Staple Cotton Co-Op. Ass'n v. Buckley

Counsel

R.C. McBee, for appellant. At the time the injunction was sued out, it was rightfully sued out and the law is that "where an injunction was rightfully sued out . . . it is error to allow damages and attorneys' fees for filing an answer and motion to dissolve the injunction" even though the injunction was afterwards dissolved. U.S. Fidelity Guaranty Co. v. Jackson, 123 Miss. 676 . The only damages allowed were the attorneys' fees. This, we submit, should not have been allowed. When the relief prayed for is injunctive relief alone, then it is proper to allow solicitors' fees as damages, when the injunction is dissolved. But when the injunction is incidental, solicitors' fees should not be allowed. Griffith's Miss. Chy. Practice, sec. 464, citing Howell v. McLeod, 127 Miss. 1 ; Valentine v. McGrath, 52 Miss. 112 . Shands, Elmore Causey, for appellee. Our court has settled the proposition that where the bill is dismissed after answer filed, and motion to dissolve has been made, it is conclusive that the injunction was wrongfully sued out. Yale v. Baum, 70 Miss. 225 ; Rubon v. Stephen, 25 Miss. 253 ; Alexander v. Wood, 115 Miss. 169 ; Trust Co. v. Fitz Patrick, 71 Miss. 347 . This is one of the few principles which seems to be uniformly adhered to by all the courts of the country in the matter of an injunction, and is conclusive of the proposition that some damages should be allowed upon the dismissal of the bill. It is unnecessary to cite any further authorities to sustain the proposition that upon the dismissal of the bill asking for an injunction by complainant that this is a final determination of the suit, and that it is the duty of the chancellor upon the request of a defendant who has given notice of his claim for damages to proceed to assess same, and that a reasonable attorney's fee for legal services in and about the dissolution of the injunction is a proper element of damage. R.C. McBee, in reply, for appellant. The only sort of damages proven or attempted to be proven by Buckley were for attorney's fees. No other sort of damages was alleged in his suggestion of damages. Therefore, no other kind of damages were pleaded or proven. The injunction was merely incidental. It was one of many kinds of relief claimed. The question before the court on this appeal is whether solicitor's fees should be allowed on the dissolution of such an injunction. This court has prescribed the condition under which attorney's fees may be allowed, and the only condition under which attorney's fees are allowed is where injunctive relief only is sought. This is the test. If other relief is sought and the injunction is incidental, then the attorney's fees are not allowable. Griffith's Miss. Chancery Practice, sec. 464; Howell v. McLeod, 127 Miss. 1 ; Valentine v. McGrath, 52 Miss. 112 . In a case having as its basis the marketing agreement of the association, founded on the bill, which is almost a literal copy of the bill in this case, this court held: "There are two kinds of an injunction." Staple Cotton Ass'n v. Borodofsky, 104 So. 91 . Referring to the case of Derdeyn v. Donovan, 81 Miss. 696 , from the syllabus it appears that one kind is "the suit for other relief than the injunction itself" and the other kind is "the suit for no other relief than by injunction itself." Under these authorities and under what we now take to be the well established rule of the court, no damages should have been awarded in this case. Appellee cites Yale v. Baum, 70 Miss. 225 . There the only relief sought was injunctive relief. Argued orally by R.C. McBee, for appellant, and A.W. Shands, for appellee.