No. 12396

I N THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF M N A A OTN

1973

KAREN RUSK,

P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

-vs - ELOISE P. SKILLMAN,

Defendant and Respondent.

Appeal from: D i s t r i c t Court o f t h e F i r s t J u d i c i a l D i s t r i c t , Honorable Gordon R. B e n n e t t , Judge p r e s i d i n g .

Counsel o f Record:

For A p p e l l a n t :

B e r g e r , Anderson, S i n c l a i r and Murphy, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Arnold B e r g e r a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana.

For Respondent:

Pedersen and Herndon, B i l l i n g s , Montana. Donald Herndon a r g u e d , B i l l i n g s , Montana.

Submitted: May 31, 1973

Decided: JUL 2 4 1973 Filed : JuL 2 4 1973 M r . J u s t i c e Gene B. Daly d e l i v e r e d t h e Opinion of t h e Court.

T h i s i s a g u e s t passenger p e r s o n a l i n j u r y a c t i o n a g a i n s t t h e d r i v e r of t h e automobile i n which p l a i n t i f f was a passenger t r i e d i n t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t of Broadwater County. The c o u r t on August 9 , 1972, ordered dismissed t h e c l a i m a g a i n s t defendant C a r l t o n Sherwood, by s t i p u l a t i o n of a l l p a r t i e s . O September n 22, 1972, t h e c o u r t made f i n d i n g s of f a c t and conclusions of law and e n t e r e d judgment f o r defendant E l o i s e Skillman. From t h a t judgment p l a i n t i f f Karen Rusk a p p e a l s . From t h e t r i a l r e c o r d i t appears t h e automobile a c c i d e n t which i s t h e s u b j e c t of t h i s l i t i g a t i o n occurred on June 21, 1969, a t about 1:00 p.m. on U.S. Highway 12 n e a r t h e west end of t h e Missouri River b r i d g e , approximately one mile northwest of Townsend, Montana. The morning of June 21, 1969, E l o i s e Skillman and Karen Rusk l e f t t h e i r r e s p e c t i v e homes i n Livingston and proceeded i n Ifiss Skillman's c a r t o Helena by way of Townsend. The t r i p was a p l e a s u r e o u t i n g and Miss Rusk i n c i d e n t a l l y intended t o look

a t an automobile i n Helena which h e r f a t h e r was c o n s i d e r i n g buying. Miss Rusk c o n t r i b u t e d $5 toward g a s o l i n e expense and Miss Skillman drove h e r automobile, a 1966 Buick which s h e had purchased some t e n days e a r l i e r . Immediately p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t , Miss Skillman was pro- ceeding o u t of Townsend toward Helena and, according t o t h e t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s of f a c t , exceeding t h e posted 55 m i l e p e r hour speed l i m i t i n t h a t a r e a , b u t was n o t going i n excess of 65 m i l e s p e r hour. Miss Skillman contended t h a t a s s h e approached t h e Missouri River Bridge s h e was unable t o s e e a v e h i c l e d r i v e n by C a r l t o n Sherwood a t t h e o p p o s i t e end of t h e b r i d g e u n t i l s h e was almost upon t h e b r i d g e . The Sherwood v e h i c l e was e i t h e r stopped o r proceeding very slowly, p r e p a r a t o r y t o making a l e f t hand t u r n onto a g r a v e l road. This g r a v e l road i s known a s t h e I n d i a n Creek Road and connects w i t h U.S. Highway 12 n e a r t h e w e s t end of t h e Missouri River bridge. Miss Skillman t e s t i f i e d t h a t upon seeing t h e Sherwood v e h i c l e and r e a l i z i n g it was stopped she braked h e r v e h i c l e hard and swerved l e f t t o avoid t h e Sherwood vehicle. She s t a t e d she believed h e r c a r went crassways between t h e two t r a f f i c l a n e s and she never saw t h e v e h i c l e driven by Reed Palmer i n t h e oncoming l a n e of t r a f f i c . She c o l l i d e d with t h e Palmer vehicle. Reed Palmer t e s t i f i e d t h a t immediately p r i o r t o t h e c o l l i - s i o n he was approaching t h e bridge, proceeding e a s t toward Town- send a t a speed of about 55 m i l e s per hour. H e f i r s t observed t h e Sherwood v e h i c l e slow down a s i t was proceeding w e s t and t h e d r i v e r gave an arm s i g n a l i n d i c a t i n g a l e f t hand t u r n . He s t a t e d t h a t a s he came n e a r t h e Sherwood v e h i c l e h e observed t h e Skillman v e h i c l e come over t h e f a r end of t h e bridge, apparently going a t a high r a t e of speed. Palmer t e s t i f i e d t h a t he then began t o slow down and, upon observing t h e Skillman v e h i c l e continue t o r a p i d l y approach him, he slammed on h i s brakes and attempted t o swerve b u t c o l l i d e d w i t h t h e Skillman v e h i c l e . The c o l l i s i o n occurred i n h i s lane of t r a f f i c . The Sherwood v e h i c l e was n o t involved i n t h e c o l l i s i o n . A Montana highway patrolman who i n v e s t i g a t e d t h e a c c i d e n t t e s t i f i e d t h a t t h e length of t h e skidmarks l e f t by t h e Skillman v e h i c l e was about 180 f e e t and t h e c o l l i s i o n occurred on t h e s i d e of t h e highway properly occupied by t h e Palmer v e h i c l e . The patrolman issued a t r a f f i c c i t a t i o n t o Miss Skillman f o r operating h e r v e h i c l e a t a speed i n excess of t h e s a f e speed having due regard f o r t h e circumstances then and t h e r e e x i s t i n g . P l a i n t i f f b r i n g s s e v e r a l i s s u e s f o r review, most r e l a t e t o s p e c i f i c f i n d i n g s of f a c t made by t h e t r i a l c o u r t which she maintains were not supported by s u b s t a n c i a l evidence before t h e court. The remaining i s s u e s concern whether t h e c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n designating Miss Rusk a "guest passenger" and whether t h e c o u r t was c o r r e c t i n f i n d i n g Miss Skillman g u i l t y of ordinary r a t h e r than gross negligence. The t r i a l c o u r t ' s d e s i g n a t i o n of Miss Rusk a s a "guest passenger" r a t h e r than a "passenger f o r h i r e " i s a c o r r e c t ap- p l i c a t i o n of s e c t i o n 32-1113, R.C.M. 1947. Under s e c t i o n 32-1113, i f t h e passenger i s I' r i d i n g i n s a i d motor v e h i c l e as a g u e s t o r by i n v i t a t i o n and n o t f o r h i r e " t h e proof of g r o s s n e g l i g e n c e r a t h e r than o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e i s r e q u i r e d t o e s t a b l i s h l i a b i l i t y . I n a n a c t i o n f o r p e r s o n a l i n j u r i e s r e s u l t i n g from an a u t o - mobile a c c i d e n t where i t appears t h a t p l a i n t i f f accepted an i n - v i t a t i o n t o accompany defendant on a t r i p , t h e burden i s on t h e

p l a i n t i f f t o show any change i n r e l a t i o n s h i p by v i r t u e of sub- sequent agreement. Copp v. Van Hise, 119 F.2d 691. N testimony was i n t r o d u c e d by Miss Rusk t o i n d i c a t e h e r o $5 c o n t r i b u t i o n was anything more than an i n c i d e n t a l , f r i e n d l y g r a t u i t y r a t h e r than l e g a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n f o r s e r v i c e s t o b e rendered. A s t o t h e remaining i s s u e s f o r review, we f i n d m e r i t i n p l a i n t i f f ' s c o n t e n t i o n t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t went o u t s i d e t h e evidence p r o p e r l y b e f o r e i t t o make f i n d i n g s of f a c t concerning t h e i n h e r e n t l y hazardous c o n d i t i o n of t h e highway a s maintained by t h e s t a t e . Conversely, we f i n d from examination of t h e t r i a l r e c o r d , t h e r e was s u f f i c i e n t evidence, considered a s a whole, b e f o r e t h e c o u r t t o e s t a b l i s h t h a t Miss Skillman's o p e r a t i o n of h e r v e h i c l e immediately p r i o r t o t h e a c c i d e n t c o n s t i t u t e d "gross negligence" and t h a t such g r o s s negligence was t h e proximate cause of t h e i n j u r i e s s u s t a i n e d by Miss Rusk i n t h e a c c i d e n t . W a g r e e , a s a g e n e r a l p r o p o s i t i o n , highway i n t e r s e c t i o n s e w i t h g r a v e l r o a d s and b r i d g e abutments along highways a r e s e t t i n g s where a c c i d e n t s occur more f r e q u e n t l y than o t h e r highway a r e a s . However, i t does appear from t h e t r i a l r e c o r d , p a r t i c u l a r l y t h e testimony o f t h e highway patrolman, t h a t had Miss Skillman (1) been observing t h e posted speed l i m i t i n t h e a r e a of t h e a c c i d e n t , (2) maintained a proper lookout i n o r d e r t o observe t h e Sherwood

v e h i c l e when i t f i r s t came i n t o h e r l i n e of v i s i o n , (3) a p p l i e d h e r b r a k e s a t t h e p o i n t where she t e s t i f i e d she f i r s t saw t h e Sherwood v e h i c l e (which appears t o be some c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s t a n c e ahead of t h e p o i n t h e r s k i d marks began t o appear on t h e highway),

and ( 4 ) guided h e r v e h i c l e t o t h e r i g h t hand shoulder of t h e highway r a t h e r than v e e r i n g t o t h e l e f t and i n t o t h e oncoming l a n e , she could have avoided t h e a c c i d e n t i n Palmer's l a n e of traffic. Legal w r i t e r s r e p u d i a t e t h e e n t i r e premise t h a t t h e con- c e p t of "negligence" can and should be d e l i n e a t e d i n t o degrees. P r o s s e r , Law of T o r t s , 4 t h Ed., Ch. 5 , 534, p. 182, s t a t e s : "Nevertheless, t h e i d e a of degrees of n e g l i g e n c e , o r a t l e a s t some kind of aggravated n e g l i g e n c e which w i l l r e s u l t i n l i a b i l i t y where o r d i n a r y n e g l i g e n c e w i l l n o t , h a s been adopted i n a number o f s t a t u t e s , which have f o r c e d t h e courts,however r e l u c t a n t l y , t o attempt t o do a g a i n what they d e c l a r e d t h a t they could n o t do, and t o make such e f f o r t s a s a r e p o s s i b l e t o supply a d e f i - n i t i o n f o r t h e undefinable. Some of t h e s e s t a t u t e s have attempted t o c o d i f y t h e e n t i r e d o c t r i n e , o r apply i t t o p a r t i c u l a r s i t u a t i o n s such a s b a i l m e n t s , c r i m i n a l n e g l i g e n c e , o r c o n t r i b u t o r y n e g l i g e n c e c a s e s . Most of them, however, a r e automobile g u e s t s t a t u t e s . I I Montana's automobile g u e s t s t a t u t e p l a c e s t h e t a s k upon t h e c o u r t s t o d e f i n e t h e u n d e f i n a b l e i n d i f f e r e n t i a t i n g between "ordinary" and "gross" negligence. The concept of g r o s s n e g l i - gence, a s i t has developed by precedent and a p p l i c a t i o n , shows a dichotomy between c i v i l t o r t law and c r i m i n a l law. Such II d e f i n i t i o n a l terms a s malignant mind" and " w i l l f u l and wanton d i s r e g a r d of consequences" a r e a p p l i e d only t o t h e c r i m i n a l con- cept. Holland v. Konda, 142 Mont. 536, 543, 385 P.2d 272, provides an example of automobile t o r t g r o s s negligence: "AS t h e p l a i n t i f f *was a g u e s t i n t h e c a r of a p p e l l a n t Konda, t h e d u t i e s owed h e r by t h e d r i v e r were governed by R.C.M. $ 5 32-1113 t o 32-1115, i n c l u s i v e . The sub- s t a n c e of t h e s e p r o v i s i o n s i s t h a t t h e g u e s t assumes, a s between himself and t h e d r i v e r , t h e o r d i n a r y n e g l i - gence of t h e d r i v e r . Thus, i n o r d e r f o r t h e d r i v e r t o be l i a b l e i n damages t o t h e g u e s t , h i s a c t i o n s must be t h o s e which a r e termed ' g r o s s l y n e g l i g e n t . I This c o u r t had d e f i n e d r o s s negligence a s t h e I f a i l u r e t o u s e s l i h t care.' Batchoff v. Craney, 119 Mont. 1 5 / , 1.12 *(Emphasis added). See a l s o : Heen v. Tiddy, 151 Mont. 265, 442 P.2d 434. Nangle v. Northern P a c i f i c Ry. Co., 96 Mont. 512, 522, 32 P.2d 11, s t a t e s : Gross negligence' and ' r e c k l e s s operation' a r e 11 t

v a r i o u s l y defined by d i f f e r e n t c o u r t s . Most, i f n o t a l l , of them a r e of l i t t l e a s s i s t a n c e i n t h e c l a s s i f i c a t i o n of various s t a t e s of f a c t s within o r without such d e f i n i t i o n s . Under t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h i s s t a t u t e h e r e i n announced, whether 'gross negligence' and ' r e c k l e s s o p e r a t i o n ' a r e synonymous o r s a i d t o be d i f f e r e n t i n meaning one from t h e o t h e r i s immaterial, f o r i f t h e conduct of t h e d r i v e r of t h e automobile was i n f a c t something more than ordinary negligence, i t matters n o t , under t h e Act i n question, [Montana Automobile Guest S t a t u t e 1 - - by what name i t i s c a l l e d , a r by what a d j e c t i v e i t may be described; t h e defendant i s n e v e r t h e l e s s l i a b l e . " (Emphasis added). See a l s o : C a r t e r v. M i l l e r , 140 Mont. 426, 372 . ~ . 2 d421.

Applying " f a i l u r e t o use s l i g h t care" and "some- thing more than ordinary negligence" t o t h e f a c t s of t h e i n s t a n t c a s e , we must determine t h a t t h e a c t s and omissions of defendant Skillman, considered i n t h e i r e n t i r e t y , c o n s t i t u t e gross n e g l i - gence and impart l i a b i l i t y t o her. The judgment i s reversed and t h e cause remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r t r i a l on t h e

Justice I N THE S P E E COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA URM

- No, 12396

KAREN RUSK, P l a i n t i f f and Appellant, VS . ELOISE P. SKILLMAN, Defendant and Respondent

ORDER AMENDING OPINION AND DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING

PER CUIBICAM: ~ e s ~ o n d e's t p e t i t i o n f o r rehearing i n t h e above entitled n matter i s hereby denied. It appearing t h a t surnmry judgment was entered by the t r i a l c o u r t p r i o r t o p r e s e n t a t i o n of defendant SkfPHman's defense h e r e i n , I T I S ORDERED t h a t t h e Opinion dated July 24, 1373, be amended by s t r i k i n g t h e f i n a l sentence of the Opinion and sub- s t i t u t i n g t h e following t h e r e f o r : 1t The summary judgment a g a i n s t defendant Skillman

i s vacated and t h e cause a g a i n s t t h a t defendant i s remanded t o t h e d i s t r i c t c o u r t f o r a new t r i a l on a l l i s s u e s , I1 DATED t h i s 15th day of October, 1973.