State v. Fowler
State v. Fowler
Opinion
The defendant moved for a judgment of nonsuit at the end of the State’s evidence and again at the end of all the evidence. He argues that a beating inflicting for corrective or disciplinary purposes without an evil motive is not a crime, even if painful and even if excessive.
*147 To be punishable as a violation of G.S. 14-360, the act must first be willful. State v. Tweedy, 115 N.C. 704, 20 S.E. 183 (1894). Willful means more than intentional. It means without just cause, excuse, or justification. State v. Dickens, 215 N.C. 303, 1 S.E. 2d 837 (1939). New Hampshire, interpreting a cruelty statute similar to that of G.S. 14-360, early noted that punishment administered to an animal in an honest and good faith effort to train it is not without justification and not willful. State v. Avery, 44 N.H. 392 (1862). A like construction of our own statute is applicable to the instant situation. The jury, therefore, should have been instructed that if it believed the defendant inflicted the punishment on his animal in a good faith effort to train him, it should return a verdict of not guilty.
Since the intent of the defendant was an essential element to determine willfulness, the trial court committed error in not allowing the defendant to testify as to the Koehler methods of training animals. It was likewise error to refuse to allow the other witnesses of the defendant to give similar testimony. An examination of the qualifications of the witnesses shows that they should have been allowed to testify as experts in the field of dog training.
It does not follow that the defendant was entitled to a nonsuit at the conclusion of the State’s evidence and at the conclusion of all the evidence. The jury was not required to believe that the defendant administered the disciplinary measures in an effort to train the animal. The same act committed against the dog for the purpose of torturing it would be within the purview of the statute. However, the jury should have been instructed that if it believed the defendant’s evidence, that the punishment was administered for a disciplinary purpose, it should return a verdict of not guilty.
New trial.
Reference
- Full Case Name
- State of North Carolina v. William Fowler
- Cited By
- 7 cases
- Status
- Published
- Syllabus
- 1. Animals 7 — cruelty to animal — intent required To be punishable as a violation of G.S. 14-360, the cruelty to animals statute, defendant's act must be wilful, that is, without just cause, excuse, or justification; therefore, the trial court should have instructed the jury that if it believed the defendant inflicted punishment on his animal in a good faith effort to train him, it should return a verdict of not guilty. 2. Animals 7 — cruelty to animal — exclusion of expert testimony error In a prosecution under G.S. 14-360 for cruelty to an animal, the trial court erred in excluding testimony of witnesses that defendant's actions involved recognized methods of training dogs, since the qualifications of the witnesses showed that they were experts in the field of dog training. 3. Animals 7 — cruelty to animal — sufficiency of evidence In a prosecution for cruelty to an animal, defendant was not entitled to nonsuit since the jury was not required to believe his testimony that he held his dog's head in a water-filled hole in an attempt to break the dog of his habit of digging holes in the yard, but could have believed that such action was intended only to torture the dog.Page 145