Busby v. Rhodes
Busby v. Rhodes
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
This is an action of ejectment submitted to the judge of the Circuit Court upon an agreement as to the facts, which were as follows: One C. A. Blackman was the owner in fee-simple of the locus in quo, and died in 1862, having first made a will, which was duly probated, the first clause of which is as follows : “I give and bequeath to my wife, Mickey W., for aud during her natural life or widowhood, all my personal and real estate, of whatever kind or description, I am now seized or possessed [of], and which may be remaining after the payment of my just debts ; and at the death or marriage of my wife, Mickey W., to my daughter Evelina Y.; and should my daughter Evelina Y. die during her minority or without issue, and after the death or marriage of my wife, Mickey W., then to James Rhodes and the children of Sallie Smith — James Rhodes one half and the children the other.” The widow died in 1867, without having married. Evelina survived her, and intermarried with W. W. Busby, the defendant. Of the marriage a child was born, who died before Evelina; and after the death of the child, and in 1878, Evelina died without issue. The plaintiffs were the ulterior limitees mentioned in the will, and the locus in quo was a part of the estate of Black-man.
The circuit judge gave judgment for the plaintiffs.
The estate given to Evelina was a fee-simple, commencing after the termination of the precedent estate of the widow and defeasible on the contingency named in the will, to wit, the dying of Evelina, after the death or marriage of the widow, without issue living at the time of her death. This results from the pi’ovisions of the statutes then and now in force. By art. 2, page 306, of the Code of 1857, every devise of an estate shall be construed as a fee-simple if a less estate be not
The judgment, being in accordance with this view, is affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- W. W. Busby v. James Rhodes
- Cited By
- 5 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- 1. Will. Construction thereof. Limitation of estate. Termination upon contingency. Case in judgment. 0. died.in 1862, leaving a last will and testament containing this provision: “I give and bequeath to my wifeM., for and during her natural life or widowhood, all my personal and real estate, of whatever kind or description, which may be remaining after the payment of my debts; and at the death or marriage of M., to my daughter E.; and should E. die during her minoi-ity, or without issue, and after the death or marriage of M., then to It. and the children of S.” M., the widow, died in 1867, without having married. B., the daughter, married B., and died in 1878, without issue living. Held, in an action of ejectment by B. and the children of S. against B., that the estate given to E. was a fee-simple, commencing after the termination of the precedent estate of the widow,' and defeasible on the contingency of E.’s death, after the death or marriage of the widow, without issue living. Oode 1857, art. 2, p. 306; art. 8, p. 307. 2. Same. Limitation over. Executory devise. Contingency. The above recited provision of O.’s will contains a devise to B. of an estate in fee-simple, but determinable, with a limitation over dependent upon the expiration of less than three lives in being, and upon the dying of the holder of the precedent estate without issue living at the time of her death. This ulterior limitation by way of executory devise is good; and as the facts stated show that the contingency upon which it was to take effect has happened, the estate has vested in the remainder-men, R. and the children of S.