Rice v. Troup
Rice v. Troup
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
The solicitors of the parties had no authority to transfer the decree. Levy v. Brown, 56 Miss. 83; Parker v. McBee, 61 Miss. 134.
If the transfer of the decree was valid, it was admissible as against the appellee to introduce parol evidence to limit the operation of the assignment. He was not a party to the instrument, but .a stranger to it. Its terms would not conclude him, because not a party to it, and his adversaries have the same right to resort to parol evidence that he would have. Whitney v. Cowan, 55 Miss. 626; 1 Greenleaf on Ev., § 279; 2 Wharton’s Law of Ev., § 923, and eases cited; 2 Taylor on Ev., § 1149 (7th edition).
Decree reversed, and decree here for payment by the appellee of the sum due, in default of which execution may be issued therefor.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Sarah E. Rice v. W. W. Troup
- Cited By
- 1 case
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- 1. Solicitor- in Chancery. Whether authorized to assign decree. A solicitor employed to collect money by a suit in chancery has no authority by reason of such employment to assign a decree obtained for his client for less than the full amount due thereon. 2. Evidence. Parol proof to vary written instrument. Right of stranger and his adversaries. Upon the application of a complainant in a decree for an execution against the defendant therein, who resists, on the ground that the decree has been assigned to a third party by the complainant, it is competent for the latter to show by parol evidence that, though the written assignment is absolute in terms, it was intended by the parties to be only a partial assignment. The defendant, being a stranger to the assignment, is not concluded by its terms, and his adversaries are entitled to-resort to parol proof where he could do so.