Hill v. State
Hill v. State
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is very questionable whether the “ dying declaration ” of Brown should have been admitted as such, and we would not be understood as approving the two instructions given for the State as universally true, and we are clearly of the opinion that the court erred in not permitting the testimony to show that Brown’s religious belief was such as to detract from the value of his dying declarations, but as the verdict is one of which the appellant cannot complain in view of his own testimony we do not regard the errors as entitling him to a new trial. He was examined as a witness for himself before the committing court, and his testimony there was read in evidence on his trial in the circuit court. Although he objected to this it was clearly admissible. "Where the State uses one as a witness in the investigation of a criminal charge the evidence thus obtained may not afterward be used against the person giving it. Josephine v. The State, 39 Miss. 613; Jackson v. The State, 56 Ib. 311; Farkas v. The State, 60 Ib. 847.
But where the statute makes an accused person a competent Avitness in his own behalf, and he testifies in the exercise of his right, this testimony may afterward be used against him.
No right of the appellant was violated in offering his own version of the encounter in which he killed Brown as evidence against him, and on this evidence he was properly convicted, and may felicitate himself that he was not found guilty of murder.
We fail to discover in this case any peculiar circumstances making it proper to release the appellant on bail pending his appeal. We suppose those circumstances were made manifest to the circuit court Avhich admitted him to bail after conviction. If the peculiar circumstances in his.case consist of what is disclosed by the affidavit in the record, the law was violated in admitting him to bail. That affidavit shows that he had a crop which needed his attention, and that he would be ruined financially by being confined and denied an opportunity to pursue his industrial vocation, and that his wife was frail and delicate.
Manifestly the laAv does not tolerate bail after conviction of felony on any such ground as this. It denies bail to a convict of
Imprisonment is doubtless generally inconvenient and undesirable to the person suffering it, and in every case it may be supposed . that the party would like to be with his wife and be permitted to pursue his usual business, but the statute declares that one convicted of felony shall not have bail except as a special favor granted by court or judge, not on personal grounds but under peculiar circumstances to be judged of as a matter of sound judicial discretion.
Affirmed.
Reference
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- R. J. Hill v. State
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- 1. CRIMINAL Practice. Testimony of defendant before committing court. Whether competent on subsequent trial. Where by statute a person accused of a crime is made a competent witness in his own behalf, and one so accused testifies on his preliminary examination before a committing court in exercise of this right, such testimony may afterward, on a trial of his case, be used against him. 2. Same. Defendant’s testimony. Sufficiency of. Errors, when not available. Supreme court practice. Manslaughter. H., charged with the murder of B., testified in his own behalf as follows: “ B. came to my house for a bucket of water, got it, and went out of the ga'e. I called to him and asked him about a threat he had made to beat me. B. answered, 1 By God! I will yet if you fool with me.’ I told him that he had threatened to kill me. He denied that he had so threatened. I told him I could prove it by E. I told him that I did not like for any man to run over me in any such style as that. He turned round and said, ‘ By God! if you don’t like it, just come out here, and I can satisfy you.’ He started toward me, pushing up his sleeves when he saw me come. He turned to get a stick and reached down toward the ground, but did not get it. I got my knife. He put his right hand in his pocket and held it open with his left, and came toward me, and I went toward him with my knife in my hand, and then I cut him, advancing face to face, and cut him one time.” B. died from the effects of this cut. H. was convicted of manslaughter. Held, that the conviction was proper on this testimony of H. himself; and the judgment cannot be reversed because of the erroneous action of the court in reference to other evidence and the instructions given for the State. 3.Same. Dying declaration. Evidence of religious belief of deceased. Where, in the trial of a case of homicide, proof of a statement made by the deceased is admitted in evidence as his dying declaration in relation to the killing, it is error for the court to exclude testimony offered by the defendant, with the view of detracting from the value of such declaration, to the effect that the deceased had, in his lifetime, often said “ that there was no hell or hereafter, and all the punishment a man got was in this world.” 4. Criminal Practice. Sail after conviction of felony. Section 2341, Code of 1880, applied. It is improper to admit to bail (pending an appeal to this court) one convicted of a felony because he has a crop which needs his attention, and the forced neglect of which hy his confinement in jail will result in his financial ruin, and because his wife is frail and delicate. Section 2341, Code of 1880, denies bail to a convict of felony, except in the discretion of court or judge, “to he exercised with the greatest caution, and only when the peculiar circumstances of the case render it proper in the opinion of such court or judge.”