Mississippi Supreme Court, 1939

R. H. Green Wholesale Co. v. Hall

R. H. Green Wholesale Co. v. Hall
Mississippi Supreme Court · Decided January 23, 1939 · Griffith
185 So. 807; 184 Miss. 296; 1939 Miss. LEXIS 44 (Southern Reporter)

Counsel

Hall Hall, of Columbia, and Lotterhos Travis and Vardaman S. Dunn, all of Jackson, for appellant. The lower court should have granted appellant's requested peremptory instructions against all three appellees, for the reason that the sale of the seed must be taken and considered as a sale to the "Rowan Hall Store," a retail establishment, and the implied warranty that the seed were true to name did not inure to the benefit of appellees, since there was no privity of contract. Pease Dwyer Co. v. Somers Planting Co., 130 Miss. 147 , 93 So. 673; D. Rosenbaum's Sons v. Davis Andrews Co., 111 Miss. 278 , 71 So. 388; Royal Feed Milling Co. v. Thorne, 142 Miss. 92 , 107 So. 282 . The circuit court was without jurisdiction to try this case, since the claim of each appellee, under their amended declaration, was less than the $200 necessary to confer jurisdiction. Sections 490 and 494, Code of 1930. Where several claimants have separate and distinct demands against a defendant or defendants, and join in a single suit to enforce them, they cannot be added together to make up the required jurisdictional amount, but each separate claim furnishes the jurisdictional test. 72 A.L.R., pages 193-224. We respectfully submit that the case at bar comes within the general rule that claims cannot be added together to make up the required jurisdictional amount where several claimants have separate and distinct demands against a defendant and join in a single suit to enforce them. Oswald v. Morris, 92 Ky. 48 , 17 S.W. 167; Miller v. Carlisle, 127 Cal. 327 , 59 P. 785 , 127 Cal. 331 , 59 P. 112; Henderson v. Carbondale Coal Coke Co., 140 U.S. 25 , 35 L.Ed. 332, 11 S.Ct. 691. Martin Farr, of Prentiss, for appellees. We do not intend to burden the court with a long list of citations on estoppel, but it seems to us that there is no element of estoppel here on appellees. There is no showing at all that there is any causal connection between the corn sold to the appellees and the same corn sold to the store, as appellant claims, as would be any basis for estoppel. It is the same corn. Appellant is only seeking to evade liability — that's all. Nobody misled this salesman. It is a known fact that merchants order things many times for farmers, that is, they are the agents for farmers and there is no law we know of that would penalize a farmer either criminally or by estoppel, etc., in so doing. We submit that the evidence shows that we do have privity of contract and that all these issues were submitted to the jury, the judgment of the court only applying the law to the issue of fact found by the jury. Winter-Loeb Grocery Co. v. Boykin, 82 So. 437 ; Grafton-Stamps Drug Co. v. Williams, 105 Miss. 296 , 62 So. 273; Lollar v. Jones, 157 So. 209 . We understand, of course, that jurisdiction may be raised anywhere and we say we properly filed the suit and that there is no error in the question of jurisdiction vel non. Judgments may be rendered for or against one or more of several plaintiffs or for or against one or more of several defendants; and in such case the verdict shall be as the right may appear among the several parties to the action and shall state separately any amount allowed to any of the parties. Section 605, Code of 1930; Hodges v. Town of Drew, 159 So. 298 ; Gillespie v. Olive Branch Bldg. Lbr. Co., 164 So. 42 ; Aven v. Singleton, 132 Miss. 256 , 96 So. 165. Court of law has inherent power to consolidate pending cases when they are between same parties, plaintiff and defendant, depend on the same, or substantially the same, facts and when thereby the interests of economy and expedition would be subserved and especially when actions might in first instance been brought in one suit. R.R. Co. v. Miss. Clinic, 152 Miss. 869 , 120 So. 187 . In Drysdale v. Canning Co., 67 Miss. 534 , our court held that a creditor may not divide a cause of action, though consisting of different items, and bring several suits. Having distinct demands against the same debtor, he may unite them in one suit, but is not compelled to do so. McLendon v. Pass, 66 Miss. 110 . Our court held in R.R. Co. v. Hitt et al., 99 Miss. 679 , 55 So. 484, that where plaintiff honestly believes and contends for a recovery of a sum above the jurisdiction of the justice of the peace, the circuit court has right to entertain jurisdiction. Fenn v. Harrington, 54 Miss. 733 ; Ball v. Sledge, 82 Miss. 479 .

R. H. Green Wholesale Co. v. Hall

Opinion of the Court

*300 Griffith, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

Bowan Hall, for himself and as agent of his brothers Beed Hall and Borne Hall, bought from appellant a bushel of a seed corn, represented by appellant to be Hastings Prolific Seed Com. Upon the delivery, the three brothers divided the bushel among themselves, each taking his part, and each planted his part of the seed on his own separate land, so that in the crops produced there was no common or joint interest in the three brothers, but the interest of each therein was separate and distinct as to his own crop.

The seed corn delivered by appellant was not Hastings Prolific Seed Com, but an extremely inferior seed, with the result that the crops were far short of what would have been produced had the seed corn been of the variety warranted by appellant. The three brothers joined as plaintiffs in a suit in the circuit court, the amended declaration demanding as damages for Bowan Hall $117.50, for Beed Hall $175, and for Borne Hall $75.50.

Under Section 171, Const. 1890, original jurisdiction in actions at law wherein the amount in controversy shall not exceed the sum of $200 is vested in justices of the peace, and under Section 156 the circuit court has no jurisdiction of such petty demands, except on appeal. It is observed that the separate demand of each of the plaintiffs is less than $200, while the sum of the three exceeds that amount. The question is whether such separate and distinct demands may be joined in a single suit so as to make up an amount sufficient to confer original jurisdiction on the circuit court.

That the claims joined in this case are in law separate *301 and distinct is well disclosed by the illustration used in Newton Oil & Mfg. Co. v. Sessum, 102 Miss. 181, 189, 59 So. 9, 10, wherein the Court said: Two or more owners of mills propelled by water are interested in preventing an obstruction above that shall interfere with the down-flow of the water,- and may unite to restrain or abate it as a nuisance; but they cannot, hence, united in an action for damages, for, as to the injury suffered, there is no community of interest. There is no more a common interest than though a carrier had, at one time, carelessly destroyed property belonging to different persons, or the lives of different passengers. ’ ’

The jurisdictional question involved being one which is controlled by the Constitution itself, no statutory device or rule of practice can be invoked to avoid or circumvent the plain provisions of the Constitution on the subject. The rule as regards actions, at law for damages seems to be without dissent as follows: Where several claimants have separate and distinct demands against a defendant or defendants and join in a single suit to enforce them, they cannot be added together to make up the required jurisdictional amount, but each separate claim furnishes the jurisdictional test. An elaborate annotation disclosing and supporting the rule, as stated, is found in 72 A. L. R. p. 193 et seq. It follows that the circuit court had no jurisdiction of the action, and that the judgment must be reversed and the cause dismissed, but without prejudice to actions separately instituted in the proper court. It may be said that the constitutional provision in question works a hardship in this case, but we have no dispensing power over it.

Reversed and dismissed without prejudice.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.