Estes v. Spain
Estes v. Spain
Opinion of the Court
This cause is submitted to the court upon bill, answers, exhibits, and proofs, from which the following facts appear:
S. H. Gunter, a merchant of the town of Sardis, in this state, was, on the twenty-fifth day of March, 1882, largely indebted to the complainants, and other merchants,—a number of whom are made defendants to the bill,—and on that day executed a deed of general assignment, purporting to convey all
The answers deny that the assignment was made in good faith, and is a valid and legal transfer of the property and assets therein conveyed for the purposes expressed, as against the defendants, who were creditors of the assignor before the assignment was made, and deny that complainants are entitled to the relief prayed for in their bill. The question of the validity of the assignment is the main question to be determined. If there is any provision on tho face of the assignment, or if there is any provision wanting in it, which renders it fraudulent and void in law, or if the facts as shown by the evidence show a purpose on the part of the granter to reserve a benefit to himself, or to hinder or delay his creditors, or any of them, in the collection of their debts, then the assignment must be declared fraudulent and void and the hill dismissed. As the debt due complainants is an antecedent debt, under the well-settled rule in this state, they or the assignee do" not occupy the position of a bona fide purchaser without notice; so that if the assignment is fraudulent and void for any reason, as against the grantor, the beneficiaries under it can take nothing by it.
It has been held by the supreme court of this state in the case of Mayer v. Shields & Mulhallan, 59 Miss. 107, and by this court in the recent case of Bickham & Moore v. Lake & Austin, that, whenéver, in-a general deed of assignment by an insolvent debtor, it is required that something must be done by the debtor in order to participate in the funds, that a reasonable time, not too long nor too short, must be given, in which to. do the thing required to be done, and that the want of such a provision will enable the assignee to unduly postpone the distribution to the hinderanceand delayof the creditors, and thereby render the assignment in law fraudulent and void. In this case nothing is required of the omitted creditors to be done in order to participate in the funds to be distributed, and it is a matter of some doubt whether this defect alone renders the conveyance void; but these omissions are circumstances to be taken in connection with the proof in the cause to determine whether or not there existed fraud, in fact, in the execution of the assignment. The assignment further provides that if any property or debts have been inadvertently or by mistake omitted, the assignees shall place them upon the proper schedules; and this, it is claimed, renders the assignment vqid. The indebtedness mentioned means the debts due to the assignor, and not those due by him, and this provision was right and proper, and could not in any way prejudice the.'creditors; but the contrary.
If all this was fair, it might have been explained by the testimony of Mrs. Gunter. She was present when her husband’s deposition was taken; yet she was not examined. The rule is that the transactions between husband and wife are to be strictly scrutinized, and if there are oven slight circumstances going to impeach the bona fules of the transaction, the burden of proof is thrown upon those claiming under it, to establish the fairness and validity of the transaction. Coupled with this is the rule that when suspicious circumstances are shown against the fairness of the transaction, and the party required to explain it, if fair, fails to produce proof to establish its fairness, the presumption is that the transaction was unfair, or that it is to be taken against its fairness. This rule applies to the facts of this case with ño little force. Notwithstanding the assignor in his testimony refers to the records of the courts in Alabama and in this state, it was the duty of the complainants to produce the proof, and not that of the defendants to disprove it. As part of the same scheme to dispose of all his means, the assignor disposed of part in the payment of what was due his clerks. This he had a right to do, as well as to pay a bona fide debt due his wife. The only question in either case is, was the debt due and owing, and that received for it reasonable in value, and the payment made in good faith and free from fraud? The proof further shows that upon the same night that the assignment was executed, acknowledged, and delivered to the clerk for record, there was another deed executed by the assignor in the form of a deed of trust, for the declared purpose of securing his sureties upon a note due to the Bank of Sardis for $1,000. This deed being executed, evidently, as part of the same purpose and scheme of an entire disposition of his means by the assignor, and as the assignment provided for the payment of the same debt as a preferred claim, and also embraces the same property conveyed in the trust deed, subject to the provisions of the trust deed, the two instruments must be •considered together, and the trust deed, under the circumstances of
The liability of the sureties was on an antecedent debt to the bank. There was no new consideration to sustain it. The grantor was then hopelessly insolvent, and at the time of its execution was then in the act of transferring all of his property and assets of every description. The conveyance provided that the grantor should retain possession of the property until the maturity of the debt, which did not take place until December 1, 1882, and not until the beneficiaries in the trust deed should request the trustee to take possession of the property conveyed, and sell the same. Unless the property should become endangered as a security for the indebtedness, when the trustee might take possession of it and hold it until the debt and costs were paid, or the property was sold, but until possession should be demanded by the trusteee, the grantor should hold the same subject to the trust deed. If this had been a general assignment, this reservation of the use of the property would unquestionably gender it fraudulent in law. The assignment conveys the same property to secure the same debt, as a preferred debt, but subject to this trust deed. According to the trust deed a sale could not take place until the first of December, 1882, and not then until the trustee was notified in writing by the beneficiaries to take possession of: and sell the property, unless there was danger of its being lost; and, as the property is real estate and immovable, it is difficult to see how this contingency could arise; and, in the mean time, the^grantor was to hold and enjoy the use of the property. It is difficult to determine that this delay would not have the effect of hindering and delaying Gunter’s other creditors; and were this all that is in the case, I am of opinion it would establish the fraudulent character of the conveyance. It will not do to say that the property might have been sold subject to the trust deed, for in that event the value of the interest sold would be too uncertain for the purchaser to pay any but a small sum.
But the complainants allege in their bill that the conveyance was made in good faith and free from all fraud, and claim affirmative relief. This allegation is denied under oath by the answer, and throws the burden of establishing the averment upon complainants. To grant to complainants all that they here claim, that is, that the conveyance is prima facie valid, and free from fraud; yet, when circumstances are proved casting a doubt upon the validity of the conveyance, the burden is thrown upon the complainants to establish its fairness and freedom from fraud. When all the circumstances already stated, arid others shown from the proof, are considered, occuring before and at the time of the execution of this assignment, I am satisfied that the conveyance must be held as fraudulent and void, and. that complainants are not entitled to any relief under their bill.
The result is that the injunction heretofore granted must ^>e dissolved, and the bill dismissed, at complainants’, cost.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Estes and others v. Spain and others
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published