F.M. Morris, of Hattiesburg, for appellant.
The main question for determination by this court in this cause is whether the interest of C.C. Smith, intervener, appellee herein, is superior to the right of the set-off of said judgment by the appellant.
Appellee herein relied successfully in the court below upon the case of Harris v. Hazlehurst Oil-Mill Manufacturing Co., 78 Miss. 603 , 30 So. 273. This case is not applicable for two reasons. First, the above case was an equitable assignment to an attorney for a fee before a suit was begun and was governed by equitable principles which were uncontrolled by statutory laws. Second, the above case is not applicable to the facts of this case and to the law of this case for the reason that the decided case was based upon an equitable assignment before the filing of suit and not upon any right growing out of the judgment and was not, therefore, based upon a judgment but upon an equitable assignment of a cause of action before suit was begun and before judgment which equitable assignment was limited only by the amount of the judgment whereas in the instant case if the intervener, C.C. Smith, appellee herein, had any equitable assignment orally from his client, it was after the suit was begun and was governed exclusively by Section 507 of the Mississippi Code of 1930, which requires a written notice to be filed with the clerk and filed in the papers of said cause, which was not done. Therefore, the intervener, appellee herein, does not rely upon his equitable
assignment as shown by his petition of intervention together with exhibits thereto in which there is a copy of the assignment in writing of the judgment showing that his claim of intervention is based upon an assignment of a one-third interest in the judgment of the circuit court of Perry County, Mississippi, and assigns one-third of whatever amount might be recovered by reason of said judgment.
This is not a case where the equitable assignment of an attorney merges into the judgment, it is by operation of law a case where the intervener, appellee herein, elected not to rely upon his equitable assignment by his failure to comply with the statutory law and by his positive act of acquiring fifteen days after the rendition of the judgment an assignment of a one-third interest therein to himself as attorney's fee.
Many courts have held that the acceptance of security of a written assignment of a judgment waives and releases any equitable lien theretofore acquired.
Fulton v. Harrington, 12 Del. 182 , 30 A. 856; Hinesley v. Stewart, 139 Ga. 7 , 76 S.E. 385; Stearns v. Wollenberg, 51 Or. 88 , 92 P. 1079, 14 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1095; Renick v. Ludington, 16 W. Va. 378 ; In re Norman, 1 Ch. 199; In re Taylor, 1 Ch. 590; Balch v. Symes, Turn. R. 87, 12 Eng. Ch. 87, 37 Reprint 1028; Cowell v. Simpson, 16 Ves. Jr. 275, 33 Reprint 989; Whitehead v. Jessup, 7 Colo. App. 460 , 43 P. 1042; Dodd v. Brott, 1 Minn. 270 , 66 Am. Dec. 541; McDonogh v. Sherman, 138 App. Div. 291 , 122 N.Y.S. 1033; Bishop v. Garcia, 14 Abb. Pr. NS. (N.Y.) 69; Cantrell v. Ford (Tenn.), 46 S.W. 581; 6 C.J. 777, par. 382.
Our own court has said that a court of equity will be guided by the intent of the parties in changing the form of an obligation and if the circumstances attending the change indicate that the parties intended to rely only on the new security, and to extinguish the lien, effect will be given to that purpose.
Lewis v. Starke, 10 Smedes M. (18 Miss.) 120; Howell v. Bush, 54 Miss. 437 ; Cansler v. Sallis, 54 Miss. 446 .
With reference to the intentions of the parties as to the effect which the written assignment should have over any equitable lien, the court below found that whatever right the intervener possessed by reason of his alleged oral contract for a contingent fee was merged into the judgment not by the operation of law but by the act of the intervener in accepting a written assignment for one-third interest of the judgment on April 5, 1941, and this finding is conclusive by the court fixing the interest to accrue to the intervener from the date of the written assignment rather than from the date of the rendition of the judgment so that from all of the above it is positively illogical and reprehensive to reason to conclude that the intervener, appellee herein, possessed any right in said judgment by reason of his equitable lien or at any other time until the execution of the assignment for two reasons, to repeat briefly: First, he did not comply with the statutory law to give effect to his equitable lien if any. The intervener, appellee here, did not assert or rely upon an equitable lien in the court below. Second, if any such lien existed it was waived and relinquished by his acceptance of the written assignment and the filing of the petition of intervention is predicated on this assignment of the judgment to the exclusion of any other right therein.
Therefore, we submit that the intervener's right in this cause must rest wholly upon whatever right he may have acquired by his written assignment from Tell Harrison on April 5, 1941, fifteen days after the rendition of the judgment.
Appellant here was owed as of the date of the replevying of the truck in question in November, 1940, and prior to any equitable assignment to the intervener, appellee here, and certainly prior to any judgment rendered by the circuit court of Perry County, Mississippi, on March 20, 1941, and, of course, prior to the assignment of the
judgment and since the intervener must rely upon his assignment of the judgment executed in writing fifteen days after the rendition of said judgment, he took such assignment subject to any and all infirmities existing in said judgment from its inception.
J.W. McNees Motor Co. v. Brumfield, 157 Miss. 132 , 126 So. 898 ; Canton Exchange Bank v. Yazoo County et al., 144 Miss. 579 , 109 So. 1 ; Duke v. Clark, 58 Miss. 465 ; Cox v. Palmer, 60 Miss. 793 ; Railey v. Bacon et al., 26 Miss. 455 .
An assignee's right against the obligor is subject to all set-offs and counterclaims which would have been available against the assignee if he were the original obligee.
Code of 1930, Sec. 2853; Restatement of the Law, "Contracts," par. 167.
Any right of set-off acquired by the obligor before notice of assignment can be availed of by him against the assignee.
Riggs v. Dyche, 2 Smedes M. (10 Miss.), 606; Hunt v. Shackleford, 55 Miss. 94 ; Peyton v. Planters' Compress Co., 63 Miss. 410 ; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. First National Bank, 110 Miss. 676 , 70 So. 831; 5 C.J. 962, par. 150; 5 C.J. 978, par. 172.
A judgment was not a negotiable instrument and could not, therefore, be transferred by delivery.
Parker v. Bacon, 26 Miss. 425 .
Since our own court has so definitely and for such continued length of time alined itself with the great majority of other courts in holding that the assignee of a judgment acquired no greater right as against the judgment debtor than the assignor had and since by statutory law the assignee of a judgment stands as the assignor subject to the defense of set-offs, then it must follow that the intervener having acquired an assignment of a judgment which is subject to set-offs, as held by the chancery court, acquired no right in said judgment except the right to stand in the place of the judgment creditor, Tell Harrison,
and that, therefore, as to adjudication of the judgment in favor of the intervener, C.C. Smith, the decree of the court below must be reversed and since all necessary matters were heretofore adjudicated by the court below a final judgment rendered here by the appellant.
E.C. Fishel and Geo. W. Currie, both of Hattiesburg, and C.C. Smith, of Richton, for appellee.
We respectively submit that this case must be affirmed for three reasons.
1. That no set-off was pleaded by complainant in his bill of complaint, whereby he was or could have been permitted to set-off any claim against Tell Harrison; therefore, whatever Tell Harrison might have done with the judgment, of which he was the owner, he was at liberty to do.
2. That at the time this injunction suit was filed, C.C. Smith, the intervener, was the owner of one-third of the judgment, rendered in the circuit court of Perry County, Mississippi. First, by reason of the equitable assignment made him before the rendition of the judgment; and second, because on the 5th day of April, 1941, he had complete legal assignment of this judgment, C.C. Smith became the owner of one-third interest of said judgment wholly and completely and the question of whether Tell Harrison owed Stribling Motor Company an indebtedness was not in any way involved and could not affect in any way the validity of this assignment and the Stribling Motor Company was not a subsequent creditor or purchaser.
3. The judgment was assignable and C.C. Smith could maintain a suit therein in his own name, under Section 505, Mississippi Code of 1930.
Section 507 of the Code is not applicable in the matter of the assignment of judgments, and the filing of the assignment with the papers in said cause is not necessary.
Pigford Grocery Co. v. Wilder, 116 Miss. 233 , 76 So. 745.
In the case of Harris v. Hazlehurst Oil-Mill Mfg. Co., 78 Miss. 603 , 30 So. 273, this court decided in behalf of appellee therein every point presented for adjudication.
Bank of Monticello v. L.D. Powell Co., 159 Miss. 183 , 130 So. 292 ; Humphreys County v. Cashin, 136 Miss. 476 , 101 So. 571; Abernethy v. Savage, 163 Miss. 789 , 141 So. 329 ; Holly v. Cook, 70 Miss. 590 , 13 So. 228; 34 C.J. 637, Sec. 977; 34 C.J. 639, Sec. 982; 34 C.J. 641, Sec. 987; 35 C.J. 645, Sec. 992; 15 R.C.L. 226, 227.
The fact of the lack of notice could not prejudice the appellant, because he made no expenditures and no equities arose in his favor, subsequent to the rendition of the judgment in the circuit court of Perry County.
Bank of Monticello v. L.D. Powell Co., supra.
Argued orally by F.M. Morris, for appellant.