Mississippi Supreme Court, 1941

Board of Supervisors v. Mid-South Mfg. Co.

Mississippi Supreme Court · Decided April 28, 1941 · Anderson, Roberds, Smith

1 So. 2d 802; 190 Miss. 812; 1941 Miss. LEXIS 103 (Southern Reporter, Second Series)

Counsel

W.D. Conn, Jr., Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. A statute is to be strictly construed against exemption from taxation or other public burdens, and the party seeking such exemption must come strictly within the letter of the statute. Brick Lbr. Co. v. Miller, 123 Miss. 850 , 86 So. 579; R.R. Co. v. Thomas, 65 Miss. 553 , 5 So. 108; Ice Coal Co. v. Greenville, 69 Miss. 96 , 10 So. 574; State v. Simmons, 70 Miss. 485 , 12 So. 477; Leaf Hotel v. Hattiesburg, 168 Miss. 304 , 150 So. 779 ; Barnes v. Jones, 139 Miss. 675 ,, 22 So. 944. It is clear to us that the exemption from all ad valorem taxation was extended only to those industries which were organized under the provisions of the Industrial Act. All others, if entitled to any exemption at all, were necessarily required to obtain that exemption under the provisions of the general law relating thereto, namely, Section 3109, Code of 1930, and amendments thereto. Gully v. Casualty Co., 176 Miss. 388 , 168 So. 609. All statutes in pari materia must be considered together. Barrett v. Cedar Hill School Dist., 123 Miss. 370 , 85 So. 125; Jackson County v. Worth, 127 Miss. 813 , 90 So. 588; Greaves v. Hinds County, 166 Miss. 89 , 145 So. 900 . In construing statutes the court will look to the entire legislation upon the subject and determine the policy of the Legislature from a consideration of all such legislation. Ice Co. v. Bd. of Sup'rs, 171 Miss. 515 , 157 So. 689 . Where there are two apparently conflicting statutes upon the same subject matter, the court will construe them, if possible, so as to harmonize each with the other. Bd. of Sup'rs v. Bay St. Louis, 157 Miss. 459 , 128 So. 331 ; Greaves v. Hinds County, 166 Miss. 89 ; State v. U.S.F. G. Co., 157 Miss. 740 , 128 So. 503 ; Life Casualty Co. v. Walters, 180 Miss. 384 , 177 So. 47 . The additional verbiage in Section 19 of the Industrial Act "or otherwise hereafter established" would not have the effect of bringing all new industries "otherwise established" out of the provisions of Section 3109 of the Code, as amended. Otherwise, the Legislature stands indicted and convicted of doing a vain and foolish thing by continuing to amend Section 3109. Guy Mitchell, Jr., of Tupelo, for appellee. The words "or otherwise hereafter established" were not a part of Section 19, Chapter 1, Extraordinary Session, Laws of 1936, as it was reported from the Committee. They were added as a committee amendment while the bill was being considered on the floor of the House (House Journal, First Extraordinary Session 1936, page 810). Under Code Section 3109 new enterprises backed by private capital could only obtain exemption from county and municipal taxes, while under the B.A.W.I. competing firms with buildings furnished at public expense would obtain exemption from all ad valorem taxes on its property. To remedy this situation the amendment above mentioned was offered and adopted. It was the expressed intent of the Legislature to give the same tax exemption to new industries organized under the general statutes as given to those organized under the terms of the B.A.W.I. At the time of the passage of the B.A.W.I. some members of the Legislature were doubtful as to its constitutionality. The Legislature was not willing to repeal Section 3109 of the Code for the reason that if the B.A.W.I. had been held unconstitutional the State would have been left without an exemption statute. Sec. 21, Chap. 1, First Extraordinary Session 1936. The case of Meador v. Mac-Smith Garment Co., 191 So. 129 , is complete authority for the holding of the circuit court in the instant case. In that case the Mac-Smith Garment Company was incorporated under the laws of the State of Mississippi and not under the terms of the B.A.W.I. Suit was brought to enjoin the sheriff from selling the property of the company and from attempting to collect taxes. The Mac-Smith Garment Company claimed a five-year exemption from all ad valorem taxation on the factory site, building, machinery and equipment. The court then proceeded to affirm the action of the lower court in granting the injunction restraining the sheriff from the sale of the property or the collection of taxes. Argued orally by W.D. Conn, Jr., for appellant, and by Guy Mitchell, Jr., for appellee.

Opinion of the Court

Anderson, J.,

delivered the opinion of the court.

The question in this case is whether or not appellee, a garment manufacturing corporation, is entitled to exemption from all ad valorem taxes both state and local for the five-year period beginning the 10th of December, 1938. The board of supervisors granted the exemption. The exemption covered only the machinery and equipment. The appeal is from that order.

The statutes involved are Section 3109 of the Code of 1930-, and amendments thereto and Chapter 1, Section 19 of the 1st Extraordinary Session of 1936. The Code section was amended by Chapter 293 of the Laws of 1932, Chapter 159 of the Laws of 1936, and Chapter 76 of the Laws of the Extraordinary Session of 1938. In all the amendments, the exemption from ad valorem taxes except state ad valorem taxes was preserved in substantially the same language as in the Code section. Chapter 1 of the Acts of the First Extraordinary Session of 1936 is known as the “Balance Agriculture with Industry Statute.” By Section 19’ of that act it was provided among’ other things, “All new factories and new enterprises of public utility hereafter established under the provisions of this act or otherwise hereafter established as hereinafter enumerated shall be exempt from all ad valorem taxation on tangible property used in or necessary to the operation of the service or industry hereinafter named, but not upon the products thereof, for a period of five (5) years.” By its own language this act was limited in its operation to April 1, 1940. It was adopted according to its terms to provide relief from an economic emergency.

*817 This, therefore, was the situation; in the latter part of 1938, when the garment factory was organized and exempted .by order of the board of supervisors from all ad valorem taxes, there stood on the one hand the B.A.W.I. statute expressly authorizing such exemption, while on the other hand there stood Section 3109 of the Code of 1930 and amendments thereto which extended the exemption to local ad valorem taxes, hut not state ad valorem taxes. Manifestly, the Code section and amendments were intended to express the permanent policy of the State, while the B.A.W.I. statute was intended to express only a temporary policy. Construing them together, we are of opinion that the Legislature intended by the latter statute while in force that the exemption therein provided should extend to corporations chartered and organized during that period under any other statutes as' well as those organized under that statute, and that when the B.A.W.I. statute expired by limitation the Code section and amendments should control in the future. In other words, the Legislature intended that there should he no discrimination in favor, of the B.A.W.I. corporations against others organized while that statute was in force. The committee amendment which was adopted to' Section 19 of the B.A.W.I. act while that act was pending in the House supports this construction. This amendment is shown at page 810 of the House Journal of the First Extraordinary Session of 1936. It is in this language: “Committee Amendment No. 33: Amend Section 19 by inserting after the word ‘act’ in line two thereof the words ‘or otherwise hereafter established as hereinafter enumerated.’ ”

This question was not discussed in Meador v. Mac-Smith Garment Co., 188 Miss. 98, 191 So. 129, but it was necessarily involved, for .if the construction we are placing on these statutes is not the correct one, that, case should have been decided contrary to the way it was.

Affirmed.

Dissenting Opinion

*818 Dissenting Opinion.

Roberds, J.,

delivered a dissenting opinion.

I cannot agree that appellee corporation is exempt from state ad valorem taxes. It was not established under the “Balance Agriculture with Industry Statute.” It was incorporated December 10th, 1938, under the general incorporated laws of the State, and was established after chapter 76', Extraordinary Session of 1938, which became effective August 20, 1938; and that act expressly states that such enterprises are not exempt from state ad valorem taxes.

The factory in the Meador case was established as a new enterprise in December, 1936, after the enactment of chapter 1, Laws First Extraordinary Session 1936, which superseded chapter 159, General Laws 1936, The taxes involved in the Meador case were for 1937, and therefore governed by chapter 1, First Extraordinary 1936. Chapter 76, Extraordinary Session 1938, conflicts with, and therefore supersedes, chapter 1, First Extraordinary Session of 1936,

“It is familiar learning that exemptions from taxation will never be presumed, and that the burden is upon the claimant of exemptions to establish clearly his right to such exemptions. Exemptions are to be strictly construed.” Jackson Fertilizer Company v. Stone, 173 Miss. 183, 162 So. 170, 172; Barnes v. Jones, 139 Miss. 675, 103 So. 773, 43 A. L. R. 673; Morris Ice Co. v. Adams, 75 Miss. 410; 22 So. 944; Gulfport Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. City of Gulfport, 155 Miss. 498, 124 So. 658; Millsaps College v. City of Jackson, 136 Miss. 795, 101 So. 574, Id., 275 U. S. 129, 48 S. Ct. 94, 72 L. Ed. 196.

Smith, C. J., concurs in this opinion.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.