Barbour Henry, of Yazoo City, for appellant.
That the appellee is maintaining and operating a plant is amply supported by the following authorities defining a "plant." If it is a "plant" of necessity it is as the head line defines it a "Meat Distributing Plant," and no other.
The word plant includes anything (as distinguished from persons) animate or inanimate whether fixed or movable that is regularly used in the conduct of the business of an employer, and that is either way, work or machinery, and without which or something of similar character the business could not be carried on in the usual and ordinary manner.
Lipstein v. Provident Loan Society, 154 App. Div. 732 .
Plant in its ordinary sense includes whatever apparatus is used by a business man in carrying on his business not his stock in trade but what he keeps for permanent employment.
State ex rel. v. Moss, 107 So. 555; Wiley v. Solvey Process Co., 109 N.E. 666 ; Holland Store Company v. Spencer, 77 So. 165.
Plant means the fixture, machinery, tools, apparatus appliances, etc., necessary to carry on any trade or business of any mechanical operation or process.
Nelson v. Downstein, 249 S.W. 241 ; 48 C.J. 1220.
The ultimate duty and responsibility of construction is upon the court, and departmental interpretation cannot well be resorted to where the language of the statute is plain. Before we are justified in accepting departmental construction of the law under consideration it must be doubtful, ambiguous or uncertain.
State v. Grenada Cotton Compress Co., 123 Miss. 191 .
The fact that appellee paid the privilege for operating a wholesale store (Sec. 189 of Chapter 88, Laws 1930) does not exempt it from the payment of the additional privilege levied by this section involved.
Section 3 of the act provides for the payment of the privilege on "every person desiring to engage in any business, or exercise any privilege hereinafter specified" the license being good for one year. By sections 220, 221 and 222, the license shall be upon each business or privilege conducted. It is manifest the statute taxes each privilege enjoyed, regardless of the number as Section 222 so provides. The act defines various professions, businesses and callings and taxes each. It specifically taxes certain plants.
It is manifest that under Section 222 other privilege taxes are imposed upon the defendant, in addition to the one for "stores."
If it sold oleomargerine, or maintained a gas or oil station, under Section 89 of the act, or maintained an oil depot under Section 137 of the act, could it be seriously contended it would not owe the privilege tax required. There is no more reason for saying that it does not owe the tax on a "Meat Distributing Plant" which it maintains in addition to its wholesale store. In other words its license to operate a wholesale store does not cover those other privileges which might be enjoyed in conjunction with its store, and which have by express terms been taxed.
Sam V. Anderson, of Greenville, and Butler Snow, of Jackson, for appellee.
It is to be assumed that the Legislature passed the act of 1930 in full view of the well known custom of business and course of dealing; that it imposed the taxes upon wholesale stores known to be engaged in the business of buying and selling meats in the ordinary and usual course of trade and temporarily stored them in coolers or refrigerators pending sale. Wholesale grocery stores at that time bought and sold meats. Many of them at that time had coolers and refrigerators in which they kept their meats to preserve them and keep them fresh and from deteriorating, pending sale and delivery. Refrigerators and coolers in this modern day are necessary to the proper equipment of a wholesale grocer, a retail grocer and the modern home.
Privileges are taxed in reference to the known course of business.
Ex Parte Taylor, 58 Miss. 482 ; Mitchell v. City of Meridian, 67 Miss. 644 ; Carney v. Hamilton, 89 Miss. 747 , 42 So. 378; Levee Commissioners v. Oil Company, 91 Miss. 480 ; Revenue Agent v. Texas Oil Company, 141 Miss. 356 , 106 So. 449 ; State v. Pons, 107 Miss. 619 , 65 So. 645; Planters Lumber Co. v. Wells, 147 Miss. 279 .
When the Legislature imposed a privilege tax upon wholesale stores, including grocery stores, they taxed the same with reference to the known course of business, and with a common understanding of what was embraced in and comprehended by a wholesale store or a wholesale grocery store.
Folkes v. State, 63 Miss. 81 ; Pitt v. Vicksburg, 72 Miss. 181 , 16 So. 418; Craig v. Patterson, 74 Miss. 881 , 21 So. 756.
The history of the statutes and the analysis of other sections of chapter 88, Laws 1930, show that in imposing a privilege tax upon "meat distributing plants" the
Legislature did not intend to require a wholesaler in selling meats to pay, in addition to the store tax, a license fee of five hundred dollars to sell meats.
The word "plant" may embrace a store, as shown by the authorities cited by appellant, and others that may be cited. But it is manifest that the Legislature did not use the word "plant" in section 121 in the sense of a store, or as intending thereby to impose a special tax upon a wholesale merchant selling meat.
It is obvious that the Legislature used the word "plant" in the sense of an establishment, with fixtures, machinery, etc., where something was manufactured, processed or converted, and not in the sense of a storehouse where commodities are bought from various producers, manufacturers, jobbers, etc., and temporarily placed in a refrigerator pending sale.
The heading of the statute "Meat Distributing Plants" is important in determining the meaning of Section 121.
J.B. Gully, State Tax Collector v. International Company, decided February 20th, 1933, 165 Miss. 103 .
Laws imposing privilege taxes are liberally construed in favor of the citizens and courts will not extend the statute imposing such taxes beyond the clear meaning of the language employed.
Bluff City Ry. Co. v. Clark, 95 Miss. 689 , 49 So. 177.
The rule is well settled that laws imposing duties or taxes are not to be construed beyond the natural import of the language and are never to be construed as imposing burdens upon citizens upon doubtful interpretations.
Ex Parte Taylor, 58 Miss. 478 ; Y. M.V.R.R. Co. v. State, 62 Miss. 195 ; State v. Union Tank Car Co., 119 So. 310 , 151 Miss. 797 ; Planters Lumber Company v. Wells, 147 Miss. 279 , 112 So. 9 ; Bell v. Currie, 80 Miss. 179 ; Wilby v. State, 93 Miss. 667 ; Greenwood v. Bank, 75 Miss. 162 , 21 So. 747; Ex Parte Ferguson, 59 Miss. 13
; Jackson v. Newman, 59 Miss. 385 ; State v. Grenada Cotton Compress Co., 123 Miss. 191 , 85 So. 137; Sperry Hutchinson v. Harbison, 123 Miss. 674 , 86 So. 455; Robertson v. Texas Oil Co., 141 Miss. 356 , 106 So. 449 ; Miller v. I.C.R.R. Co., 146 Miss. 422 , 111 So. 558 ; State v. Grenada Cotton Compress Co., 123 Miss. 191 , 55 So. 137; Board of Levee Commissioners v. Howze Merc. Co., 149 Miss. 843 , 116 So. 92 .
We grant that the Legislature may classify. In the privilege tax statute, they have classified, wholesale and retail stores, wharfs and trading boats, lumber yards, warehouses, meat markets, etc., as all constituting stores. But this court will not impute to the Legislature an intent to discriminate.
Smith v. Perkins, 112 Miss. 870 , 73 So. 797; Johnson v. Long Furniture Co., 113 Miss. 373 , 74 So. 283; Hyland v. Sharp, 88 Miss. 567 , 41 So. 264; Adams, State Revenue Agent, v. Standard Oil Company, 97 Miss. 879 ; 4 Ency. U.S. Sup. Ct. Rep. 362, 363; Chicago, etc., Ry. Co. v. Westby, 178 Fed. 619; Railroad Company v. Adams, 90 Miss. 559 , 45 So. 91; Vicksburg v. Mullins, 106 Miss. 217 ; Adams, Revenue Agent, v. Mississippi Lumber Co., 84 Miss. 23 , 36 So. 68; Toomes v. Sharkey, 106 So. 273 .
We respectfully submit that if the act is given the construction which appellant's counsel contend for, it creates an arbitrary discrimination and seemingly runs counter to the equal protection clause of the State Constitution.
And if two constructions of a statute are admissible and to construe it one way would present grave constitutional questions, the court will adopt such construction as will eliminate the question of the constitutionality of the statute.
New Orleans, etc., R.R. v. State, 110 Miss. 290 , 70 So. 355; Staple Cotton Coop. Assn. v. Hemphill, 142 Miss. 298 , 107 So. 24 .
Shortly after chapter 88, Laws of 1930, became operative numerous inquiries were made of the Attorney-General as to the application of section 121 thereof. The Attorney-General undertook to answer all of these inquiries in one opinion. He ruled that one conducting the kind and character of business conducted by the appellee was not liable for the five hundred dollars tax imposed upon meat distributing plant, and that the statute would apply to such concerns as Swift, Armour and Wilson.
The court takes judicial knowledge of the Attorney-General's ruling. He is required by law to give his opinion. Two sessions of the Legislature were held after this opinion was given and before this suit was filed. The Legislature made no effort to change the statute. And if it be true that there is reasonable ground to contend that the statute taxes the business conducted by appellee, then departmental construction may be resorted to.
Briscoe v. Busby, 143 So. 887; Gully, State Tax Collector, v. International Co., 165 Miss. 103 .
Argued orally by George Butler, for the appellee.