No. 84-482

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1985 RICHARD MERENESS ,

Plaintiff and Respondent, -vs- FRITO-LAY, INC.,

Defendant and Appellant. APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Yellowstone,

The Honorable Robert Holmstrom, Judge presiding. COUNSEL OF IIECORD:

For Appellant:

Loble & Pauly, Helena, Montana

For Respondent:

howard and Grubbs, Billings, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: Feb. 22, 1985

Decided: May 23, 1985

Clerk M r . J u s t i c e J o h n Conway H a r r i s o n d e l i v e r e d t h e O p i n i o n of t h e Court.

P l a i n t i f f R i c h a r d M e r e n e s s b r o u g h t s u i t i n Y e 1 1o w s t o n e County District Court against defendant Frito-Lay, Inc. Frito-Lay f i l e d a c o n s o l i d a t e d motion t o d i s m i s s , motion f o r summary judgment, and motion for a change of venue. The D i s t r i c t Court denied t h e s e motions. T h i s i s a n a p p e a l from the District Court's denial of the motion for change of venue.

Richard Mereness worked for Frito-Lay as a route salesman, selling and delivering Frito-Lay snack-foods to retail outlets. He was responsible for all accounting related to his sales and deliveries. If his a c c o u n t was short, the shortage was deducted from his paycheck. In November o f 1 9 8 0 , M e r e n e s s l e f t h i s employment w i t h F r i t o - L a y a l l e g i n g w r o n g f u l d e d u c t i o n s from h i s p a y c h e c k . In January of 1981, he filed a claim against Frito-Lay with the D e p a r t m e n t o f L a b o r and I n d u s t r y . Frito-Lay responded t h a t , instead of Frito-Lay owing Mereness wages, Mereness owed Frito-Lay for newly-found shortages in his account, in addition to the shortages previously withheld. However, under the then-prevailing interpretation of Montana law, Frito-Lay could not assert either previously-deducted or newly found shortages as offsets or counterclaims in the proceeding before the Department of Labor and Industry. Therefore, in May of 1981, Frito-Lay filed a complaint in Lewis and C l a r k County D i s t r i c t C o u r t a g a i n s t b o t h Mereness and t h e Department. Frito-Lay s o u g h t t o r e c o v e r newly-found shortages from Mereness and to enjoin the Department from p r o c e e d i n g on t h e wage claim. On May 22, 1981, Mereness, a c t i n g p r o se, f i l e d a p l e a d i n g denominated motion t o d i s m i s s b u t w h i c h i n f a c t was a m o t i o n t o c h a n g e v e n u e t o Y e l l o w s t o n e County. A b o u t o n e month l a t e r M e r e n e s s r e t a i n e d c o u n s e l . A h e a r i n g was h e l d on t h e m o t i o n on O c t o b e r 1, 1 9 8 1 . An o r d e r d e n y i n g t h e v e n u e c h a n g e w a s i s s u e d on O c t o b e r 6 , 1 9 8 1 .

Mereness then changed attorneys and in November of 1981, together with the Department of Labor and Industry, a g a i n made a m o t i o n t o c h a n g e v e n u e t o Y e l l o w s t o n e County. Mereness a l s o joined i n t h e Department's motion t o d i s m i s s . A h ~ a r i n gw a s held and on January 5, 1982, t h e L e w i s and C l a r k C o u n t y a c t i o n was d i s m i s s e d a n d t h e e n t i r e m a t t e r w a s s e n t back t o t h e Department w i t h the direction t o consider o f f s e t s a l l e g e d by Frito-Lay. Proceedings i n t h e Department of Labor and Industry continued without conclusion. In November of 1983, Mereness brought the present action in Yellowstone County. Frito-Lay's m o t i o n t o change v e n u e was d e n i e d on S e p t e m b e r 2 7 , 1 9 8 4 .

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the District Court, Yellowstone County, erred in denying defendant Frito-Lay's motion for a change in venue? Frito-Lay a r g u e s t h a t t h e a c t i o n s i n Lewis and C l a r k County and Yellowstone County are the same and therefore the doctrine of l a w o f t h e c a s e makes t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e L e w i s and C l a r k C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C o u r t , d e n y i n g a m o t i o n f o r c h a n g e of venue, b i n d i n g on t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y D i s t r i c t C o u r t .

As authority, defendant c i t e s t o S t a t e o f Montana v. Carden ( 1 9 7 6 ) , 1 7 0 Mont. 436, 555 P . 2 d 738. I n Carden t h e S t a t e f i l e d a motion f o r l e a v ~t o f i l e a d i r e c t i n f o r m a t i o n i n D i s t r i c t Court c h a r g i n g d e f e n d a n t Carden w i t h 118 c o u n t s of criminal offenses. This motion was granted. Several months later a second judge dismissed seventy-five of the counts and the S t a t e was granted leave t o f i l e a n amended information covering t h e remaining f o r t y - t h r e e counts. This information was filed but subsequently a third judge dismissed thirty-eight of the forty-three counts. The S t a t e conceded the dismissal of ten counts but appealed the dismissal of t h e remaining twenty-eight.

W e provided a s follows:

"Under t h e ' l a w o f t h e c a s e ' p r i n c i p l e ,

judges of coordinate jurisdictions

s i t t i n g i n t h e same c o u r t a n d i n t h e same

c a s p may n o t o r d i n a r i l y o v e r r u l e t h e

decisions o f each other. It i s simply a

rule of practice that articulates the

s o u n d p o l i c y t h a t when a n i s s u e i s o n e

j u d i c i a l l y d e t e r m i n e d , t h a t s h o u l d be t h e

e n d o f t h e m a t t e r a s f a r a s j u d g e s and

courts of coordinate jurisdiction are

concerned. The ' l a w o f t h e c a s e ' i s n o t

a n i m p e r a t i v e ; d o e s n o t g o t o t h e power

o f t h e c o u r t ; a n d d o e s n o t mean t h a t a

court does not have discretion to

r e c o n s i d e r a r u l i n g made b y a n o t h e r j u d g e

i n t h e same c a s e . " (Citations omitted.)

C a r d e n , 1 7 0 Mont. a t 4 4 0 , 555 P.2d a t

?40. S i n c e t h e r e was n o d i s c e r n a b l e r e a s o n why t h e t h i r d j u d g e , in his discretion, decided t o reconsider t h e determinations of the two previous judges, we held that the prior rulings finding probable cause for filing the twenty-eight counts w e r e t h e l a w o f t h e c a s e a n d b i n d i n g on t h e t h i r d j u d g e in t h e same a c t i o n .

The q u e s t i o n b e f o r e u s now, i s w h e t h e r t h e r e was good r e a s o n f o r J u d g e Holmstrom, in his discretion, to rule that p r o p e r venue in t h i s action i s i n Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y , when J u d g e Meloy had p r e v i o u s l y r u l e d p r o p e r v e n u e t o h e i n L e w i s and C l a r k County?

The parties on appeal have argued at length the q u e s t i o n o f w h e t h e r o r n o t t h e c a s e f i l e d i n Lewis and C l a r k C o u n t y i s t h e same a s t h e c a s e f i l e d i n Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y . We agree with appellant t h a t , f o r p u r p o s e s of res j u d i c a t a , i f a j u d g m e n t h a d b e e n r e a c h e d on t h e merits i n t h e L e w i s a n d C l a r k C o u n t y a c t i o n , t h e Y e l l o w s t o n e C o u n t y a c t i o n would h a v e been b a r r e d . T h i s i s b e c a u s e t h e two c a s e s a r o s e n u t o f t h e same a c t , occurrence o r transaction. However, t h e m e r i t s o f t h e c a s e w e r e n o t r e a c h e d i n Lewis and C l a r k County a n d , as noted above, t h e m e r e f a c t t h a t t h e c a s e s a r e t h e same d o e s not automatically preclude one court from reconsidering a ruling of a court of coordinate jurisdiction. I n Lewis and C l a r k County F r i t o - L a y f i l e d a s u i t a g a i n s t Mereness and t h e Department of Labor and Industry. Mereness's motion for c h a n g e o f v e n u e was d e n i e d . Though n o r e a s o n f o r t h e d e n i a l was given, it i s r e a s o n a b l e t o assume, as Judge Holmstrom d i d , t h a t J u d g e Meloy f e l t bound b y s e c t i o n 25-2-105, MCA, t o hold t h a t t h e c a u s e a g a i n s t t h e Department must b e t r i e d i n the County in which it arose, or Lewis and Clark County. However, i n t h e Y e l l o w s to n e County a c t i o n , t h e Department i s not a party and therefore there was no reason for Judge Holmstrom t o t a k e i n t o a c c o u n t s e c t i o n 25-2-105, MCA, or to c o n s i d e r h i m s e l f bound b y t h e p r e v i o u s d e c i s i o n o f t h e L e w i s and C l a r k County D i s t r i c t C o u r t . The p r o b a b l e j u s t i f i c a t i o n f o r t h e o r i g i n a l v e n u e d e c i s i o n b y J u d g e Meloy d i d n o t e x i s t in the Yellowstone County action. Moreover, as Judge Holmstrom p o i n t s out, there i s a m p l e r e a s o n why t h i s c a s e s h o u l d b e t r i e d i n Y e l l o w s t o n e County. The c o m p l a i n t a l l e g e s a b r e a c h o f c o n t r a c t t h a t was t o b e p e r f o r m e d i n Y e l l o w s t o n e County and a t o r t t h a t a l l e g e d l y took place i n Yellowstone County. Therefore, pursuant to sections 25-2-101 and 25-2-102, MCA, Yellowstone County is the proper venue for t h i s action.

We hold that Judge Holmstrom properly exercised his d i s c r e t i o n by r e c o n s i d e r i n g t h e venue r u l i n g o f t h e Lewis and C l a r k County D i s t r i c t C o u r t . H i s d e c i s i o n denying a motion f o r a change o f venue i s a f f i r m e d . W e concur:

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