LeBlanc v. Illinois Central Railroad
LeBlanc v. Illinois Central Railroad
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
It is too late now to call in question the title of the appellee to its roadbed and right of way. For forty years the railroad has been in undisturbed possession of the right of way, and asserting title in every way possible, almost. Henry and John Carter, the original owners of the land which the right of way traverses, have, in writing, solemnly recognized the right of way as belonging to appellee’s lessor.
That the roadbed and right of way was not assessable or .salable by the local authorities of Pike county is susceptible of jeady demonstration. Under the scheme of the code of 1880,
As to the Carter gravel pit (as we shall call it for convenience) and the adjoining gravel pit of the appellee, it is equally clear to us that these, if not used by appellee in operating its railroad, were taxable by the local authorities. This view is supported by three considerations: 1. The proviso to § 607 declares that lands owned by railroad companies, and not used in operating its railroad, shall be taxable as other property, and for all purposes. 2. By an act approved March 12, 1884, (Laws, p. 29), this section of the code of 1880 was amended in these words: “ Lands owned by railroad companies, and not
The only question remaining is one of fact. Was the Carter gravel pit “used” in 1890 in operating the railroad? The Carter gravel pit was used by the appellee — partly in operating its railroad and largely for purposes of sale and gain — -as very clearly appears from the evidence before us, and so these gravel pits were properly sold as delinquent for taxes by the local authorities of Pike county, and respondents acquired a valid tax title to them at the collector’s tax sale made March 2, 1891.
The offer to redeem was too late. The period of redemption was one year.
Reversed in part and affirmed in pond, and decree here in accordance with this opinion.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- R. E. LeBlanc v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.
- Cited By
- 5 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- 1. Raii.boads. Title to roadbed. User. Lapse of time. On. a bill filed by a railroad Company to cancel a tax title to its roadbed and right of way, where the company has been in the undisturbed possession of the same, asserting title, for forty years, and the original owners of the land have, in writing, solemnly recognized its ownership, it is unavailing as a defense to set up that the original condemnation was void, and, therefore, that the complainant has not shown a perfect title. 2. Same. Commutation tax. Pa/yment. Exemption of property. Code 1880, 22 607, 608. Under 22 607, 608, code 1880, a railroad company accepting the provisions of the statute and paying the fixed tax per mile on its line of railroad in this state, was exempt from other taxes on its roadbed and all other property used in operating the road. 3. Same. Property not used in operating road. Taxation. Code 1880, 2 607; Laios 1884, p. 39. But, under 2 607, code 1880, and the act of 1884 (Laws, p. 39), all lands of a railroad company not used in operating the road were liable to assessment and sale for taxes by the local authorities, just as in case of other property subject to taxation. 4. Same. Land used partly for sale of gravel. Liability to taxation. Under said statutes, land (though, adjacent to the railroad) upon which are gravel pits, connected with the main line by switches or spur tracks, and from which gravel is used, partly in operating the road, hut largely for purposes of sale and gain, is not “used in operating the road ” within the meaning of the statute, and such land is subject to assessment and sale for taxes, although the railroad company has paid the fixed privilege or commutation tax per mile on its line of railroad. 5. Tax Title. Redemption. Constitution 1890, 79, 274. Section 79, constitution 1890, giving two years to redeem land sold for taxes, was prospective. Under $ 274, continuing in force until April 1, 1892, existing statutes, the right to redeem land sold in March, 1891, was limited to one year.