State ex rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau
State ex rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau
Opinion of the Court
Appellate review of this case is governed by the standards set forth in G.S. 58-9.6 of the Insurance Law, Chapter 58 of the North Carolina General Statutes and by the provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, in particular G.S. 150A-51.
Appellants have assigned as error the entry of the order, most of the findings and conclusions therein, many of the hearing
Appellants assign as error the action of the hearing officer in entering the order of 1 December 1981, and argue that the order is fatally defective because the hearing officer lacks authority to enter a final order under the provisions of Chapters 58 and 150A of the North Carolina General Statutes. The order of 1 December 1981 was signed by Thomas B. Sawyer. Following his signature are these words: “Deputy Commissioner of Insurance and Designated Hearing Officer Presiding and Designated to make the Final Agency Decision.” Apart from this reference, no recital of the hearing officer’s authority to make the final order appears either in the order itself or elsewhere in the record.
The appellants do not dispute the Commissioner’s authority to designate Deputy Commissioner Sawyer as the hearing officer in this case. Both G.S. 58-9.2 and G.S. 150A-32 recognize the right of the Commissioner of Insurance to designate other persons to serve as hearing officers. However, appellants do dispute the Commissioner’s attempt to delegate to Deputy Commissioner Sawyer the authority to make the final agency decision in this matter.
In State of North Carolina Ex Rel. Commissioner of Insurance v. North Carolina Rate Bureau, 61 N.C. App. 262, 300 S.E. 2d 586 (1983) this Court recently examined the respective powers and duties of the Commissioner of Insurance and his designated hearing officer in the review of filed rates and entry of a final agency decision in a contested insurance rate case. We found the proper statutory allocation of authority and procedure to be as follows: (1) the powers and duties of both the Commissioner of Insurance and the designated hearing officer are limited by legislative prescription;
Based upon these various statutes we concluded that (1) it was the duty of the hearing officer to go no further than to make a proposal for decision to the Commissioner of Insurance himself (or his chief deputy appointed under G.S. 58-7.1); (2) it then became the duty of the Commissioner to review the submitted proposal for decision and thereafter decide for himself “wherein and to what extent such filing is deemed to be improper;” and (3) when the Commissioner of Insurance delegated to his appointed hearing officer the power to make the final agency decision, the Commissioner made an unlawful delegation of power in excess of his statutory authority. Accordingly we held (1) that the order
For the reasons set forth in that opinion, we hold that the order entered 1 December 1981 by Thomas B. Sawyer, a Deputy Commissioner of Insurance and Hearing Officer in this contested case, is void ab initio as the delegation of power to him to make the final agency decision was in excess of the Commissioner’s statutory authority. Therefore, the order of the Commissioner disapproving the workers’ compensation insurance rate increase for the industrial classification and approving only a portion of the rate increase for the “F” classifications proposed in the Rate Bureau’s filing is reversed and vacated and the rates proposed therein are deemed approved. See Comr. of Insurance v. Rate Bureau, supra, 54 N.C. App. at 606, 284 S.E. 2d at 343; Commissioner of Insurance v. Rate Bureau, 40 N.C. App. 85, 108, 252 S.E. 2d 811, 826, cert. denied, 297 N.C. 452, 256 S.E. 2d 810 (1979). The portion of the premium escrowed by the member insurance companies in the escrow account pursuant to G.S. 58424.22(b) shall be distributed to the insurance companies for whose account it was escrowed by the escrow agents.
Reversed and vacated.
. G.S. 58-9.6(b) provides in pertinent part: The court may affirm or reverse the decision of the Commissioner, declare the same null and void, or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the appellants have been prejudiced because the Commissioner’s findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions are: (1) In violation of constitutional provisions or (2) In excess of statutory authority or jurisdiction of the Commissioner, or (3) Made upon unlawful proceedings, or (4) Affected by other errors of law, or (5) Unsupported by material and substantial evidence in view of the entire record as submitted, or (6) Arbitrary or capricious.
G.S. 150A-51. The court may affirm the decision of the agency or remand the case for further proceedings; or it may reverse or modify the decision if the substantial rights of the petitioners may have been prejudiced because the agency findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: (I) In violation of constitutional provisions; or (2) In excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or (3) Made upon unlawful procedure; or (4) Affected by other error of law; or (5) Unsupported by substantial evidence admissible under G.S. 150A-29(a) or G.S. 150A-30 in view of the entire record as submitted; or (6) Arbitrary or capricious . . .
. In Comr. of Insurance v. Automobile Rate Office, 287 N.C. 192, 202, 214 S.E. 2d 98, 104 (1975) the court stated that although the Commissioner’s office is created by the North Carolina Constitution, his power and authority emanate from the General Assembly and are limited by legislative prescription. The only power he has to fix rates is such power as the General Assembly has delegated to and vested
. G.S. 58-124.21(a) states in pertinent part: If the Commissioner after hearing finds that the filing does not comply with the provisions of this Article, he may issue his order determining wherein and to what extent such filing is deemed to be improper and fixing a date thereafter, within a reasonable time, after which such filing shall no longer be effective. Any order of disapproval under this section must be entered within 90 days of the date such filing is received by the Commissioner.
. The six categories listed in G.S. 150A-33 are: Administering oaths, signing and issuing subpoenas, taking depositions, regulating the course of hearings, providing for pre-trial conferences of parties to simplify issues, and making application to the court for contempt orders.
Concurring Opinion
concurring.
We have overruled the Commissioner of Insurance once again, this time on narrow procedural, but clearly correct, grounds. Our insurance laws are cumbersome and confusing; their administration is often ineffective. North Carolina consumers of insurance protection — who pay both the costs of insurance itself and their share of the cost of insurance regulation — are not being served. The need for reform of our insurance laws is obvious and corrective action is overdue.
Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.