Houck v. Stephens
Houck v. Stephens
Opinion of the Court
Appellant Patrick Stephens is dissatisfied with the trial judge’s construction of the deed. He first takes the position that the language “to Emer J. Stephens and her children after her” conveys to Emma J. Stephens a life estate with a contingent remainder to her children so that only those children who can answer the roll upon the death of Emma Stephens acquire any interest in the lands. This is so, he argues, because the words “after her” limit the remainder interest to those surviving the life tenant.
“In 24 A. and E. Enc., 394, the author says: ‘Where a remainder is given to a class, as, for instance, the children of a designated person, it will be held a vested remainder unless the terms of the instrument creating it clearly show that the ascertainment of the individuals composing the class is to be postponed until the determination of the preceding estate. But such a remainder, though vested, will open to let in members of the class who may be born during the continuance of the preceding estate.’ ” Powell v. Powell, 168 N.C. 561, 84 S.E. 860 (1915).
Failing in his contention that the remainder interest was contingent, appellant resourcefully advances two other interpretations of the deed. Neither contains merit.
Judge Ervin properly construed the deed as conveying a life estate to Emma J. Stephens with a vested remainder in her children Fred Stephens, Rose Stephens, Ann S. Hudson, Patrick Stephens, and Theodore Stephens.
Affirmed.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.