Office of the Attorney General v. Jimenez
Office of the Attorney General v. Jimenez
Opinion of the Court
OPINION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 29, 1988 the Government filed various Petitions for Order to Show Cause why respondents, 15 nonresident contract workers from the Philippines, should not be deported.
At the deportation hearing, the trial court found the respondents deportable and gave them 30 days to voluntarily leave the Commonwealth. Respondents appealed.
In this opinion, we construe and harmonize various Commonwealth statutes governing jurisdiction over the status of nonresident workers and jurisdiction over their deportation. We reverse an order of the trial court requiring the deportation of the 15 nonresident workers who are the respondents in the instant case.
FACTS
Respondents/appellants ("the workers") came to Saipan to work for 3-K Corporation ("the employer"). The employer had entered a standard form of "Employer's Nonresident Worker Agreement" with the Division of Labor covering the employment. The workers were issued, entry permits by the Division of Labor, which bore an expiration date in late June, 1988.
On January 26, 1988, the workers filed a complaint against the employer with the Division of Labor seeking back wages and claiming unauthorized wage deductions. Also, on that same date, the employer issued a "Letter of Termination" to
The workers' complaint was investigated by an Administrative Hearing Officer with the Division of Labor. On Feoruary 8, 1988 the Hearing Officer issued a "Labor Order" concerning the complaint. In 'large measure, it found against the workers. It also contained language to the effect that the workers should be allowed to continue working for the employer. The workers appealed the Labor Order to the Director of Commerce and Labor who heads the Division of Labor. On March 8, 1988, the Director remanded the matter for a departmental hearing, finding that no prior hearing within the Department of Commerce and Labor had been conducted in the matter as required by law. The Director therefore concluded that any prior decision or order issued by anyone within the Department was "issued erroneously." No hearing within the Department pursuant to the Director's remand was ever held because of the deportation order issued by the Commonwealth Trial Court as described below.
On February 29, 1988, while the aforesaid departmental appeal was pending, and before the Director's March 8, 1988 remand order was issued, the Immigration and Naturalization Office ("INO") filed petitions in the Commonwealth Trial Court that the workers show cause why they should not be deported on
Counsel for the workers argues that the trial court's deportation order is void because the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter it. Counsel contends that INO may not institute deportation proceedings against a nonresident worker based upon the purported termination of that worker's employment, and the Commonwealth Trial Court may not act upon such a deportation petition, unless there has been a final determination by the Division of Labor in the Department of Commerce and Labor that the worker's employment contract has been terminated and his work permit has been revoked.
For reasons which are not clear to us, the workers' attorney goes on to make a constitutional argument that seems off the point. He attacks the validity of 3 CMC §§ 4434(f), 4434(g) and 4447(g). Those sections make a nonresident worker deportable whenever he has left his employment or is no longer employed by the employer approved by the Chief of Labor. They
We will dispose of counsel's constitutional claim first. Respondents have no standing to contest the validity of the statutory sections being attacked because none of them have filed any civil action. For reasons stated below, we have determined to reverse the deportation order entered by the Commonwealth Trial Court in the instant case. It is thus unnecessary for us to decide the constitutional challenge, even if standing, arguendo, exists. We decline to consider the constitutional claim.
ISSUE
I. WHETHER THE IMMIGRATION OFFICE CAN INSTITUTE DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS AGAINST A NONRESIDENT WORKER BASED UPON THE TERMINATION OF THAT WORKER'S EMPLOYMENT PRIOR TO A FINAL DETERMINATION BY THE DIVISION OF LABOR THAT THE WORKER'S EMPLOYMENT CONTRACT HAS BEEN TERMINATED AND HIS OR HER WORK PERMIT REVOKED.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Respondents' arguments involving jurisdiction of the trial court raise issues of law. Conclusions of law are reviewed by the appellate court ¿e novo. United States v. Endicott, 803 F.2d 506, 508 (9th Cir. 1986).
Initially, any employer who desires to utilize the survices of nonresident workers must notify the Chief of Labor (the "Chief").
After the employment contract is approved by the Chief, the employer must post a bond. 3 CMC § 4435(a). After receiving evidence of the bond and payment of the required fees, 'the Director shall issue a certificate to be used for both labor and immigration purposes (the "certificate"). 3 CMC §§ 4412(c) and 4435(b). Such certificate shall be forwarded to the immigration authorities for immigration clearance. 3 CMC § 4435(b). Upon receipt of the certificate, the immigration authorities shall issue the appropriate entry documents or state in writing their reasons for denying such. 3 CMC § 4435.
Appeals of such administrative hearings shall be made to the Director. 3 CMC § 4445(a). The Director's decision shall constitute final action for purposes of judicial review. 3 CMC § 4445(c).
In this case, the workers were ordered deported pursuant to 3 CMC § 4340(e) which provides that an alien may be deported for failure to comply with the requirements or conditions of his entry. The trial court found that the workers failed to comply with their conditions of entry since they were no longer employed by 3-K Corporation.
At the deportation hearing/ testimony indicated that the Division of Labor does not view a letter of termination given to a nonresident worker by an employer as determinative of his employment status. See, testimony of Jack Torresf Excerpts of Record page 10, and Felix Fitial, Excerpts pages 19 and 20. Prior to the deportation hearing no administrative determination had been made as to the workers' employment status.
3 CMC S 4444(e)(5) provides that, after a hearing, the Chief may transfer a nonresident worker to another employer with the consent of the worker and the new employer. Since there was no administrative hearing prior to the deportation proceedings, the Chief was precluded from exercising this option to transfer the workers. Had he done so, the workers would have remained in compliance with their entry permits and would not have been deportable under 3 CMC § 4340(e).
The procedures established for the entry and exit of nonresident workers are different from those established for other types of aliens. Prior to entry into the Commonwealth all nonresident labor contracts must be approved by the Chief. 3 CMC § 4434. Cancellation of this contract, for whatever reason, must be done pursuant to a hearing. 3 CMC § 4444(e).
Before a nonresident worker ' can pass through immigration, a certificate must be issued by the Director. 3 CMC § 4435(b). INO cannot admit a nonresident worker prior to the
In this case, there is no evidence that the Chief either cancelled or modified the .workers' certificates to result in the termination of their employment. 3 CMC § 4444(f). The cancellation of the respondents' nonresident worker's certificates was a prerequisite to having their employment terminated, A hearing was necessary to determine their employment status. Since no hearing occurred in this instance, as a matter of law the workers had not been terminated at the time of the deportation hearing.
Appellee contends that INO had an absolute right pursuant to 3 CMC § 4447(g) to institute deportation proceedings without going through any administrative process in situations where nonresident workers are found working for son,jone other than their authorized employer. This argument is neither pertinent nor logical. First of all, INO sought to have the workers deported because they had allegedly been terminated by their employer, not because they were working for someone else. Secondly, the trial judge found that the workers were deportable by virtue of "their refusal to return to their employment" which constituted "a termination thereof." Despite appellee's contention to the contrary, the trial court clearly did not order deportation pursuant to 3 CMC § 4447(g).
The INO sought to deport respondents because their respective, employment contracts had been cancelled. The trial court found that respondents' employment, contracts had been terminated. However, any cancellation of a nonresident' workers' contract of employment must be made in the first instance by the Division of-Labor. 3 CMC § 4444 (e). Since primary jurisdiction in this case lies with the Division of Labor and respondents' administrative remedies were not exhausted, th'e trial court was without authority to find respondents deportable based on their employment status. Therefore, the decision of the trial court is hereby REVERSED.
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The Chief is under the supervision of the Director of Commerce & Labor (the "Director”). 3 CMC § 4421.
The Chief may authorize an exemption from this section with the approval of the Director. 3 CMC § 4440(a).
Reference
- Full Case Name
- OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL and THE OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION OF THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE NORTHERN MARIANA ISLANDS v. MARTIN P. JIMENEZ, MARCELINO UTAYDE, RICARDO RESTOLES, DANILO MENDOZA, NICOLAS C. DE LEON, ROLANDO QUIROZ, LEONARDO SALVADOR, CONSTANTE B. BAJET, ALFREDO G. TARVINA, GONZALO R. REYES, EFREN MUNAR, EMILIO S. VILLANUEVA, JR., ALEJO C. CAPUGAN, JESUS MAGNO, and LORENZO G. VILLANUEVA
- Status
- Published