UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSISSIPPI NORTHERN DIVISION

CLEVELAND E. JOHNSON PLAINTIFF

V. CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:17-CV-856-DPJ-FKB

CHRISTOPER EPPS AND DEFENDANTS SHANNON WARNOCK

ORDER

Pro se prisoner Plaintiff Cleveland E. Johnson asserts equal-protection, due-process, and personal-injury claims against former Commissioner of the Mississippi Department of Corrections Christopher Epps and former Chairman of the Mississippi Parole Board Shannon Warnock in this § 1983 case. Defendants moved for summary judgment [34], and United States Magistrate Judge F. Keith Ball recommended [39] dismissal with prejudice of the constitutional claims and dismissal without prejudice of the personal-injury claim. Johnson, a state prisoner currently serving his prison sentence in the custody of the United States Bureau of Prisons, timely filed an objection [44] to Judge Ball’s Report and Recommendation. In his objection, Johnson does not address Judge Ball’s recommendation that the personal-injury claim be dismissed without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The Court therefore adopts that portion of the R&R as unopposed. Johnson’s objection does discuss his constitutional claims, which state: “[t]he unlawful withholding of a Parole Hearing and the improper computation of no parole eligibility violates [his] rights . . . under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution.” Compl. [1] ¶ 18. Specifically, Johnson says Mississippi law required that the state first consider his eligibility for parole in 2013, and he appears to claim that he has yet to receive a parole hearing.1 He asserts violations of his rights under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses. Judge Ball correctly noted that, because “[p]arole . . . is discretionary in Mississippi, [Mississippi] prisoners . . . have no liberty interest in parole.” Wansley v. Miss. Dep’t of Corr.,

(5th Cir. 2014). And because Johnson has no liberty interest in obtaining

parole, “he cannot complain of the constitutionality of procedural devices attendant to parole decisions.”

at 312–13. “Whether or not [Johnson] is entitled to a parole hearing as a matter of Mississippi law, the discretionary nature of the state’s parole system ends the federal due process inquiry.”

. Nothing in Johnson’s objection changes the application of Wansley to Johnson’s federal-due-process claim. As for Johnson’s equal-protection claim, Johnson neither identifies a protected class of which he is a member nor alleges that he has been treated differently than others who are similarly situated. See Gibson v. Tex. Dep’t of Ins. Div. of Workers’ Comp.,

(5th Cir. 2012). That failure is fatal to his claim.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court adopts the Report and Recommendation [39] in its entirety as the opinion of the Court. Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment [34] is granted. The constitutional claims are dismissed with prejudice, and the personal-injury claim is dismissed without prejudice. A separate judgment will be entered in accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 58. SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 23rd day of March, 2020.

s/ Daniel P. Jordan III CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

1 Defendants submitted evidence indicating that Johnson has had several parole hearings.