Beverly v. City of Hattiesburg

Mississippi Supreme Court
Beverly v. City of Hattiesburg, 83 Miss. 621 (Miss. 1903)
Oalhoon

Beverly v. City of Hattiesburg

Opinion of the Court

OalhooN, J.,

delivered the opinion of the' court.

The demurrer to the information in the quo warranto proceeding was properly overruled. The information was in the name of the state, by the proper district attorney, on the relation of the city of Hattiesburg, to oust a policeman alleged to be a usurper of that office. Code 1892, § 3521. The relator in such proceeding need not necessarily be an individual. A municipal corporaton, empowered to sue and liable to be sued, may be the relator, and, in the case before us, ought to be.

*624The abjection that the information does not specifically aver that the office usurped was created before the date charged as that of the commencement of the usurpation is too technical and refined. It is charged that it was an office created by the municipal board, and that it is now existing, and that Beverly is exercising its functions without warrant of law. This is enough.

The third ground of demurrer — that it is not shown that the city has sufficient interest to become relator- — -is equally untenable; it being shown that it created the office usurped, and was under the duty to protect its citizens by an efficient police.

The costs were properly adjudged against defendant by the court below, and are taxed against him here.

Affirmed.

Reference

Full Case Name
Thaddeus W. Beverly v. City of Hattiesburg
Cited By
3 cases
Status
Published
Syllabus
1. Quo Wabbanto. Code 1892, l 3521. Proper parties. Relator. Municipality. PoUcemcm. Under Code 1892, § 3521, regulating the trial of the right to hold office, the municipality which created the office may be the • relator in a quo warranto proceeding-, instituted by the district attorney, to oust an intruder who has usurped the office of policeman. 2. Same. Information. An information in such case, showing that the office is an existing one, was created by the municipality, and that defendant is exercising its functions without warrant, is sufficient, although it does not charge that the office was created anterior to the date when defendant is averred to have begun the course of conduct constituting the usurpation.