delivered the opinion of the court.

Acting under chapter 195, Laws of 1912, as amended by chapters 269 and 271, Laws of 1914, the appellees filed their petition in the chancery court of Leflore county, praying for the organization of a drainage district comprising certain lands in Leflore, Holmes, and *91Carroll counties, and to be known as the “Abiaca drainage district” of said counties. Upon this petition the chancellor directed the clerk to give notive by publication to all parties interested, and the publication was made in the three counties named. Ten persons claiming to own lands in the proposed district appeared as objectors, and by a pleading in the nature of an answer to the petition challenged the sufficiency of the petition in law, and, among other things, pleaded that the chancery court of Leflore county is without jurisdiction of this proceeding, for the reason, as alleged, that the same petitioners heretofore exhibited their petition to the chancery court of Holmes county, praying for the organization of a drainage district to be composed of approximately the same territory here to be incorporated into a district; that the chancery court of Holmes county upon due consideration entered a decree dismissing the petition, and that the final decree entered by the chancery court of Holmes county is a bar to this proceeding in Leflore county. A copy of the pleadings and decree in the Holmes county proceeding- is exhibited as a part of the answer. The chancellor appointed C. L. Lomax as special commissioner to hear any controversies arising between the parties, and the commissioner passed upon the plea of res ad judicata, and made his report to the chancellor, setting forth his ruling and the reasons therefor, and the chancellor, over the objections of the appellants, confirmed the report of the commissioner, thereupon accepted the resignation of the commissioner, and fixed a day- in vacation for further proceedings in this cause, but granted an appeal to appellants “to settle the principles of the cause and to avoid expense and delay. ’ ’ In the final decree rendered by the chancellor in the Holmes county proceeding is the following provision :

*92“It is further ordered that the clerk of this court preserve all maps, plats, engineer’s report and surveys and other proceedings had herein, for future use as provided by section 4, chapter 269, Laws of 1914.”

And the decree makes provision for the costs incurred in the first proceeding and the collection thereof.

It does not affirmatively appear to us now that at the hearing fixed by the chancellor a protest or objection was interposed signed by a third of the landowners or by a majority of the landowners, but appellants do enter their appearance, and file certain remonstrances. No final disposition had been made of the petition when the commissioner overruled the plea of res adjudicata and when the chancellor confirmed and approved this action of the commissioners but it affirmatively appears that a subsequent date was fixed by the chancellor for further proceedings to be had in accordance with the statute. The appeal here prosecuted is therefore an appeal from an interlocutory decree entered by the chancellor in the course of the proceedings.

There are two contentions in reference to jurisdiction: First, want of jurisdiction is predicated upon section 1, chapter 269, Laws of 1914, which provides:

“If land in more than one county is embraced in the proposed district, the application shall be addressed to the chancery court of any county of such district, and all proceedings shall be had in such chancery court.”

Secondly, that the decree entered by the chancery court of Holmes county in the first proceeding is such a former adjudication as constitutes an absoute bar to the present proceeding in Leflore county.

The right of appellants to prosecute this appeal is not challenged by motion to dismiss or otherwise. The chancellor expressly granted an appeal, and both parties ask and insist that the point raised and briefed should *93be decided. Without, therefore, passing upon any question as to the right of appellants to appeal from the decree complained of, we proceed to a brief discussion and á decision of the one and only point presented; that is, whether the chancery court of Leflore county had jurisdiction, and. whether the plea of res adjudicata was properly overruled by the chancellor. No other point could now be decided. The latter part of section 4, chapter 269, Laws of 1914, provides:

“In any proceeding heretofore, or hereafter, had for the establishment of a ditch or drain, or the doing of any other thing deemed necessary when an engineer has been appointed, and has made complete surveys and reports thereof, and for - any reason the improvement has been abandoned, and the proceedings dismissed, and afterward proceedings are instituted for the establishment of a ditch or drain or for the doing of anything toward the prosecution of said work, for the reclamation of the same territory surveyed in said former proceedings, or a part thereof, and the territory additional thereto, the engineer’s reports, surveys, stakes and monuments made in former proceedings, as far as practicable, or so much thereof as may be applicable, and the cost thereof in said former proceedings, or such parts thereof as used, shall be paid for as a part of the subsequent proceeding in which such report, surveys, stakes and monuments, or a part thereof, are used.”

It is the province of the legislature to provide for the establishment of drainage districts and the authority, as well as the procedure, for the creation of the drainage district in this case is governed by the statutes. If the district is to be created out of territory situated in more than one county, the statute provides that the application shall be addressed to the chancery court of either county in which a portion of the lands may be situated, “and all proceedings shall be had *94in such chancery court.” This means nothing more than that the proceeding shall he had before the chancery court instead of before the board of supervisors. It does' not deprive the chancery court of Leflore county of jurisdiction in this case.

The plea of former adjudication is not well taken. The petitioners have proceeded under the authority of the statute, and proceedings are being taken by the chancery court of Leflore county looking to the permanent creation of a drainage district out of well-defined territory. "We do not regard this as a kind of proceeding in which the doctrine of former adjudication can be invoked, in the absence of an express statutory provision to that effect. The statutes under review make no provision for such a plea. On the contrary, the quoted provision of section 4, chapter 269, Laws of 1914, clearly indicate that more than one proceeding may be instituted for the establishment of a ditch or drain under the provisions of the statute. The legislature, in contemplating a subsequent proceeding," expressly provides that the engineer’s reports, surveys, stakes, and monuments made in the first proceeding shall be paid for as a part of the costs in a subsequent proceeding. The only judgment which the statute gives the force of the usual judgment at law is the order of the board of supervisors or the chancery court establishing a district. This final order establishing a district is by express provisions of section 3, chapter 269, LaAVs of 1914, given “all the force of a judgment,” and from this order any owner of real property is given the right of appeal. The proceeding being statutory, we must look to the statute for the available, grounds of remonstrance. A case in point is that of Heick v. Voight, 110 Ind. 279, 11 N. E. 306. In that case the answer pleaded an alleged former adjudication, and the supreme court of Indiana, by Mitchell, J., on this point said:

*95“The statute provides definite and particular grounds of remonstrance. Some of the answers presented, as a bar to the proceedings, grounds of objection which are not specified as grounds of remonstrance. The grounds of remonstrance cannot be enlarged by answers filed before a report of the commissioners is made. No provision is made for pleading a former adjudication. It is therefore to.be inferred that the legislature did not intend that one failure to secure the drainage petitioned for should bar all future attempts, if the petitioner was willing to run the hazard of paying the costs in case such subsequent efforts failed of success.”

The reason for this ruling is apparent. If an order of the board of supervisors or the chancery court dismissing the petition is given all the force of a judgment, it would operate for an indefinite length of time. A mistake might be made or conditions easily change. This is a statutory and administrative matter in which the public has an interest. Surely a technical rule of the common law should not be invoked to defeat a meritorious internal improvement; and the courts should not so'hold in the absence of an express statutory provision on the point. It is well that litigation should be ended, and we do not mean to say that a case could not arise indicating a fraudulent repetition of the same proceeding or an imposition upon the court and a possible case of estoppel.

The decree appealed from will be affirmed and the cause remanded for further proceedings.

Affirmed and remanded-

(dissenting).

I do not think the court has jurisdiction of the appeal so as to authorize it to decide the cause, and that the appeal should be dismissed by the court of its own motion. The appellees in their brief say: \

*96“We are aware of the fact that the appellants have no right to be heard in this court, and that this appeal should be dismissed, and this cause remanded to the chancery court of Leflore county for further proceedings until a decree is rendered, from which an appeal will lie as held in Drainage District v. Napence Plantation Co., 118 Miss. 493, 78 So. 709, and Clark v. Strong, 81 So. 643, but as such action would serve only to delay the cause and would leave the questions raised by these objectors undecided and all to he argued and insisted upon again, we have refrained from making a motion to dismiss the appeal, hoping that these questions may he finally decided and eliminated from the proceeding.”

In the case of Drainage District v. Napence Plantation Co., above cited, this court held that no appeal lies from the order of the chancellor complained of and sustained a motion to dismiss the proceeding because no appeal would lie from an order of this kind. In Clark v. Strong, 81 So. 643, upon motion to dismiss, the court said:

“The statute under which the [drainage] district is being formed does not provide for the appeal here attempted to be taken, and the orders and decrees made in the process of the creation of a drainage district were not within the general statutes regulating appeals from the chancery court.”

It is well settled' in Mississippi that the right of this court to entertain appeals is dependent upon statute, and where there is no appeal allowed by statute this court has no jurisdiction to entertain an appeal. It is equally well settled in this state that jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon this court by consent so as to give it a right to entertain an appeal not provided for by law. In Ward v. Whitfield, 64 Miss. 754, 2 So. 493, the court held that where no appeal is provided for by statute and the lower court grants an appeal authorized by law that this court will apply the corrective *97by dismissing of its own motion sncb appeals.. Cooper, C. J., delivering the opinion of the court, at page 761 of 64 Miss., 2 So. 495, said :

“We would have disposed of these appeals with a simple order of affirmance but for the opportunity afforded by them to again admonish chancellors, that appeals from interlocutory decrees ought not to be granted unless the principles of the case can be settled upon such appeals. In the progress of chancery pro-. ceedings very many interlocutory decrees are made, and it is but natural that parties should desire to avail themselves of every opportunity afforded for appeals. But the statute authorizing appeals from such decrees can have application only when the principles governing the cause may be settled by the appeal, or where the chancellor doubts the correctness of his conclusion, and costs and delay may be avoided by the appeal. It is not the purpose of the statute to afford appeals to this court merely because litigants are dissatisfied with such interlocutory decrees; ordinarily, the interests of all parties will be advanced, and justice more speedily and economically administered by proceeding to final decree. Unless the evil of frequent appeals is removed by the action of the lower courts, this court will apply the corrective by dismissing ex mero motu appeals improvidently granted.”

In Greve v. McGee, 92 Miss. 190, 45 So. 706, the court of its own motion dismissed an appeal to this court not allowed by the chancellor.

So I say the court of its own motion ought to dismiss the appeal in this case. The opinion rendered by the majority does not hold that the court has jurisdiction by the statute, and the above cases are not overruled, but the court has entertained the appeal as a matter of mere grace and favor to the litigants. If I understand them, the majority reserved the right to dismiss such appeals whenever a motion is made to *98do so, and will consider themselves bound by the cases quoted from the appellee’s brief. In my opinion all litigants as to appeals should have equal rights before this court, and appeals should be entertained as of right and not otherwise. In legal effect the opinion of ’ the majority is not an opinion of this court, as such, but is a mere opinion of five learned lawyers who happen to occupy positions in this court. I prefer not to express my own opinion on the merits presented, and it seems to me that the question as to whether the question presented is a judicial question is open to doubt. The creation of a drainage district seems to be a legislative function, and it is doubtful whether the controversy is a judicial one, at least I deem it sufficiently so to have that question determined after argument and investigation in a real suit where the question is presented.