Fairchild v. New Orleans & North-Eastern Railroad
Fairchild v. New Orleans & North-Eastern Railroad
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
The appellee was engaged in the erection of a telephone
It is, however, said by the appellant that as a corporation can only act by and through its agents, it must be held that the corporation was itself present through its agents, the laborers, and if it was so present then the negligence or wilfulness of the laborers was the negligence or wilfulness of the defendant. The principle invoked would be applicable if the injury had been caused by the negligence of Thompson, the agent of the corporation, who was charged with the performance of the work of constructing the line ; but the mere laborers who were under his control and direction did not occupy the attitude of agents of the company within the rule invoked.
These laborers were the mere sentient tools of the company, authorized by the character of their employment to exercise no discretion or judgment as the representatives of the corporation, but were simply charged with performance of the physical labor necessary to the execution of the instructions of their superior.
The judgment is affirmed.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- L. E. Fairchild v. New Orleans and North-Eastern Railroad Company
- Cited By
- 3 cases
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- Published
- Syllabus
- Cutting Trees. Corporation not liable for, when. Case in judgment. The New Orleans and North-Eastern Railroad Company, a corporation, was engaged in the erection of a telephone line along its right of way, the work being under the supervision of T., who was charged with the duty of procuring the necessary poles, which he was directed by the superintendent of the railroad to get from the corporation’s right of way. The laborers employed were explicitly instructed by T. to confine themselves to the right of way, which was clearly defined, in cutting trees for poles. They negligently or wilfully cut certain trees, using them as poles, from the land of E. who brought this suit against the corporation to recover the statutory penalty for such cutting under chapter 30 of the Code of 1880. Held, that the laborers being the mere sentient tools of the corporation, authorized by the nature of the employment to exercise no discretion or judgment as representatives of . the corporation, but simply charged with the performance of the physical labor necessary to the execution of their instructions, the corporation is not liable for the trespass committed by them in disobedience of their instructions.