Woodward v. Shook
Woodward v. Shook
Opinion of the Court
Plaintiff’s assignments of error are all directed to the charge to the jury.
Plaintiff argues that the trial court failed to apply the law of the case to the facts in evidence as required by G.S. 1-180.
The exception on which this assignment of error is based is to the charge on the first issue.
The court had previously summarized the evidence, instructed on burden of proof; defined actionable negligence, foreseeability, and proximate cause; instructed with respect to what constitutes negligence per se; summarized and explained the applicable statutes; and again reminded the jury that plaintiff, in invoking the violation of one or more of those statutes as being the proximate cause of his damages, had the burden of proof by the greater weight of the evidence.
We are of the opinion, from an examination of the entire charge, that there is a substantial compliance with G.S. 1-180. This assignment of error is overruled.
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary defines “skid” thusly: “To slide without rotating (as a wheel held from turning while a vehicle moves onward)” and gives “slide” as a synonym for “skid”.
This assignment of error is overruled.
Appellant also contends that the trial judge committed reversible error in that he failed to define the term per se. The court, in charging on the law applicable to the first issue instructed the jury that plaintiff invoked the alleged violation of certain statutes. He then discussed those statutes and their provisions, instructing, as to some of them, that a violation thereof is negligence per se. It is true that at this point in his charge, he did not define per se of differentiate between negligence and negligence per se with reference to the violation of a statute. Plowever, later, in connection with that portion of his charge having to do with proximate cause, he instructed the jury substantially in the language of Cowan v. Transfer Co.,, and Carr v. Transfer Co., 262 N.C. 550, 138 S.E. 2d 228, and, we think, clearly defined for the jury negligence per se as related to the violation of a statute. It was not necessary for the court again to define it in setting out the statutes allegedly violated.
Appellant’s remaining assignment of error embraces his contention that the court committed prejudicial error in defining and explaining proximate cause and the element of foreseeability. Reading the charge contextually, we do not think the jury could have been confused or misled, particularly in view of thé fact that the
“Foreseeable injury is a requisite of proximate cause, and proximate cause is a requisite for actionable negligence, and actionable negligence is a requisite for recovery for any injury negligently inflicted. A proximate cause' is also a cause from which a person of ordinary prudence could have reasonably foreseen that such a result or some similar injurious result was probable under the facts as they existed.”
An examination of the entire charge does not, in our opinion, reveal reversible error.
AfBrmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.