Mahorner v. Harrison
Mahorner v. Harrison
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
This bill was filed by Hooe in his lifetime, in the vice-chancery court, to compel respondent to convey the land therein mentioned to complainant.
The record in the case contains near six hundred pages of manuscript, closely written, made up mostly of the evidence of the case, which, besides the depositions of many witnesses, consists of a lengthy and almost continuous correspondence, which was kept up for several years. It is impossible that we can do more than advert to a few of the leading features in the case, as disclosed by this mass of matter, not the most satisfactory, and give the impressions left upon the mind by the examination.
The foundation on which the trust is sought to be established, is an alleged agreement between complainant and respondent,
Hooe was a citizen of Yirginia, and so was Harrison until the latter part of 1831. Hooe was wealthy, and the respondent, who was in limited circumstances, married the daughter of Hooe, in 1831. By the advice of complainant, as it is alleged, respondent agreed to come to Alabama, and examine and endeavor to acquire lands for the complainant, in part, in the country which had been recently purchased from the Choctaw Indians. The complainant furnished respondent Avith a sum of money ($400) and other requisites for the journey, and placed in his possession sixteen slaves, taking a receipt for them, the terms of which are unknoAvn, though it was probably intended by Hooe to enable him to establish a loan of the slaves, in case of necessity. The respondent insists that it was an advancement.
The allegations of the bill, as respects the agreement to invest money for complainant, are denied. The receipt of considerable sums of money at different times, is admitted, but it is insisted that they too were intended as advancements, to be invested for the sole benefit of respondent, for the purpose of securing a home for himself and family, and for laying the foundation of a future fortune.
The defendant left Yirginia with his family, and, after having stopped some time at Huntsville, located in Pickens county, Alabama, Avhere he laid the foundation for future acquisitions of a large body of land. Not very long aftenvards he commenced an examination of the surrounding country, Avith a vieAV to other locations, all of Avhich he did under the advice of the complainant. The letters Avhich passed, prove conclusively that the defendant had no means of his own. He made frequent calls for small sums to defray current expenses, and received them from complainant. The letters of complainant abound in promises of money to aid defendant in his views, to such an extent as might be necessary. The land on which Harrison settled, had not then been brought into market. The pre-emption laws, however, conferred certain privileges on actual settlers, and by making a settlement of his oAvn, and by securing the rights of
After the respondent had made his settlement in Alabama, his attention was directed to land on the Noxubee river, in Mississippi, about eight miles from his place in Alabama, and he became desirous of securing a location here also, with a view, no doubt, to further acquisitions around it. As the respondent was dependent on complainant for means, and disposed, no doubt, to pay great deference to his opinions, he disclosed his views fully in reference to his plans, and the advantages of the country, and value of the lands. The Noxubee lands occupy a prominent place in the correspondence. It was not very long before the respondent acquired a foothold there, by the purchase of one or two Indian reserves.
As the necessities of respondent required, in the accomplishment of his objects, the complainant made remittances to meet them.
The complainant had, in the mean time, been induced by the favorable accounts given him, to desire a location in the vicinity of the respondent, and had expressed this wish, and his intention on the subject to Harrison. That such was a part of his original scheme when he advised Harrison to leave Virginia, is by no means certain. Probably this desire was superinduced by the accounts which he received as to the value of the land and its product, and the field for speculation opened to his view in this new region or country. This, however, is an immaterial cir-' cumstance, so far as it may influence the trust. It is immaterial whether he originally entertained the design of having land purchased for him or not. If, after Harrison had pointed out the advantages, and proffered his aid, Hooe furnished him with money to be invested in land for himself, it is still a trust.
The leading objects of each of the parties must be kept in view, as gathered from the correspondence, in order that we may be enabled to arrive at a just conclusion on the particular matter
But it is also clear that Hooe, in the mean time, had conceived'
Harrison’s first choice was the place in Alabama, or Prarie Place, as it was called; that is evident. His efforts were directed mainly to secure that, and his object was accomplished before Hooe came out in December, 1834. Keeping this important point in view, we are to endeavor to ascertain the intention of the parties, as to the location for Hooe; and we must endeavor to ascertain their intentions during the existence of their friendly feelings.
All of this land, except the south-east quarter of section thirty-three, was purchased by Harrison at different times in 1833 and 1S34, and before the land sales in December, 1834. In the bill, there are many special interrogatories propounded, and amongst others, the respondent is asked if he did not purchase the lands above mentioned, with funds of complainant. These interrogatories are not specifically answered, as they should have been, but still it is insisted that they are answered. The answer is unnecessarily prolix, and it is argumentative. As regards this interrogatory, not to mention others, it is evasive. Whilst the respondent admits the receipt of a large amount of money, he insists that it was an advancement, except about $2985. The conclusion is irresistible, that the land in dispute was purchased with money furnished by Hooe, and if so, prima, facie, a trust resulted for his benefit. The law will presume such to have been the intention of the parties. A resulting trust can be established only by giving to the acts of the parties a fair and just interpretation, with a view to arrive at their intention, the object being to carry out the intention. But its existence may be rebutted by circumstances preponderating towards a different intention. It is a very common mode of defeating a trust to show that an advancement was intended, when the relation of the parties is such as to give plausibility to the defence. The relationship existed in this instance, and the pretensions of the respondent are powerfully fortified by the repeated declarations of the complainant. But whilst it is very certain that a large advancement was intended, it is equally certain that all the money sent was not so intended. Hooe intended to acquire a place near Harrison, Harrison intended to aid him in that view.
Let us again advert to what seems to have been the leading objects of the parties. Harrison was to be provided for; his first choice was the Alabama place; in that he might be defeated; he therefore obtained an interest on the Noxubee. Next to this, Hooe was to have a place near Harrison, sufficiently near to be under his immediate superintendence, and the profits of this place were to be equally divided. When Harrison secured his place in Ala ama, the great object was accomplished. The secondary object was also accomplished if the Noxubee place was to be appropriated to Hooe. Whether that was originally intended for Hooe or not, does not seem to be material. Hooe certainly had a resulting trust in part of the land purchased by Harrison, who took all the titles in his own name. It was competent for the parties to designate the part to which Hooe’s interest should attach, after titles had been acquired. This was only to designate the part which was subject to an existing trust.
Now, in solving the question we have just propounded, to wit, was Hooe’s location to be on the Noxubee I let us notice some of the circumstances which seem irresistibly to tend to an affirmative answer.
The subject of a purchase for Hooe was mentioned at an early period in the correspondence. As early as July, 1832, Harrison regretted that he had not been permitted to purchase a reserve for Hooe. In May, 1833, Hooe expressed a desire to move some of his people out near Harrison. In August., 1833, Hooe made a remittance of $2000, with express directions that two eighty acre reserves should be bought and managed by Harrison, as he would his own. In October, 1833, he informed Harrison that he had obtained a loan of $3000, to be invested in land in his (Hooe’s) name, and that he had made arrangements for a further sum of $5000. In the same letter, he directed Harrison to commence building as soon as he had made purchases, for the
In December, 1834, Hooe came to this country to attend the land sales at Columbus. Harrison attended with him, and being better acquainted with the land, purchased largely for him around the Noxubee place. Thus it seems that Hooe was but carrying out his plan of a large place. Harrison did not then inform him that he claimed as his own the land before purchased on the Noxubee.
After Hooe left the country, Harrison continued for several years to live on the place, and was regarded by every body as agent. But after a few years had elapsed, he advised that an agent should be sent out from Virginia to take charge of the place; and accordingly one was sent, to whom he delivered an unqualified possession, without making claim to any of the land. This, to be sure, is not conclusive against him, but it is a circumstance entitled to much weight.
It seems that Hooe instituted suit, in Alabama, for the land claimed by respondent there. In his answer to tile bill, Harrison admits that he received money to be invested in land, but insists that it was invested in Mississippi. It should be remembered that part of his right in Alabama was acquired by virtue of a pre-emption in favor of Hooe. So far as that is concerned, the title, the legal title we mean, must have been in Hooe; and yet it only proves what we have said, that their combined efforts were directed to secure a place for Harrison as the first object. The form of the title was regarded as an immaterial matter. If, as his answer states, he had invested money in Mississippi for Hooe, he'should be able to designate the place. True, he says in his answer here that he purchased in Octibbeha county. He
The foregoing are not a tithe of the circumstances which lead us to believe that if the purer intentions of the parties had prevailed, and they had settled their respective rights before any rupture of feelings took place, the land in Alabama would have been assigned to Harrison, and the Noxubee place to Hooe.
Much reliance has been placed on a settlement made between the parties, in which Harrison surrendered certain land titles, taking therefor a receipt. This is entitled to but little weight. Hooe was evidently much dissatisfied, and said he would not submit to such a settlement. He did not receive the titles surrendered in full discharge, and is therefore not concluded.
How this Williams place was ultimately paid for, we are not otherwise informed than by the answer. The difficulty is
Decree reversed, and decree ordered for complainant.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Mathias Mahorner v. William H. Harrison
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- The facts of this case examined by the court, and the conclusion reached that part of the lands in controversy in the cause, were purchased by the defendant for the testator, as whose devisee the complainant claimed, and with the testator’s money; and that a resulting trust was created thereby in favor of the testator, and through him of his devisee; which trust the court established. Before a resulting trust can be raised, the payment or advance of money must precede the purchase ; a subsequent payment where the trust is denied, will not suffice for that end.