delivered the opinion of the court.

The defendants, charged with having stolen sheep, were found guilty by the verdict of a jury. By judgment they were sentenced to the state prison. Their motion for a new trial having been denied, they appealed to this court.

The sheep alleged to have been stolen were branded with a red bar and were the property of one Tom Hovland. A material witness for the state was one Henry C. Jones, who testified that at the time of the alleged theft he was working for the defendants, herding their sheep, which were branded with two black bars on the back. About October 27, 1926, the defendants sold several hundred sheep to Ole Hanson who shipped them out of the state. With these sheep were a number bearing the red bar brand. The red bar sheep, about twenty-five, the witness testified, were put with the defendants’ sheep, herded by the witness, on the 5th or 6th of October, 1926, by defendant McComas. The circumstances were detailed, indicating a direct intention on part of both defendants to steal the sheep.

The witness, upon direct examination, testified that afte"r the arrest of the defendants they came to see him at Bozeman, at which time they urged him to forget what he knew with respect to the matter; and that later, a week before the trial, they again sought him out, finding him near Columbus; they plied him with intoxicating liquor and by means of threats induced him to go to Columbus to the office of Mr. Parcells, where an affidavit drawn by that gentleman was read to the witness, in part at least. The witness did not want to sign it, and laid down the pen which he had in his hand; the defendant McComas “picked up the pen and kind of jogged me, saying, ‘You know,’ ” and the witness signed.

Having been apprised of the existence of the affidavit the prosecuting attorney demanded it of defendants’ counsel, who *134 produced it. The prosecuting attorney thereupon introduced it in evidence himself, thus anticipating its introduction by the defendants. In effect, the affidavit contained a denial of material parts of the testimony which the witness had detailed before the jury. Therein the witness said, among other things, that during all the times in question he had never seen any sheep in the band he herded for defendants, except those bearing the defendants’ brand.

The court, over the objection of the defendants, gave the jury the following instruction, which is the sole error assigned: “If you believe beyond a reasonable doubt that any statement, declaration, or testimony in evidence before you was not voluntarily made, but was obtained by means of threats, force, or fear, sufficient to overcome the free will of the person by whom it is asserted that such statement, declaration, or testimony, if any, was made, or given, then you will disregard such evidence, if any, altogether, and the same will not be further considered by you in arriving at your verdict.”

The defendants urge that the court thus committed error to their prejudice. The attorney general admits error, but attempts to maintain that it was nonprejudicial to the defendants. He says that the affidavit was admissible on part of the state for one purpose only, — to show the subsequent conduct of the a"ccused, and he contends that the only effect of the instruction was to withdraw from the jury the right to consider the evidence as showing subsequent guilty conduct on the part of the accused, if the jury found the facts in connection with the execution of the affidavit were true as stated by the witness Jones. The court’s action, says the attorney general, operated to the benefit of the defendants.

We are unable to appreciate the force of this argument. The affidavit was permitted in evidence and all of it was for the consideration of the jury. It was a part of the evidence in the case. The jury were entitled to consider it, and every statement in it, in the light of the circumstances under which it. was made and the explanations given by the witness. It contained a statement under oath, made by the witness prior *135 to the trial, which was contradictory of the evidence the witness gave upon the trial. The case is no different than if the defendants had introduced the affidavit, for the purpose of impeaching the witness, and the witness had then given his explanation as to how it came to be made. The court erred in withdrawing from the consideration of the jury the evidence, whether voluntarily or involuntarily made and whether secured by means of threats or otherwise. It was the sole province of the jury to believe, or to disbelieve, the affidavit; to give it, or portions of it, credence, or no credence at all. If the jury saw fit to give the affidavit credence, even though it were obtained by force, or fear — and the jury had the right to give it credence even so — it would deem it evidence of an impeaching character, to some extent weighty. In peremptorily directing the jury, if it found certain facts, to disregard it altogether, the court invaded the province of the jury upon a material point, to the manifest prejudice of the defendants.

For this reason the judgment must be reversed and the cause remanded to the district court of Sweet Grass county, with direction to grant the defendants a new trial, and it is so ordered.

Reversed and remanded.