Gerdine v. State
Gerdine v. State
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
The instruction numbered 16, and asked by the accused, should have been given. It correctly states the law as applied to the facts testified to by the accused, and should have been preferred over several which were given. Its refusal was not justified by the giving of the third, eighth, and eleventh for the defendant, the two first of which might have been properly refused if it had been given. The reason that the third given for the accused did not fill the place of the sixteenth is that it couples the proposition as to the threats with its other proposition, and requires the belief of both by the jury in order to acquit. We reaffirm the doctrine of Aldridge v. The State, 59 Miss. 250, and Lamar v. The State, ante, 428, and intend in every case to apply it in the hope that
Reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Antoinette Gerdine v. State
- Cited By
- 4 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- 1, Criminal Practice. Refusal of instruction in concrete. Not cured by abstract charge. ' ' It is error for the court, in the trial of a criminal case, to refuse an instruction for the defendant applying a principle of law to the facts which the evidence of his defense tends to establish, even though such principle be stated abstractly in other instructions given for the .defendant. It is better for a court to instruct in the concrete than in the abstract. Lamar v. State, antei 687, cited. 2. Same. Concrete instruction topfull. Whether substitute for restricted one. An instruction applying the law to a theory of facts constituting a perfect defense for the accused, but only authorizing an acquittal if the jury believes those facts in connection with other facts stated, is not a substitute for an instruction which only requires the jury to believe the facts necessary to the defense set up, in order to acquit.