Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Price
Paramount-Richards Theatres v. Price
Opinion of the Court
On the night of April 8, 1948, the plaintiff, Mrs. T. J. Price, sustained a severe injury in a fall while descending some steps in the well lighted marquee of the theatre of Paramount-Richards Theatres, Incorporated, immediately after leaving the dark auditorium and about 10 o ’clock in the evening* where she had seen a picture show. She filed this suit on December 19, 1949, and thereafter recovered damages in the sum of $5,000 for such personal injury.
The most important fact in the case is that the steps were not only reasonably safe but were altogether safe, and it is not alleged that they were in any manner defective or insubstantial, except that it is alleged in the declaration that they were too narrow, and this allegation
It is suggested that the owner of the theatre should have anticipated that its patrons in descending the steps would look into a mirror off to one side of where they were walking. But, it is likewise true that it should have been anticipated that the patrons would look at the advertisements of coming attractions that were displayed on the wall at the end of the steps, and which advertisements are disclosed in the photographs contained in the record before us, but these considerations do not impose liability upon the defendant for an injury that was not reasonably foreseeable as a probable consequence of the manner in which the premises were being kept and maintained.
Under the decision in the case of Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., 193 Miss. 421, 8 So. (2d) 249, 9 So. (2d) 780, the Court is not justified in standing on the vantage ground of what did happen on the occasion complained of and look back in the direction from effect to cause, but we must go back and view the situation from the standpoint of foreseeability before the accident occurred and determine whether or not there was a failure to exercise reasonable care to maintain the premises in a reasonably safe condition to avoid the real probability
The testimony of the plaintiff, upon whom the burden of proof rested in the case, is for the most part not clear and understandable as to just what caused her to stumble and fall, but she was asked the following questions and gave the following answers thereto which are clearly understandable. She was asked:
“Q. Did you see your feet, or in the mirror! A. I seen them in the mirror.
“Q‘. Did you ever look down in front of you as you came down! A. No, sir, looked at my feet.
“Q. In the mirror! A. Yes. Then, the steps looked larger.
“Q. Why, in coming down the steps, didn’t you look in front of you and look at the steps! A. Idont’tknow why I didn’t, but I didn’t.”
The appellee cites the case of Daniel v. Jackson Infirmary, 173 Miss. 832, 163 So. 447, 448, and particularly the portion thereof which reads as follows: "It is not to be denied that there is some inharmony among the numer
Our sympathies are, of course, on the side of this elderly lady who sustained such a severe injury, but our paramount duty is to undertake to apply the true test of liability, and to hold a defendant to only that degree of care to keep its premises in a reasonably safe condition so as to guard against accidents that are reasonably foreseeable as a reasonable probability of the act complained of, in keeping with the principles heretofore announced in the decided cases.
The judgment of the trial court must, therefore, be reversed and a judgment rendered here in favor of the appellant.
Eeversed and judgment here for the appellant.
Dissenting Opinion
(dissenting)
I think that the case of Daniel v. Jackson Infirmary, 173 Miss. 832, 163 So. 447, cited in the majority opinion, lays down the correct rule as to the degree of care which the owner of a building must exercise for the safety of his patrons. In that case, the woman slipped and fell on linoleum. Bnt the proof showed that such linoleum was in common use in stores, office buildings and other public buildings everywhere, and that it was installed, cleaned and polished in the usual and customary manner.
In the case here, the mirrored post was erected on the steps. The purpose was not one of necessity, but merely for ornamentation. There is no proof in this record that the erection of such a post on the steps of entrance into and exit from picture slums is usual or customary. It cannot be said from this record that there is any other picture show in the country which has a mirrored post almost in the middle of the steps which patrons must use in going into and out of the show.
Mauney v. Gulf Refining Co., 193 Miss. 421, 8 So. (2d) 249, 9 So. (2d) 780; Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams, 183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234; Louisiana Oil Corp. v. Davis, 172 Miss. 126, 158 So. 792, and other cases cited in the majority opinion, do not require the owner to anticipate unusual or improbable results. Those cases do announce the rule, however, that the owner must anticipate such results as are reasonably foreseeable as probable consequences of his act. We are in complete agreement as to the correctness of these principles. The parting of the ways comes in the application of those principles to the particular facts of this case.
Appellee’s statement was that she left the show, and went around the post, which was at an angle to her. The place was then bright, but before she took two steps, it became dimmer. While she gave the answers appearing in the majority opinion, at another place in her testimony, she said: “A. I came on out, and I was coming on out-
“Q. What caused you to fall? A. Was that mirrored post and the artificial light”.
And again on cross-examination:
“Ql The first time you ever noticed those mirrors was that night? A. Yes, sir.
“Q. If you hadn’t noticed them, you wouldn’t have been confused? A. I wouldn’t have got hurt.”
To me, it seems clear that the jury was warranted in finding these facts: As appellee came out of the show, there was considerable brightness for an instant until her eyes could react. As she started descending the steps,' her attention was attracted by and to the mirror. She could see herself and the steps therein. She became confused from the reflection. She was still in motion. When she took the second step down, she fell on account of the confusion which she experienced by reason of the mirror.
The mirrored post was erected near the middle of the stairs, on the third step from the top, which stair, the appellant knew, would be used daily by large numbers of people.
Now, the descent of steps is an ordinary experience of life. It is necessary, however, in such operation, that a person so descending shall keep his attention on what he is doing. Otherwise, it can be hazardous.
It is a matter of common knowledge that the average person, on passing a mirror, will look in it. It is also a matter of common knowledge that the reflection of steps in such mirror, where such person is descending, produces great confusion to him. Consequently, when the appel
It is my view that the appellant, when it erected the mirrored post on the steps, ought reasonably to have foreseen that its patrons would likely have their attention attracted thereto, and distracted from the task of descending the steps, and that, on this account, falls and injuries would proximately result. To me, it was the equivalent of setting a trap for its patrons. I consider it almost a miracle that others had not been previously injured.
I do not agree with the reasoning of the majority that a similar situation would exist if the mirror had been placed on one of the side walls. In that event, the patron, in order to look in it, would necessarily be required to turn in that direction. It could hardly be assumed that a person, in his right mind, would look in a mirror, and at the same time, move sidewise at a right angle down a flight of steps. I do not see how such an analogy can circumvent liability on account of confusion from a mirrored post, situated almost immediately in front of the patron as he comes out of the show, there on the steps, which he must descend.
Sincerely believing that the evidence was sufficient to present an issue of negligence for determination by the' jury, and that the jury’s verdict should be upheld, I most respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by the majority of the Court.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- Paramount-Richards Theaters v. Price
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- 12 cases
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- Published