Mississippi Supreme Court, 1949

Petition of Aultman

Mississippi Supreme Court · Decided February 28, 1949 · McGehee

38 So. 2d 901; 205 Miss. 397; 1949 Miss. LEXIS 437 (Southern Reporter, Second Series)

Counsel

Dale Dale, for appellant. Under the statutes of the State relating to municipalities, and the construction of those statutes by this court, a municipality has only authority to pass penal ordinances concerning the commission of misdemeanors, and cannot in any manner deal with crimes falling in the class of felonies. This matter is governed by the provisions of Section 3660 of the Mississippi Code of 1942. Petitioner in this case was nothing more than an appointed police officer in and for the City of Columbia — he was not an elected official, he could be dismissed at any time by the governing body of the municipality. Being such a non-elected employee of the City of Columbia he could only have imposed upon him such obligations as the City government might, by law, impose upon him; this could not include the obligation of seeking out and arresting and delivering up for trial of persons accused and/or suspected of the commission of felonies. The existing law of our State is not broad enough to include such imposition of obligation. Under this existing condition of our law today appellant respectfully contends that logic and reasoning dictate the conclusion that he, the appellant, could not possibly have been under any legal obligation to ferret out and arrest Alice Jones any more so than any other private citizen. The act committed by the person arrested was a felony, and therefore a crime over which the municipality and its officers could exercise no jurisdiction whatsoever. Appellant contends that this reasoning is definitely supported by the language of the court in the case of Ex Parte J.W. Gore, 57 Miss. 251 . Appellant further submits that this reasoning is borne out by a careful reading and consideration of the statutes dealing with the fees of peace officers of the county level. Close examination of the statutes relative to the payment of set fees to officers having performed duties involved in state-fail cases reveals that it was not in the contemplation of the legislature to impose upon municipal police officers the obligation of enforcing the general penal statutes of the state regarding felonies. We note there is no provision for police officers in the matter of fees for the performance of certain acts; and again the reason therefore must be that the legislature did not contemplate the placing of any obligations upon such officers other than those so placed by municipal ordinance. Appellant most respectfully submits that his act in this instance was not one required of him by virtue of his employment and capacity, and that therefore he should be held to be within the language of this court in the Gore case, supra. This court, in the case of Ex Parte Fairley et al, (1932), 162 Miss. 456 , 139 So. 399 , in speaking of the statute here involved, said: "The purpose of the statute is to prevent the escape of fleeing homicides and promote their speedy arrest and trial. To that end the statute is to be liberally construed in favor of any person making the arrest and delivering up the homicide for trial." That, if the court please, is a clear statement, requiring no interpretation or explanation, declaring that the courts are to be liberal in construing the statute, and liberality in construction of the statute in favor of any person making the arrest can only mean like liberality in declaring the public policy of the State relative to the same proposition. Appellant would call the court's attention to only one other authority, that being the Supreme Court of the United States, and its opinion delivered in the case of United States v. Andrew J. Mathews, (1899), 173 U.S. 381 , 43 L.Ed. 738, 19 S.Ct. 413. The case involved the claim of a deputy United States Marshal for recovery of a reward offered by the Attorney General's office for the apprehension of a certain criminal sought for violation of federal law. The court carefully considered the question of a deputy marshal receiving such extra remuneration, and reviewed numerous cases and authorities dealing with the general problem, whereupon they arrived at the decision that the recovery should be allowed. Appellant feels that the language of the court is most pertinent, and begs the court's indulgence to set forth a portion thereof here: "It is undoubted that both in England and in this country it has been held that it is contrary to public policy to enforce in a court of law, in favor of a public officer, whose duty by virtue of his employment required the doing of a particular act, any agreement or contract made by the officer with a private individual, stipulating that the officer should receive an extra compensation or reward for the doing of such act. An agreement of this character was considered at common law to be a species of quasi extortion, and partaking of the character of a bribe . . . The broad difference between the right of an officer to take from a private individual a reward or compensation for the performance of his official duty, and the capacity of such officer to receive a reward expressly authorized by competent legislative authority and sanctioned by the executive officer to whom the legislative power has delegated ample discretion to offer the reward, is too obvious to require anything but statement." No counsel contra.

Opinion of the Court

McGeh.ee, C. J.

This appeal is from an order of the circuit court which disallowed a claim of the petitioner, B. B. Aultman, for the sum of $100 as a reward provided for under Section 2482, Code of 1942, for the arrest and delivering up for trial of a fleeing homicide.

The petitioner, at the time of making such arrest, was a resident citizen of the City of Columbia, in Marion County, and a member of the Police Force thereof, and was being paid a fixed salary by the City for his services tinder such employment. The homicide occurred within the corporate limits of the City and the arrest was made therein, and immediately after the accused had fled from the scene of the alleged crime. The facts are stipulated *401 and they show, as found by the trial judge, that the petitioner would have been entitled to the reward, under the statute hereinbefore referred to, unless he is precluded from recovering the reward by reason of his position or employment as a Police Officer.

Section 2483, Code of 1942, provides in substance that a sheriff or other officer who shall arrest a fleeing homicide shall be entitled to the reward provided for under the foregoing Section “the same as other persons, provided the killing is not done in the county in which the officer making the arrest resides.” The City of Columbia being in Marion County, and the petitioner being a resident of the said City and County, it follows from the facts hereinbefore stated that the killing was done in the County in which the officer who made the arrest resided.

But it is urged that a police officer is under no official obligation to make arrests for penal offenses under general laws, except in cases of misdemeanors that have been made offenses against the municipality by a general ordinance thereof, and that therefore the petitioner was not in the discharge of the duty required of him by law when making arrest of a fleeing homicide; and that since the Court has held that the statute allowing this reward for the arrest of a fleeing homicide should be liberally construed so as to encourage the making of such arrest by any person, the petitioner would not be precluded from receiving such reward.

However, we are of the opinion that the petitioner is rendered ineligible to receive the reward by virtue of the above quoted language from Section 2483, supra. Moreover, Section 3645, Code of 1942, provides in effect that a mayor or police judge in such a municipality “may sit as a commiting court in all violations of the criminal laws of the state committed within the county outside the municipal corporation and of all felonies within the corporation, and bind over the accused to appear before the proper court having jurisdiction to try the same, or *402 refuse bail and commit the accused to jail in cases not bailable. He shall also be ex officio justice of the peace in all cases arising within the corporate limits of the municipality, and he shall discharge his duties as such.”

This being true, the mayor, whether serving as police judge, or as ex officio justice of the peace, had jurisdiction of the case as a committing court, and from which authority of the mayor there, would follow a duty on the part of the police officers to make arrests of per? sons' who commit felonies within a municipality. In fact, such a duty would arise out of the official obligation, of a police officer to render services in the maintenance of law and order. If police officers were under no duty to make arrests except in misdemeanor cases within the corporate limits of our cities and towns, then most all felons would be afforded ample opportunity to make their escape from the scene of their crimes unless each sheriff should maintain a sufficient force of deputies in each municipality to cope with such offenders — a requirement, not contemplated by law.

The factual situation involved in the case of United States v. Matthews, 173 U. S. 381, 19 S. Ct. 413, 43 L. Ed. 738, was such as to render that case distinguishable from the case at bar, since, as pointed out .in the case of Williamson v. Board of Com’rs Labette County, 122 Kan. 349, 252 P. 466, 467, “ the one claiming a reward (in the Matthews’ case) was a non-pay non-salaried officer. ’ ’ And the Court further said, ‘ ‘ but if the decision is open to the interpretation placed upon it by plaintiffs that an officer may recover a reward for services rendered in the line or scope of his official duty, it is out of line with the well-nigh unanimous holdings of the courts of this- country. ’ ’ Then, too, we think that the Matthews ’ case is not controlling here because of the provisions of our statute, Section 2483, hereinbefore quoted from.

In 46 Am. Jur. 114, Section 17, it is said: “The principal is:settled, on considerations of public policy, that an officer cannot lawfully claim a reward for the *403 performance of a service which it was his duty to discharge. . . .” A great number of decisions are cited in the footnote in the support of this rule.

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is disallowing the award must be affirmed.

Affirmed.

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.