Whitfield v. Lyon
Whitfield v. Lyon
Opinion of the Court
delivered the opinion of the court.
This case presents two controversies, arising under the fifteenth article of the will of William Whitfield, who died in
“Nevertheless, I hereby authorize my sons, if they desire, or if either of them are desirous, to sell the real estate devised to him for the purpose of purchasing other lands or other productive property, * * * to sell the real estate * * * for the reasons above given, and the title shall he good to the purchaser. The proceeds of the sale, however, is to be invested in other productive and valuable property, and is to be held under the limitations and conditions of all the property so held by them.”
The facts out of which these controversies have developed are somewhat complicated, and are now, by lapse of time and the deaths of parties, quite obscure; but we shall endeavor to state them intelligibly so far as known.
It seems that in February, 1873, Nathan W. Whitfield, one of the children of William W., and therefore one of the remaindermen under the will, borrowed from Theodoric C. Lyon the sum of $800, which was invested in a homestead for Nathan W., and for which he executed his promissory note, with his father, his brother, and his aunt as securities. In February, 1874, there were large amounts of taxes due on the Whitfield lands, and William W. and Lucy A. borrowed from Samuel Kline the sum of $3,375 to pay the same, having no other resources because of the low conditions of agriculture at that time, and apparently they applied the money to that use. They executed a trust deed to secure those moneys on certain lands, including three hundred and twenty acres of the land in controversy. On April 28, 1874, William W. Whitfield and Lucy A.
At the April term, 1874, the Banks creditors recovered judgment against William W. Whitfield and his two sons on the debt above mentioned as purchase money of the Worley place in the sum of $8,832.50; and on July 9th following Lyon paid on that judgment the sum of $4,000. Some time prior to June 23,, 1874, Lyon paid off one of the four last $1,200 notes owing by William W. Whitfield for purchase of his residence, the Gray Mount place; and on that day he also executed to Whitfield a penal bond, with Yates himself as surety, in the sum of $5,000,. conditioned for the payment of the three remaining notes. On-August 11th a deed by Lyon to William W. and Lucy A. Whitfield, conveying the iron front store property, for the stated con
To this point of time and events even this fragmentary and obscure record shows clearly that Theoderic C. Lyon had exactly fulfilled his assumptions by the agreement of purchase. The agreement itself was practically a satisfaction of the $800 note, and it disappears; he paid the $1,200 note of 1874 to Tates on the Gray Mount place, and the interest; he paid the $4,000 on the banks judgment for purchase money of the Worley place; he conveyed the iron, front store property; in all, he had paid about $13,000. It only remained for him to pay the thrée $1,200 notes and interest, executed to Tates for the Gray Mount place, falling due, respectively, on the 1st days of March, 1875, 1876, and 1877. He failed to pay the note of 1875. There is no testimony showing the reason for such failure. It is left to conjecture. It will now be recalled that, when the Whitfields conveyed the one thousand and eighty acres to Lyon by their warranty deed in 1874, part of the same, amounting to five hundred and sixty acres, was under mortgage to Kline. The Whit-fields did not make good their warranty, but failed to pay their note due February 1, 1875, and on April 13, 1875, the lands embraced in the Kline trust deed were accordingly sold because
On the same day, May 24th, Whitfield filed a bill against Yates, Lyon, the trustee, Leigh, and others, setting up the agreement of June 23, 1874, whereby Lyon gave bond, with Yates himself as surety, for the payment of. the three notes falling due in 1875, 1876, and 1877, alleging that by the execution of such bond these notes were all in effect discharged, and praying for an injunction of the proposed sale by the trustee. This bill did not stop the sale, which occurred notwithstanding, as stated above. Shortly afterwards the bill was dismissed by complainant, and then an action of debt was brought against Lyon and Yates in the circuit court. This suit is only shown by docket entries. The declaration is not in the record. Counsel here say in their brief that it was on the bond. There was a trial, and a judgment for the defense. Meanwhile, Kline brought an action of ejectment against Lyon to the April term, and recovered judgment at the November term following. In June, 1875, Lyon executed a second deed to his father and mother conveying certain other lands of those purchased by him from the Whitfields, in consideration of $200 paid and the failure of title to the three hundred and twenty acres of their lands so sold under the Kline trust deed. No other claim or demand seems ever to have been asserted by the Whitfields against Lyon because of his failure to pay the three Yates notes; and, unless this failure to, pay be taken for such, Yates never received any compensation, so far as this record shows, for the failure of title to the lands of his parents and himself so sold under the Kline trust deed.
Miss Lucy A. Whitfield died childless in 1887. William W. Whitfield died January, 1903, leaving children, who are the ap
It is here contended by the Whitfields appellants, first, that Theoderic O. Lyon failed to pay for the lands conveyed to him as required', by his purchase contract; 'and, secondly, that William W. and Lucy A. conveyed in violation of their father’s will, and not for reinvestment, and that Theoderic <3. Lyon knew of and participated in their wrongdoing. Wherefore his mother cannot succeed; she being chargeable with notice, and there being no evidence that she was a bona fide purchaser for value. That Theoderic O. Lyon discharged his obligations under the agreement of purchase with the exception, possibly of the payment of the three notes of $1,200 each to Tates,, appears clear, as stated above. If he did not pay the three notes, the record shows what is apparently good and adequate reason, in that he seems to have failed to get five hundred and sixty acres of the land warranted to him. The record discloses no effort by the Whitfields to make their broken warranty good. It shows no claim asserted against Lyon or Mrs. Lyon for any liability during a period of thirty years. It is difficult to see how they can now claim that he was in default in that particular.
But it is urged that the lands so received by way of exchange were acquired with th’e fee in Whitfield, and with no limitations over in remainder to his children. That is true; but there is no evidence that, at the time of the sale to Lyon, Whitfield had any other intention than to comply literally with the terms of his father’s will, and settle a remainder on the parties entitled (who, it will be remembered, were his own children). The agreement with Lyon clearly expresses such an intention as to the greater part of the purchase price. However, even if it were shown that the arrangements made by William W. Whitfield and Lucy A. were intended to oust the remaindermen, there is no evidence that Lyon had knowledge of such purpose, or participated in it. Such knowledge and participation are imputed to him because of certain details; but those details are entirety consistent with fidelity at the time in the Whitfields to the obligations of the will. Subsequent events cannot be used against Lyon. His good faith and merit must be judged by things as they were rvhen he contracted. His action seems to have been free'from blame.
The $800 note discharged was the obligation of two of the remaindermen. The four notes, of $1,200 each, with interest, held by Tates, which he undertook to pay, were the purchase
We turn now to the Kline branch of the case. It is claimed by Mrs. Lyon’s heirs that the Kline title was only an estate for the life of William W. Whitfield, and terminated with his death in 1903. It is claimed by them to have been only a life estate, because the will of William Whitfield only authorized a sale of the fee for reinvestment, and not a mortgage for borrowed money. Whatever force there may be in this position as a general proposition, we hold that it does not ápply in this instance. We decide this case on the special facts. The Kline answer averred, and McQuown’s deposition proves, that the ■money was borrowed in order to pay taxes on the AVhitfield lands, and that the Whitfields were without other resources to pay the taxes, and that moneys were so applied. In such case this expenditure was indispensably necessary to the preservation of the estates, both of the lands mortgaged and of the other lands. As to these and, all the lands, William W. and Lucy A. were trustees of the fee for the remaindermen; and to preserve the corpus of the estate against the paramount demand and lien for taxes, and against a forfeiture, we think they had power to mortgage a part of the lands for that purpose by necessity, in, • order to carry out the general expressed purpose of the will. It
The decree of the chancery court is affirmed on both appeals.
Chief Justice Whitefield, being related to some of the parties, recused himself in this case, and Edwakd Mayes, Esq., a member of the supreme court bar, was appointed a special judge by the governor, and presided in this case in place of the Chief Justice.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Nathan W. Whitfield v. Adelaide E. Lyon
- Cited By
- 1 case
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- Syllabus
- 1. Vendor and Vendee. Purchase money. Payment Presumptions. Where in a' suit to cancel defendants’ title, the charge being that the ancestor, from whom defendants acquired the land, as a part consideration for his purchase thereof, had undertaken to pay a large sum in discharge of the debts of his vendor, but had failed to pay a part, approximately one-fifth, thereof, and the proof showing that the title to one-half the lands had failed and that the vendor made no effort to make good his broken warranty, it was-too late after thirty years acquiescence to claim that the purchaser, defendants’ ancestor, was in default. 2. Winns. Life estate. Conveyance hy life tenant. Where a will devised land to testator’s children for life, remainder to their children, with power in the life tenants to sell the land and invest the proceeds in other lands to be held under the same limitations and conditions, the contention cannot be maintained that a conveyance by the life tenants was in violation of the will and not for reinvestment (the purchaser having full knowledge in-the premises) so as to entitle, the remaindermen to the land, because part of the consideration was land, title to which was taken in the names of the life tenants without limitation over to their children and part of the money consideration was used to'pav off liabilities of the life tenants, on the purchase money of another tract of land they had bought, taking title in their own names; their agreement of sale of the devised land expressly naming the other tract as one to be invested in under the terms of the will, it not appearing that‘their vendee had reason to know or believe that they would fail to settle the title accordingly. 3. Same. Mortgage on account of taxes. Although, a will devising land to testator’s children ror life, remainder to their children, gave the life tenants power only to sell for purposes of reinvestment, yet, there being taxes due on the land and the life tenants being unable otherwise to pay them, they may, where necessary to preserve the estate from forfeiture, mortgage a part of the land in fee to raise money to pay the taxes.