Peoples' Bank v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad
Peoples' Bank v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the Court.
The eighth instruction for the defendant should not have been given. Whether the bank had paid a proper privilege tax at the time it acquired the bill of lading is not material to its right to sue. The object of the suit is not to enforce a contract made by the bank in the course of its business; but is to recover property (or its value) acquired by it from a third person. If the contract between the bank and Wilder & Co. was an executory one, and the bank was suing that firm upon the contract, the suit might be defeated by proof of the fact that it had not paid the privilege tax required by law when the contract was made.
The statute, after fixing the sums to be paid by the persons exercising the privileges enumerated, and declaring punishment against the unlicensed party, proceeds : “ And all contracts made with any person who shall violate this act, in reference to the business carried on in disregard of this law, shall be null and void so far only as such person may base any claim upon them ; and no suit shall be maintainable in favor of such person on any such contract.”
The Act is of a highly penal character; and while its terms should not be refined away upon familiar rules of construction, it should not be extended by implication or broadened by con
One conducting a business in violation of the statute acquires title to the goods he purchases in the markets of the world ; though he might be unable to enforce an executory contract for their purchase, or to sue upon a warranty of title or of quality. If he buys on credit, the seller may enforce payment of the purchase price; for the contract is void only as to the violator of the law, and as to him only so far as he may base a claim upon them — i. e., endeavor to maintain an action upon the contract. An anomalous condition of things would exist if a merchant transacting business without payment of the license required was disqualified to receive title to property bought and paid for in the usual course of trade. He certainly could not recover the price paid from the seller; for, as to the seller, the contract is valid. But if he does not acquire title by a con summated sale, he would be unable to protect his possession from the unlawful interference of strangers having no sort of connection with the “ contract ’’which the law condemns. Since, by the assignment of the bill of lading by Wilder & Co., the
Reversed and remanded.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Peoples' Bank of Meridian v. Alabama Great Southern Railroad Company
- Cited By
- 2 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- Privile&e License. Section 589, Code of 1880, considered. Case in judgment. W. delivered certain cotton to a railroad company for shipment, and then transferred the bill of lading to a bank. The creditors of W. sued out an attachment, and caused the cotton to be seized thereunder. The railroad company having failed to ship the cotton, the bank brought an action for' damages against the company to recover the value of the cotton. The latter pleaded that the bank at the time of the transfer ¡of the bill of lading was doing business without a sufficient privilege license, under “An Act in Relation to Public Revenue,” in the Code of 1880, and was, therefore, precluded from maintaining its action by Section 589, in that act, which provides that “ all contracts made with any person who shall violate this act, in reference to the business carried on in disregard of this law, shall be null and void so far only as such person may base any claim upon them; and no suit shall be maintainable in favor of such person on any such contract.” Held, that by the assignment of the bill of lading the bank acquired the title to the cotton; and the action being upon the contract made between W. and the defendant, and not upon the contract between itself and W., is maintainable (unaffected by the provision quoted), though the plaintiff derives title through a contract on which it could not have sued.