Mississippi Supreme Court, 1933

Lintonia Building & Loan Ass'n v. McRaven

Mississippi Supreme Court · Decided October 23, 1933 · McGowen

150 So. 213; 167 Miss. 803; 1933 Miss. LEXIS 145 (Southern Reporter)

Counsel

J.G. Holmes, of Yazoo City, for appellants. The sole question in this case is whether or not the will of the decedent creates a trust for the payment of his debts. It is the contention of the appellants that it does, and that, therefore, the decree of the chancellor holding to the contrary should be reversed. Gordon v. MacDougall, 84 Miss. 715 , 37 So. 298; O'Rielly v. Missouri McGuiggan et al., 91 Miss. 498 , 44 So. 968. In the outset we recognize the general principle that a mere direction in a will that the testator's debts be paid, followed by devises of his estate, is not of itself sufficient to create a trust for the payment of his debts. Cudahy Packing Co. v. C.E. Miller's Estate, 103 Miss. 435 , 60 So. 574; Cohn v. McClintock, 107 Miss. 831 , 66 So. 217; Stevens v. Dunlap Mercantile Co., 108 Miss. 690 , 67 So. 160. In determining whether or not a will creates a trust for the payment of debts, an easy test is whether or not the testator has done more in the application of his estate as a whole to the payment of his debts than his executor would ordinarily be required to do under the law. Gordon v. MacDougall, 84 Miss. 715 . The testator here not only blended in one common mass his real and personal estate, obliterating all differences which the law makes between the two as to the order of liability in the payment of debts, but he did not devise and bequeath his whole estate, both real and personal, except "after all legal debts are satisfied." In other words, by this language of the will, he made the payment of his debts a condition precedent to the absoluteness of any entire bequest and devise in his will. Fenwick v. Chapman, 9 Peters 461, 9 U.S. (L.Ed.) 193. The devise and bequest was made subject to the payment of his debts, just as was true in the case of Hanson v. Davis, 132 Miss. 81 , 95 So. 787, wherein the court held that the will under such circumstances created a trust for the payment of the debts of the testator. Wise Bridgforth and Barbour Henry, all of Yazoo City, for appellees. Extrinsic evidence of the circumstances surrounding the testimony on the execution of a will is always admissible to explain ambiguities; and a will is read by the courts in the light of such circumstances, subject to the requirement that the plainly expressed language of a will shall not be altered or changed. 28 R.C.L. 270 et seq.; 28 R.C.L. 235, 236. Appellants seek a reversal of the decree of the chancellor and ask this court to hold that the expression in the will of J.W. McRaven "after all legal debts are satisfied" created a trust for the payment of his debts. Realizing the weakness of his position on the wording of the will, he relies on the case of Gordon v. McDougall, 84 Miss. 715 , which goes no further than to hold that a will should be construed in the light of conditions surrounding the testator at the time he made the will. The essential requirements of a trust for payment of debts are that the testator shall so charge his property with the payment of his debts as to amount to an actual gift of his property expressly in trust for that purpose, and to directly change the ordinary course of administration of the estate so as to insure, to the limit of the property so passing, their payment. Hill v. Abbay, 64 Miss. 358 , 1 So. 484; Gordon v. McDougall, 84 Miss. 715 ; O'Reilly v. McGuiggan, 91 Miss. 498 , 44 So. 986; Rainey v. Rainey, 124 Miss. 780 , 87 So. 128; Harrison v. Davis, 132 Miss. 81 , 95 So. 787. Trusts for the payment of debts are not to be raised by implication or conjecture. Gwin v. Nettles, 18 So. 798; Cohn v. McClintock, 207 Miss. 831 , 66 So. 217; Stevens v. Dunlap Mercantile Co., 108 Miss. 690 , 67 So. 160. There is nothing in the words to evidence any desire whatever that the testator's debts should be paid. He does not even say "my debts" or "all just debts" or "all my just debts." In view of the absence of the usual phrase desiring that the just debts be paid, the use of the word "legal" implies the contrary to the interpretation sought to be put on the will by the appellant. By "legal debts" the word "legal" implies only the debts which must be paid before a distribution can be made. It would have been very easy for this man to have created a trust in language not ambiguous, if he had desired to do so. All he had to say was that his debts were to be paid with his exempt insurance, if necessary, but he does not do so, and there is nothing in the language to justify any such interpretation as is sought by appellant.

Opinion of the Court

*806 McGowen, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Upon an issue made up between the executrix, the legatees of J. W. McRaven, and certain creditors, this case was submitted to the chancery court for a construction of his will. The will was executed on January 26, 1931, and the testator died October 1,1931. The will presented for construction is in the following language:

“State of Mississippi, County of Yazoo.

“I, J. W. McRaven, Yazoo City, Mississippi hereby make and declare this to be my last will and testament.

“I give and bequeath my whole estate, both personal and real as follows: In consideration of the services rendered in keeping house and making a home for me for eight years after my wife’s death, I give to my daughter, Margaret McRaven, fifteen hundred dollars ($1,500) the balance of my estate, after all legal debts are satisfied, except the household effects such as furniture, silverware, etc., to be equally divided between all my children, to-wit: Will Henry McRaven; Margaret McRaven, Evie Louise Pepper; Lucil'e McRaven, Annette McRaven. The disposition of the household goods is left to the discretion of Margaret McRaven. I appoint Margaret McRaven, of Yazoo City, Mississippi, executrix of this my last will and testament without bond. This will is written with my own hand and revokes all previous wills made by me.

“This 26 day of January, 1931.

“[Signed] J. W. McRaven. ”

*807 Upon the filing of an inventory and petition for construction, it appeared that the estate of J. W. McRaven, aside from his household goods, was exempt, after the payment of the one thousand five hundred dollar legacy, from the payment of debts, being the proceeds of an insurance policy.

The question presented to the court was whether or not, from the language of the will, after paying the bequest of the one thousand five hundred dollars, his estate, real, personal, and mixed, was exempt or nonexempt from the payment of his legal debts, or whether the residuary legatees could take the balance freed from his debts.

Viewing the will as a whole, with the admitted facts shown by the record, there being no other evidence, we have no difficulty in arriving at the conclusion that the testator directed, first, that one thousand five hundred dollars be paid to Margaret McRaven; and, second, that his legal debts be paid from the balance of his estate, whether exempt or not, omitting from the clause his “household effects” which he did not devote to the payment of his debts.

The only logical construction of the will is that the testator intended his legal debts to be paid, and that he charged the balance of his estate, except his household goods, with the payment thereof, and, when the debts had been so paid, the balance, if any, was bequeathed or devised to the named legatees.

We have reached this conclusion after an examination of the following cases: Gordon v. McDougall, 84 Miss. 715, 37 So. 298, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 355; O’Reilly v. McGuiggan, 91 Miss. 498, 44 So. 986, 15 Ann. Cas. 623; Cohn v. McClintock, 107 Miss. 831, 66 So. 217, and Stevens v. Dunlap Mercantile Co., 108 Miss. 690, 67 So. 160.

The language is clear, and the environment of the testator in the case at bar would most probably not shed any light upon the language used by him in disposing of his property and in charging the balance of his estate with the payment of his legal debts.

*808 The chancellor, by his decree, held that the residuary legatees took the exempt property freed from the decedent’s debts, in which conclusion we think he was in error.

We express no opinion as to the small claim not probated, but remand the case to the court below to be further proceeded with in accordance with the construction of the will which we have here announced.

Reversed and remanded.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.