Mariah Jones v. Brookdale Senior Living

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA MARIAH JONES, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) 1:26CV142 ) BROOKDALE SENIOR LIVING, ) ) Defendant. ) ORDER, MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE This matter is before the Court on pro claim, “a complaint must contain se Plaintiff Mariah Jones’s (“Jones’s”) sufficient factual matter, accepted as application to proceed in forma true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is pauperis. See Docket Entry 1. For the plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. reasons laid out below, Jones’s Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) application is granted for the limited (quoting and citing Bell Atlantic Corp. purpose of allowing the Court to v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 consider a recommendation of (2007). That is, a plaintiff must make dismissal. factual allegations that are “enough to raise a right to relief above the I. DISCUSSION speculative level.” See Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 555 (citation Jones’s Complaint alleges two claims: modified). “Thus, while a plaintiff retaliation in violation of Title VII of does not need to demonstrate in a the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e complaint that the right to relief is et seq., and wrongful termination. See ‘probable,’ the complaint must generally Docket Entry 1 (“Compl.”). advance the plaintiff’s claim ‘across The Court should dismiss the the line from conceivable to Complaint in its entirety because plausible.’” Walters v. McMahen, Jones has failed to state both claims. 684 F.3d 435, 439 (4th Cir. 2012) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570).

The Court must dismiss a case filed in The Court “accepts all well-pled facts forma pauperis if it fails to state a as true and construes these facts in claim on which relief may be granted. the light most favorable to the 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B). To state a plaintiff, but does not consider legal conclusions, elements of a cause of safety, being assigned work outside action, and bare assertions devoid of one’s normal job duties, or being sent factual enhancement[,] . . . erroneous disciplinary letters. See id.; unwarranted inferences, Muller v. Westinghouse Elec. Co., unreasonable conclusions, or LLC, LP, No. 3:20-CV-1094-SAL- arguments.” Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. KDW, 2022 WL 17345480, at *17 Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d (D.S.C. Oct. 28, 2022) (collecting 250, 255 (4th Cir. 2009) (citation cases), report and recommendation modified). A pro se plaintiff’s adopted as modified on other complaint must be construed liberally grounds, No. 3:20-CV-1094-SAL- in their favor. See Jehovah v. Clarke, KDW, 2022 WL 17343484 (D.S.C. 798 F.3d 169, 176 (4th Cir. 2015). Nov. 30, 2022). Jones has failed to state a claim under Title VII because A. Title VII Retaliation she has alleged no discrimination against a protected class.

Jones alleges her former employer violated Title VII by disciplining and B. Wrongful Termination terminating her in retaliation for her complaints about “workplace issues, Jones also alleges “wrongful including unfair treatment and unsafe termination” in violation of “federal or improper working conditions.” See law.” See Compl. at 10. But Jones Compl. at 8–10. Jones provides only does not identify the federal statute or two examples: on April 26, 2025, she constitutional provision that provides was “left alone in a facility as a relief for this claim. “A complaint fails caregiver without proper staffing or to state a claim if it identifies no support,” and on May 2, her particular section of the statutory supervisor told her to “clean the spa scheme which was violated and fails room because ‘we have no to describe with any reasonable housekeeper,’” which was “outside particularity the facts supporting [her] normal duties” as a caregiver. violation.” Swasey v. Seterus, Inc., See id. at 4, 7, 9. Jones also alleges she No. 216CV01633TLNEFB, 2018 WL “was sent a corrective action letter 3017554, at *13 (E.D. Cal. June 14, with somebody[’s] name signed as a 2018) (quotation marks omitted). witness who wasn’t there.” Id. at 5. Jones therefore failed to state a wrongful termination claim under These allegations are insufficient to federal law. state a claim under Title VII, which protects against retaliation for To the extent that Jones intended to reporting discrimination against a plead a claim for wrongful protected class. See 42 U.S.C. termination under North Carolina §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3. Absent such law, she still failed. “North Carolina discrimination, Title VII does not adheres to the presumption of ‘at-will’ protect complaints about workplace employment. This means that, unless otherwise agreed upon by Dance, No. 5:18-CV-433-D, 2021 WL employment contract or a collective 232121, at *9 (E.D.N.C. Jan. 22, 2021) bargaining agreement, an employee (collecting cases); see also Shook, may generally be terminated for no LLC, 114 F.4th at 249. Having reason, or even for an arbitrary or identified no North Carolina statute irrational reason.” Shook v. NCG or constitutional provision, Jones Acquisition, LLC, 114 F.4th 242, 245 failed to state this state law claim. (4th Cir. 2024). However, an exception exists for wrongful II. CONCLUSION termination in violation of public policy. See id. (citing Coman uv. It is ORDERED that Jones’s Thomas Mfg. Co., 325 N.C. 172 application to proceed in forma (1989)). “To prove a_ wrongful pauperis, Docket Entry 1, _ is discharge claim in violation of North GRANTED for the limited purpose Carolina public policy, a plaintiff must of allowing the Court to consider a identify and rely upon a specific North recommendation of dismissal. It is Carolina statute or North Carolina RECOMMENDED that this case be constitutional provision stating North dismissed under 28 U.S.C. Carolina’s public policy.” Carmon v. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure to state a claim.

J L na Gibson McFadden United States Magistrate Judge February 18, 2026 Durham, North Carolina