constitutional question at the first available opportunity; (2) designate specifically the constitutional provision claimed to have been violated, such as by explicit reference to the article and section or by quotation of the provision itself; (3) state the facts showing the violation; and (4) preserve the constitutional question throughout for appellate review.

Id.

Here, Bridegan followed the first three steps. First, she raised the question at her earliest opportunity by moving to strike Turntine’s affirmative defense shortly after he filed his Answer. Second, Bridegan specifically invoked article I, section 22(a) in her motion as the constitutional provision she claims section 303.390 violates, and she cited the relevant cases from this Court bearing on that question. Finally, Bridegan alleged in her motion the facts she believes demonstrate this alleged violation.

Even though Bridegan plainly complied with the first three steps, she just as plainly failed to “preserve the constitutional question throughout for appellate review.” Id. (emphasis added). Bridegan argues she did so by presenting this issue in her motion to strike and at other times leading up to, during, and after trial. This is true, but Bridegan fails to account for her waiver of the right to a jury trial and the effect this had on the preservation of her claim that section 303.390 violates that same right.

Bridegan does not dispute she waived her right to a jury trial, nor could she. This Court has said “[t]he right to a jury trial in a civil action for damages is a personal right that may be waived,” and section 510.190.2 “sets forth the exclusive methods of waiver.” Holm v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., 514 S.W.3d 590, 600 (Mo. banc 2017) (emphasis omitted). Section 510.190.2 states a party may waive the right to a jury trial by: “(1) [] failing to appear at the trial; (2) [] filing with the clerk written consent in person or by attorney; (3) [] oral consent in court, entered on the minutes; [and] (4) [] entering into trial before the court without objection.” Bridegan does not dispute she consented to a bench trial in open court during a July 2021 case management conference. In doing so, she waived her constitutional right to a jury trial and is bound by that waiver. As a result of that waiver, Bridegan necessarily abandoned her claim that section 303.190 violated that same right. 5 Accordingly, this Court declines to reach the merits of whether section 303.390 violates article I, section 22(a). 6

Conclusion

For the reasons set forth above, the judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.

___________________________________ Paul C. Wilson, Chief Justice

Russell, Powell, Breckenridge, Fischer and Ransom, JJ., concur; Draper, J., dissents without opinion.