Papin v. Univ. of Miss. Med. Ctr.
Cases that cite this one
7 later published cases cite this decision.
- Cordova v. Louisiana State University Health Science Center (District Court, W.D. Louisiana 2020)
- Decou-Snowton v. Jefferson Parish (United States District Court Eastern District of Louisiana 2022)
- Doe v. University of Mississippi (District Court, S.D. Mississippi 2023)
- Brookwood Development, LLC v. City of Ridgeland, Mississippi (District Court, S.D. Mississippi 2023)
- Doe v. University of Texas Health Science Center at Houston (District Court, S.D. Texas 2021)
- Cordova v. Louisiana State University Health Science Center (District Court, W.D. Louisiana 2020)
- Anita S. Gutierrez (United States Bankruptcy Court, S.D. Mississippi 2020)
This list shows which later cases cite this one. It does not say how they treated it, and no review of that has been done. Not a substitute for Shepard’s or KeyCite — verify before relying.
Opinion of the Court
Dr. Joseph Papin, a Hispanic man and former resident at the University of Mississippi Medical Center, is suing his former supervisor, Dr. T. Mark Earl.
I. FACTUAL ALLEGATION
Below are the facts as alleged in Papin's amended complaint.
On January 10, 2017, Papin met with Earl and signed a formal remediation plan. The plan alleged five deficient areas of performance: "lying and being untruthful about patient care"; "leaving the hospital during duty hours (to exercise)-dereliction of duty"; "unwillingness to help with tasks"; "condescending tone to nurses and fellow residents"; and "poor inter-professional communication."
After his termination, Papin retained counsel. His counsel began communicating with UMMC in early March 2017. Papin's counsel requested a formal appeals hearing for his client and suggested that a lawsuit was forthcoming. Sometime in the summer of 2017, prior to the appeals hearing, Papin filed a formal charge of discrimination with the EEOC alleging race discrimination and retaliation. The EEOC issued its Notice of Right to Sue.
*277In July 2017, there was an appeals hearing where Earl served in a "quasi-prosecutorial fashion" in front of a committee of his "peers in management."
II. LEGAL STANDARD
When considering a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations by Papin as true and make reasonable inferences in Papin's favor.
Earl has invoked a qualified immunity defense. Government officials invoke qualified immunity to shield themselves "from civil damages liability insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known."
"For a right to be clearly established under the second step of the qualified immunity analysis, the contours of that right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."
III. DISCUSSION
A. FIRST AMENDMENT RETALIATION
Papin argues that he was retaliated against after threatening to sue UMMC. He says he has a protected right *278"to sue and threaten suit against the government and its employees" under the First Amendment.
Before moving through the four elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim, there is an issue that sticks out immediately to the Court. It is undisputed that Earl terminated Papin on February 20, 2017, prior to Papin's threat of suit. Therefore, Earl's initial termination of Papin could not have been in retaliation for Papin's threat of a lawsuit. After Papin's threat of a lawsuit, Earl's role was as the prosecutor at the appeals hearing. Papin's complaint about Earl's role at the hearing is that he presented evidence to the committee that he had never raised to Papin previously. Papin's complaint regarding Earl is one about notice,
If a First Amendment retaliation claim was sufficiently pled, Earl would be entitled to qualified immunity. This summer, the Fifth Circuit noted that four cases in three years reached the court asking whether someone who is not a final decision maker can be liable for a First Amendment retaliation claim.
Ultimately, the Fifth Circuit clarified that the Court's standard of causation for a First Amendment retaliation case is that a plaintiff only has to show "an affirmative causal link" between a party's actions and the ultimate termination by the final decision maker.
B. FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT DUE PROCESS
Papin alleges a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment rights to procedural and substantive due process by Earl.
Though not expressly articulated as such, Papin's amended complaint alleges two types of procedural due process violations: a lack of notice and a lack of adequate hearing. Papin says his due process rights were violated when, during his appeals hearing, Earl - "act[ing] in a quasi-prosecutorial fashion" - "introduced testimony and other evidence about a host of matters that had never before been identified as a basis for termination."
"Many times over the Supreme Court has made clear that there are two basic due process requirements: (1) notice, and (2) an opportunity to be heard."
There is a minimum level of due process owed that the parties seem to agree upon. As Earl concedes,
Based on the amended complaint, Earl failed to provide Papin with notice on two different occasions: he did not provide the full extent of the reasons for Papin's termination at their January 10, 2017 meeting nor did he provide the full list of those reasons to Papin at any time ahead of appeals hearing in July 2017. It is clear from cases dealing with dismissals in similar academic programs that it is clearly established that the bare minimum requirement for due process is one of notice.
*280The Court now turns to Papin's second due process allegation, that the hearing procedures did not provide him with a sufficient opportunity to respond to the allegations against him. Papin and Earl dispute the boundaries of the property interest created by Papin's contract with the Medical Center. Earl believes the interest is identical to that a student who, facing expulsion for academic reasons, has in continuing enrollment; Papin believes his interest is a stronger one.
At a minimum, Papin had a property interest in his residency at UMMC.
In trying to comprehend the extent of the due process owed to Papin, this Court finds Plummer v. University of Houston instructive.
The Plummer court ultimately concluded that because the unique facts in the case so obviously supported a finding of guilt for the two students, "further procedural safeguards would not have lessened the risk of an erroneous deprivation of [the students'] interests or otherwise altered the outcome."
Here, the loss of a professional training program and the allegations amongst professional colleagues of inappropriate behavior has had a great impact on Papin and his future. On the other hand, UMMC and Earl had an interest in the safety of other students, the safety of patients, and of the integrity of their program. Like Plummer , we find ourselves evaluating "the risk of erroneously depriving [Papin's] interests through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedure safeguards."
While the facts of each case make it difficult for courts to set any universal standard when it comes to the due process procedures owed in a student disciplinary hearing, the hearing itself "must be meaningful and must provide the accused with the opportunity to respond, explain, and defend."
1. "An accused individual has the right to respond and defend, which will generally include the opportunity to make a statement and present evidence. It may also include the right to call exculpatory witnesses."
2. "Some circumstances may require the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, though this right might exist only in the most serious of cases."
3. Counsel is typically not required, but "may be required by the Due Process Clause to ensure fundamental fairness when the school proceeds *282through counsel or the procedures are overly complex."45
Further, the Fifth Circuit in evaluating the potential bias of an administrator conducting a disciplinary hearing held that "[a] school administrator involved in the initiation and investigation of charges is not thereby disqualified from conducting a hearing on the charges, although the facts of an occasional case may demonstrate that a school official's involvement in an incident created a bias such as to preclude his affording the student an impartial hearing."
In a case involving a medical student, the Fifth Circuit found that procedural due process was satisfied because the student received ample notice of the reasons for dismissal and the student had two hearings.
Now turning to the relevant facts of this case, according to the amended complaint. The allegations made against Papin during the appeals hearing were serious, particularly the one regarding the sexual harassment of a coworker. Further, the value of Papin's future career rests entirely within the residency program, to which he had a property interest. Papin did not have the opportunity for questioning or presentation of his own witnesses at his hearing.
An adequate opportunity to be heard is a clearly established floor of procedural due process, especially in academic dismissal cases. If Earl's real reason for Papin's termination included an allegation of sexual harassment, Earl should have been even more aware that a heightened level of due process was due to Papin during his disciplinary hearing. For those reasons, Earl's motion for qualified immunity on the due process claim is denied.
"It bears repeating that sufficiently stating a claim says nothing about a plaintiff's ability to succeed at summary judgment or *283at trial. That is especially true in the qualified immunity context."
For those reasons, Earl's Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED as to the First Amendment Retaliation claim and is DENIED as to the Due Process claim.
Within 10 days the parties are instructed to contact the Chambers of the Magistrate Judge for the entry of a new Case Management Order.
SO ORDERED, this the 28th day of September, 2018.
See Docket No. 18. Papin has also sued the University of Mississippi Medical Center ("UMMC") and Dr. LouAnn Woodward in her official capacity. The only pending motion before this Court, however, is Earl's motion to dismiss and for qualified immunity.
Papin initially alleged a breach of contract claim against Earl, but that claim has been dismissed. See Docket Nos. 18, 31.
See Docket Nos. 20, 22. The Court notes that Earl has filed identical motions twice on the docket.
See generally Docket No. 18.
Id. at ¶ 26.
Id. at ¶ 52.
See Ashcroft v. Iqbal ,
Collins v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter ,
See Iqbal ,
Flagg v. Stryker Corp.
Pasco ex rel. Pasco v. Knoblauch ,
Bishop v. Arcuri ,
Thompson v. Upshur Cty., Tex. ,
Docket No. 18 at ¶ 102.
Anderson v. Valdez ,
See Docket No. 18 at ¶ 55 ("During this hearing, Dr. Earl introduced testimony and other evidence about a host of matters that had never before been identified as a basis for termination or other discipline.").
Sims v. City of Madisonville ,
Papin also asserts this claim against Dr. Woodward, though she has not moved for qualified immunity.
See Black v. N. Panola Sch. Dist. ,
Docket No. 18 at ¶¶ 52-59.
See
See Id. at ¶¶ 53, 54, 60.
Flaim v. Med. Coll. of Ohio ,
Mathews v. Eldridge ,
See Docket No. 23 at 7-8.
Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo. v. Horowitz ,
Davis v. Mann ,
The Court notes that it must take the complaint's factual allegations as true in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. One could not help but read the letter attached to Earl's motion that seems to refute the assertion that Papin had no prior notice of the allegations against him at the appeals hearing. Where the issue is "plausibility rather than a lack of evidence," the Court will not weigh the competing facts. Doe v. Univ. of Miss. , No. 3:16-CV-63-DPJ-FKB,
Compare Docket No. 23 at 7-8 with Docket No. 29 at 9-17.
See Davis ,
See Beauchene v. Miss. Coll. ,
See Horowitz ,
See generally Plummer v. Univ. of Houston ,
See
Flaim ,
Brewer by Dreyfus v. Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. ,
Than v. Univ. of Texas Med. Sch. at Houston ,
Docket No. 18 at ¶¶ 53, 54, 60.
Id. at ¶ 61.
See supra, footnote 48.
Univ. of Miss. ,
Acadia Ins. Co. v. Hinds Cty. Sch. Dist. , No. 3:12-CV-188-CWR-LRA,
Case-law data current through September 30, 2026. Source: CourtListener bulk data.