Raevin B. v. Frank Bisignano, Commissioner of Social Security

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA RAEVIN B., ) ) Plaintiff, ) v. ) 1:25CV831 ) FRANK BISIGNANO, ) Commissioner of Social ) Security, ) ) Defendant. ) ORDER AND MEMORANDUM OPINION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE The plaintiff, Raevin B. (“Raevin”), I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY brought this action to obtain review of a final decision of the Commissioner Raevin filed an application for of Social Security denying her claim disability insurance benefits and a for social security disability insurance period of disability in July of 2022, benefits and a period of disability.1 alleging a disability onset date of June The Court has considered the certified 15, 2022, later amended to September administrative record and dispositive 19, 2022. (Tr. 181-87, 221, 17.) The briefing from the parties. Because applications were denied initially and substantial evidence supports the upon reconsideration. (Tr. 106-09, determination of the Administrative 112-14.) After two hearings,2 the Law Judge (“ALJ”), the Court will Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) deny Raevin’s request for the award of determined on August 30, 2024 that benefits or for a remand, as set forth Raevin was not disabled under the below. Act. (Tr. 17-76.) The Appeals Council denied a request for review, making the ALJ’s decision the final decision for review. (Tr. 1-6.)

1 Transcript citations refer to the in this case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § Administrative Transcript of Record filed 636(c). Docket Entry 11. manually with the Commissioner’s Answer. See Docket Entry 4. By Order of 2 A supplemental hearing was held after Reference, this matter was referred to the technical issues ended the first hearing.

Undersigned to conduct all proceedings (Tr. 17.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “The Commissioner uses a five-step process to evaluate disability claims.”

While Section 405(g) of Title 42 of the Hancock v. Astrue, 667 F.3d 470, United States Code “authorizes 472-73 (4th Cir. 2012) (citing 20 judicial review of the Social Security C.F.R. §§ 416.920(a)(4), Commissioner’s denial of social 404.1520(a)(4)). security benefits,” see Hines v. Barnhart, 453 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. Under this process, the 2006), the scope of that review is Commissioner asks, in specific and narrow, see Smith v. sequence, whether the Schweiker, 795 F.2d 343, 345 (4th claimant: (1) worked during the Cir. 1986). Specifically, review is alleged period of disability; (2) limited to determining if there is had a severe impairment; (3) substantial evidence in the record to had an impairment that met or support the Commissioner’s decision. equaled the requirements of a 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Hunter v. listed impairment; (4) could Sullivan, 993 F.2d 31, 34 (4th Cir. return to her [or his] past 1992); Hays v. Sullivan, 907 F.2d relevant work; and (5) if not, 1453, 1456 (4th Cir. 1990). In could perform any other work reviewing for substantial evidence, in the national economy. the Court does not re-weigh conflicting evidence, make credibility Id. at 472. A finding adverse to the determinations, or substitute its claimant at any of several points in judgment for that of the this five-step sequence forecloses a Commissioner. Craig v. Chater, 76 disability designation and ends the F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996). Put inquiry. Id. at 473. “Through the simply: the issue before the Court is fourth step, the burden of production not whether Raevin is disabled but and proof is on the claimant. If the whether the finding that she is not claimant reaches step five, the burden disabled is supported by substantial shifts to the Secretary to produce evidence and based upon a correct evidence that other jobs exist in the application of the relevant law. Id. national economy that the claimant can perform considering his age, III. THE ALJ’S DECISION education, and work experience.” See Hunter, 993 F.2d at 35 (internal The ALJ followed the correct process, citations omitted). set forth in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, to determine disability. See Albright v. The ALJ determined at step one that Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 174 F.3d Raevin had not engaged in substantial 473, 475 n.2 (4th Cir. 1999). gainful activity since the alleged onset date. (Tr. 19.) The ALJ next found the following severe impairments at step two: degenerative disc disease; (Tr. 22-23.) At the fourth step, the depressive, bipolar, and related ALJ determined that Raevin was disorders; anxiety and obsessive- unable to perform her past relevant compulsive disorder; and post- work. (Tr. 30.) Last, at step five, the traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”). ALJ concluded that there were other (Tr. 20.) At step three, the ALJ found jobs in the national economy that that Raevin did not have an Raevin could perform. (Tr. 30.) impairment or combination of impairments listed in, or medically IV. DISCUSSION equal to one listed in, Appendix 1. (Tr.

20.) In her appeal, Raevin asserts only that “[t]he ALJ erred by failing to evaluate The ALJ next set forth Raevin’s and account for [her] therapy animal Residual Functional Capacity (“RFC”) usage in the RFC assessment.” and determined that she could Docket Entry 8 at 4. The record perform a reduced range of medium demonstrates otherwise, as set forth work as follows: below. specifically, the claimant can A. The RFC Determination lift and/or carry up to 50 pounds occasionally and up The RFC measures the most a and 25 pounds frequently; she claimant can do in a work setting is [sic] sit, stand, and walk up to despite the physical and mental six hours each in an eight-hour limitations of his or her impairments workday; she can push/pull as and any related symptoms (e.g., pain). much as she can lift/carry; See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1545(a)(1); see further, she is able to also Dunn v. Colvin, 607 F. App’x understand, remember and 264, 272 (4th Cir. 2015) carryout instructions by (unpublished) (claimant’s RFC is “[a] performing simple, routine, medical assessment of what an and repetitive tasks, but not at individual can do in a work setting in a production rate pace (e.g., spite of the functional limitations and assembly line work); she is able environmental restrictions imposed to perform simple work-related by all of his or her medically decisions; she can frequently determinable impairment(s)”) interact with supervisors, and (internal citation omitted); Hines, occasionally interact with 453 F.3d at 562. The RFC includes coworkers and the public; and both a “physical exertional or strength the claimant’s time-off task can limitation” that assesses the be accommodated by normal claimant’s “ability to do sedentary, breaks. light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work,” as well as “nonexertional limitations (mental, sensory, or skin components: (1) evidence, (2) logical impairments).” Hall v. Harris, 658 explanation, and (3) conclusion”). As F.2d 260, 265 (4th Cir. 1981). noted earlier, the ALJ “must both identify evidence that supports his “Social Security Ruling 96-8p conclusion and ‘build an accurate and explains that the RFC assessment logical bridge from [that] evidence to must include a narrative discussion his conclusion.’” Woods v. Berryhill, describing how the evidence supports 888 F.3d 686, 694 (4th Cir. 2018) each conclusion, citing specific (alteration in original) (quoting medical facts (e.g., laboratory Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189). Failure to findings) and nonmedical evidence do so constitutes reversible error. See (e.g., daily activities, observations).” Lewis v. Berryhill, 858 F.3d 858, 868 Monroe v. Colvin, 826 F.3d 176, 189 (4th Cir. 2017). Where an ALJ’s (4th Cir. 2016) (internal quotations “analysis is incomplete and precludes omitted). An ALJ need not discuss meaningful review,” remand is every piece of evidence in making an appropriate. Monroe, 826 F.3d at 191.

RFC determination. See Reid v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 769 F.3d 861, Moreover, “[a]n ALJ assesses the (4th Cir. 2014). Yet, the ALJ credibility of a claimant’s subjective “must build an accurate and logical statements about his condition as part bridge from the evidence to [the] of the RFC assessment,” Ladda v. conclusion.” Brown v. Commissioner, Berryhill, 749 F. App’x 166, 170 (4th 873 F.3d 251, 269 (4th Cir. 2017) Cir. 2018) (unpublished), using a two- (internal quotations omitted). “The part test: “First, there must be RFC assessment must first identify objective medical evidence showing the individual’s functional limitations ‘the existence of a medical or restrictions and assess his or her impairment(s) which results from work-related abilities on a function- anatomical, physiological, or by-function basis . . . . Only [then] psychological abnormalities and may RFC be expressed in terms of the which could reasonably be expected to exertional levels of work, sedentary, produce the pain or other symptoms light, medium, heavy, and very alleged,’” Craig, 76 F.3d at 594 (citing heavy.” SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184, 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.929(b), at *1. 404.1529(b)).

The Fourth Circuit has held that If such an impairment exists, the ALJ “meaningful review is frustrated when must then consider, as the second an ALJ goes straight from listing prong of the test, all available evidence to stating a conclusion.” evidence, including the claimant’s Thomas v. Berryhill, 916 F.3d 307, statements about pain, to determine (4th Cir. 2019) (explaining that “a whether the claimant is disabled. Id. proper RFC analysis has three at 595-96. In so doing, the ALJ need not credit them if they conflict with (vi) Any measures [Plaintiff] the objective medical evidence or if use[s] or [has] used to the underlying impairment could not relieve his pain or other reasonably be expected to cause the symptoms (e.g., lying flat symptoms alleged. Id. Where the ALJ on [his] back, standing has considered the relevant factors, for 15 to 20 minutes see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3), and every hour, sleeping on a heard the claimant’s testimony and board, etc.); and observed his or her demeanor, the Court will defer to the ALJ’s (vii) Other factors concerning determination regarding those [Plaintiff’s] functional subjective complaints. Shively v. limitations and Heckler, 739 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. restrictions due to pain 1984). or other symptoms.

Those relevant factors include: 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3). (i) [Plaintiff’s] daily Additionally, the longstanding activities; requirements calling for adjudicators to weigh medical opinions and give (ii) The location, duration, special deference to treating source frequency, and intensity opinions have changed. See 20 C.F.R. of [Plaintiff’s] pain or § 404.1520c(a) (effective March 27, other symptoms; 2017). Now, adjudicators “will not defer or give any specific evidentiary (iii) Precipitating and weight, including controlling weight, aggravating factors; to any medical opinion(s) or prior administrative medical finding(s), (iv) The type, dosage, including those from [a claimant’s] effectiveness, and side medical sources.” Id. Nevertheless, an effects of any medication ALJ must consider and articulate in [Plaintiff] take[s] or the administrative decision how [has] taken to alleviate persuasive he or she finds each his pain or other medical opinion or prior medical symptoms; finding in a claimant’s case record.

See id. § 404.1520c(b). When a (v) Treatment, other than medical source provides more than medication, [Plaintiff] one opinion or finding, the ALJ will receive[s] or [has] evaluate the persuasiveness of such received for relief of his opinions or findings as a class. See id. pain or other symptoms; § 404.1520c(b)(1). The ALJ is “not required to articulate how [she] considered each medical opinion or claimant is] disabled.” 20 C.F.R. § prior administrative medical finding 404.1520b(c)(1)-(3). The regulations from one medical source also make clear that, for such claims, individually.” Id. “we will not provide any analysis about how we considered such As to persuasiveness, the ALJ must evidence in our determination or articulate two factors: supportability decision.” 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c). and consistency. Id. § 404.1520c(b)(2). Supportability is an Last, though there appears to be no internal check that references binding Fourth Circuit precedent, objective medical evidence and other courts have found that the use of supporting explanations that come a therapy/service animal must be from the source itself. Id. § medically necessary (for example, 404.1520c(c)(1); see also Revisions to medically prescribed or Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. recommended) to be considered in an Consistency is an external check that RFC assessment. See Shue v. references evidence from other O’Malley, No. 23-1795, 2024 WL medical and nonmedical sources. Id. § 2827936, at *3 (4th Cir. June 4, 2024) 404.1520c(c)(2); see also Revisions to (unpublished) affirming, 2023 WL Rules, 82 Fed. Reg. at 5853. The ALJ 3727935, at *6 (E.D. Va. May 30, must only address the three other 2023) (“A prescription has reasonably persuasiveness factors—relationship been considered adequate evidence of with the claimant, specialization, and necessity, which would trigger a duty the catchall “other factors”—when two for the ALJ to address the service or more medical opinions, or prior animal’s role and impact on the administrative medical findings about claimant’s RFC, while a lack of a the same issue, are equally persuasive prescription or other credible medical in terms of supportability and documentation may indicate the consistency. Id. §§ 404.1520c(b)(3), animal is not medically necessary.”).

404.1520c(c)(3)-(5). However, the Fourth Circuit has noted that the medical necessity Furthermore, “[s]tatements that standard “appears to be in tension [claimants] are or are not disabled, . . with the requirement that the RFC be . able to work, or able to perform based on all the relevant medical and regular or continuing work,” are other evidence found in the record.” statements on an issue reserved to the Shue, 2024 WL 2827936, at *3 Commissioner. 20 C.F.R. § (emphasis added).

404.1520b(c)(3). And statements on issues reserved to the Commissioner B. The RFC Is Legally Correct, Well- are deemed evidence that “is Supported, and Susceptible to inherently neither valuable nor Review. persuasive to the issue of whether [a Here, regardless of whether the concerning the intensity, persistence “medical necessity” standard or the and limiting effects of these “all the relevant medical and other symptoms are not entirely consistent evidence” standard applies, the ALJ in with the medical evidence and other this case adequately explained in a evidence in the record for the reasons manner susceptible to judicial review explained in this decision.” (Tr. 24.) why the RFC did not warrant the As shown below, the ALJ then gave inclusion of a therapy animal. good reasons for partially discounting Instead, the ALJ concluded, in a her subjective allegations (which decision supported by substantial includes any purported need for a evidence, that Raevin could perform a therapy animal in the workplace), range of medium work with which are the same reasons that also numerous mental limitations. (Tr. support the ALJ’s overall RFC 22.) determination.

Specifically, the ALJ began his RFC First, the ALJ accurately pointed to assessment by summarizing at length Raevin’s sparse mental health Raevin’s testimony. (Tr. 23-24.) And, treatment, explaining that in pertinent part, the ALJ noted that Raevin testified that she “lives by for her mental health herself in an apartment with a therapy impairments, the claimant has dog, stating that the therapy dog helps had sparse medical treatment. . . . with her anxiety, depression, and Although she alleges that she bipolar disorder. She stated that the became too limited to work as therapy dog [provides] reminders of of September 2022, she had [sic] during the day of things such as only been seen on three when to go to bed, and reminds [her] occasions for mental health to eat.” (Tr. 23.) treatment in July 2022, and did not seek any additional mental Nevertheless, the ALJ decided not to health treatment until fully credit all of Raevin’s allegations, November 2023. She began including any allegation that she consistent outpatient therapy required a therapy animal to function sessions in January 2024, but in the workplace. Specifically, the ALJ did not begin any medication explained that Raevin’s “medically until June 2024. determinable impairments could reasonably be expected to cause some Tr. 27, 427-30 (7/1/2022), 431-34 of the alleged symptoms . . . .” (Tr. 24.) (7/7/2022), 435-38 (7/21/2022), The ALJ thus performed the first step 369-78 (11/20/2023), 400-12, 407 of the Craig analysis. Next, the ALJ (11/20/23) (“not open to psychotropic performed step two of the analysis, medications at this time”), 379-89 concluding that Raevin’s “statements (1/31/24), 390-91 (2/7/2024), 392- (2/15/2024), 395-96 (2/21/2024), Second, in supporting his RFC 413-23 (1/30-31/2024), 440-42 determination and subjective (4/12/2024), 443-45 (4/15/2024), complaints assessment, the ALJ 446-48 (4/25/2024), 449-51 pointed to Raevin’s extensive daily (5/7/2024), 452-54 (5/14/2024), activities. For example, the ALJ 455-57 (5/21/2024), 458-60 pointed out that at a consultative (5/28/2024), 461-63 (6/11/2024), physical examination in March 2023, 464-66 (6/18/2024), 467-68 Raevin stated that she lived (7/7/24), 471-73 (6/21/2024) independently. (Tr. 22, 335.) She also (“Currently w/o medications for few stated that she was able to do years and agreed to medication household chores like cooking, management and OPT . . . . Wants to cleaning, washing dishes, laundry, try new medication or holistic and that she was able to take care of remedy.”), 474-76 (7/2/2024), 477-79 her hygiene. (Tr. 21, 335.) She (7/9/2024), 480-82 (7/16/2024), reported at another March 2023 483-85 (7/30/2024). consultative examination that her daily routine consisted of caring for Raevin has not challenged this her dog, completing chores, and finding, and it supports the ALJ’s grooming. (Tr. 26, 343.) She stated conclusion that she did not suffer that she was able to drive and could from disabling mental health grocery shop independently although impairments. See Lewis v. Colvin, No. she generally used Instacart. (Tr. 26, 3:12-CV-08073, 2013 WL 6145811, at 343.) Also, during therapy, she *21 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 21, 2013) reported that she was able to live (“Claimant’s sparse mental health independently, dated, was working treatment is inconsistent with her towards her degree (receiving an A in claim of severe impairment due to a class in 2024), and also started her PTSD. The overall paucity of own business. (Tr. 21, 26-27, 379, 413, treatment records reflecting any 427, 428, 431-32, 435-36, 455, 449.) limiting complaints or symptoms of PTSD undercuts Claimant’s reports of In fact, she was interviewed for this symptoms to the consultative business, participated in the filming examiners.”) (citing Mickles v. of a one-hour video regarding the Shalala, 29 F.3d 918, 930 (4th Cir. business, and sustained an active 1994) (holding that “it was not social medial presence and website improper for the ALJ to consider the for her business. (Tr. 21, 24, 26-27, level and type of treatment [the 60-62, 446, 449.) The ALJ further claimant] sought and obtained in pointed out that Raevin also hosted a determining what weight to accord “yoga event” in 2024. (Tr. 26, 63-64, her allegations” of symptoms and 330, 390, 438, 452 (“She mentioned severity). that she hosted a yoga event”), 343 (“She has attempted odd jobs like teaching yoga but proved Jill J. v. Dudek, No. 8:23-CV-5536- unsuccessful due to issues with WSB, 2025 WL 1009089, at *12 location.”).) Raevin has not (D.S.C. Mar. 7, 2025) (“[N]ormal challenged the ALJ’s assessment of mental status findings, when her activities of daily living and these considered in combination with extensive activities further support Plaintiff’s conservative treatment the ALJ’s RFC determination as well during the period under review and as his decision to partially discount Plaintiff’s daily activities, provide her allegations of total disability, substantial evidence to support the including any allegation that she ALJ’s decision as to Plaintiff’s mental required a therapy animal in the limitations.”). workplace. See Monroe, 826 F.3d at 189 (listing daily activities as the type Fourth, the ALJ addressed numerous of non-medical evidence an ALJ may medical opinions in assessing consider in assessing the RFC); 20 Raevin’s RFC. Specifically, the ALJ C.F.R. § 404.1529(c)(3)(i) (listing considered the March 2023 opinions activities of daily living as a relevant of non-examining state agency factor to consider in assessing medical consultant C. Leinweber, DO, subjective allegations). as well as a December 2023 opinion of non-examining state agency medical Third, the ALJ pointed to Raevin’s consultant Dr. Scott Murkin, both of generally normal mental status whom concluded that Raevin could examinations. (Tr. 21 (“Mental status perform a full range of medium work. examinations noted that her thought (Tr. 28, 89, 100.) The ALJ found these process and thought content were opinions persuasive, because “they normal, she was oriented on all had an opportunity to review the planes, and that her immediate and entirety of [Raevin’s] medical records remote memory seemed to be within regarding her physical impairments, normal range. Additionally, her including the consultative physical mental trend and thought content examinations, and their findings are revealed no hallucinations, delusions, consistent with the relative lack of any persecutions, obsessions, thought physical findings at these control, unusual power, suicidal or examinations.” (Tr. 27.) homicidal ideation.”), 22, 25, 27, 428, 372-75, 403-06, 354-57, 341, 344-47.) The ALJ next considered the medical Raevin has not challenged the ALJ’s opinions of the non-examining state assessment of her generally normal agency psychological consultants. (Tr. mental status reports and this was 28.) In May 2023, Dr. Kristin Wiltrout additional substantial evidence in concluded that Raevin could support of both the ALJ’s RFC understand and remember at least determination as well as the ALJ’s simple instructions, could sustain subjective complaints analysis. See concentration and persistence for simple work in a low-stress, non- had no medical treatment for any production environment, could physical impairments and further maintain appropriate interactions in because they were consistent with the the workplace, and could adapt to lack of any significant findings at Dr. occasional, predictable changes in a Flores’ examination. (Tr. 28.) Raevin stable work environment. (Tr. 28, 89- has not challenged the ALJ’s 91.) Dr. Susan Stanton, another state assessment or Dr. Flores’ opinion. agency psychological consultant, came to the same conclusion in The ALJ next found the March and January 2024. (Tr. 28, 101-03.) The December 2023 medical opinions of ALJ found these opinions persuasive consultative examiners Warren E. because the consultants supported Hoskins, LPA HSP, a licensed their findings with record evidence psychological associate, and Larry and their findings were consistent Hines, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist with the medical and other evidence only “somewhat persuasive.” (Tr. 28- as a whole.3 (Tr. 28.) 29, 341-48, 352-58.) In both opinions they described Raevin as “emotionally The ALJ next found Dr. Augustin fragile” with mild to moderate Flores’ March 2023 opinion difficulties negotiating simple stress persuasive, which found that Raevin in light of her history; mild difficulties had no limitations with regards to her understanding, retaining and ability to stand, walk, or sit and found following instructions to performing that she would be limited to routine, repetitive tasks given her lifting/carrying/pushing/pulling up reported short term memory to 50 pounds occasionally and up to impairment; mild/moderate pounds frequently, and that she limitations in concentration had no postural, manipulative, or persistence and pace in light of her environmental limitations. (Tr. 28, current functioning; and moderately 339.) He concluded the same self-sufficient, though her level of self- following a second consultative sufficiency was likely to parallel physical examination in December declines in mental functioning in light 2023. (Tr. 28, 365.) The ALJ found of her history of not showing up to these opinions persuasive, because work because of depression after they were consistent with the record mania. (Tr. 28, 347, 358.) as a whole, which showed that Raevin The ALJ explained that these Raevin has not challenged the ALJ’s the ALJ’s assessment or this Order, assessment of the non-examining state especially in light of the remaining record agency opinions other than to note that illustrating Raevin’s sparse mental they are silent on the issue of the need for health treatment, extensive activities of a therapy animal. Docket Entry 10 at 2-3. daily living, and generally normal mental However, that does not undermine either status reports. opinions were not entirely supported Phillip’s letter did not contain any by the medical evidence, which vocationally relevant functional showed that, at the time of the initial assessment. (Tr. 29.) consultative examination, Raevin was not receiving any mental health Likewise, the ALJ noted that Dr. treatment, that she opted not to take Tasha Holland-Kornegay, with Our any medication until June of 2024 for Treatment Center, wrote in May 2023 her conditions, and that despite her that, upon evaluation, Raevin was mental health impairments, she was “limited [in] one or more major life able to work on college classes, live activities or major bodily functions, alone, and establish and maintain her including the ability to care for one’s own business. (Tr. 29.) Raevin has not self and within their work.” (Tr. 29.) challenged the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Holland-Kornegay thus these opinions. recommended an emotional support animal. (Tr. 29, 426.) However, the The ALJ then noted that Nizae Phillip, ALJ found that this recommendation MSW, LCSWA, with B&D Integrated was not persuasive either, because Health Services, wrote that in there was no vocationally relevant November 2023 Raevin was functional assessment, and there were diagnosed with bipolar disorder, no treatment notes from Dr. Holland- generalized anxiety disorder, and Kornegay to verify these statements. major depressive disorder, and that (Tr. 29.) outpatient therapy services and medication management had been In light of all this, the ALJ limited recommended. (Tr. 29, 425.) The ALJ Raevin to, in pertinent part, a reduced found that, to the extent this range of medium work performing statement could be considered a simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, medical opinion under the but not at a production rate pace; regulations, it was unpersuasive performing simple work-related because there was no vocationally decisions; and only frequent relevant functional assessment. (Tr. interactions with supervisors, and 29.) The ALJ further noted that only occasionally interaction with Phillip also wrote in a June 2024 coworkers and the public. (Tr. 22-23.) letter that Raevin was disabled and The ALJ also considered all the was eligible for an emotional support material evidence related to Raevin’s animal to help alleviate her mental alleged need for a therapy animal in health challenges and improve her the workplace (i.e., Raevin’s ability to live independently. (Tr. 29, testimony and the two letters from 439.) The ALJ found this medical providers, neither of which unpersuasive, noting that the issue of were persuasive) but concluded that disability is one reserved for the this alleged need did not warrant Commissioner and noting further that inclusion in the RFC in light of Raevin’s sparse mental health the letter written by therapist Phillip, treatment, her extensive activities of both of whom recommended a daily living, her mental status reports therapy animal (Tr. 426, 439) and she upon examination, and the persuasive challenges the ALJ’s decision to find medical opinion evidence. This is them unpersuasive because they substantial evidence to support the lacked “any vocationally relevant ALJ’s RFC determination as well as functional assessment” (Tr. 29). the omission of a therapy animal from However, under both the old and new the RFC. regulations describing how an ALJ is to evaluate medical opinions, C. Raevin’s Objections to the vagueness in assessing vocational Contrary Are Not Persuasive. limitations constitutes a permissible ground for an ALJ to discount a Nevertheless, Raevin contends that medical opinion in whole or in part.4 the ALJ erred by failing to either The Court is unaware of any law that include the use of a therapy animal in would change this general principle the RFC or to explain why he omitted when it comes to a therapy animal and the use of one. Docket Entry 8 at 6. In ample persuasive case law supports support, she points to the letter this conclusion.5 See also 20 C.F.R. § written by Dr. Holland-Kornegay and 404.1513(a)(2) (providing that “[a] See, e.g., Wesley v. Kijakazi, No. reversible error where “Dr. Stromberg 1:20CV364, 2021 WL 4129234, at *11 did not opine that Plaintiff required an (M.D.N.C. Sept. 9, 2021) (“Vagueness emotional support animal in order to constitutes a permissible grounds for an perform any work-related functions, nor ALJ to discount a medical opinion.”) did he discuss what Plaintiff could do in (collecting cases); Betty C. v. Comm’r, a work setting despite her symptoms and Soc. Sec. Admin., No. 1:23-CV-00246- diagnoses”); Angela H. v. Comm’r, SSA, JMC, 2023 WL 7386206, at *5 (D. Md. No. 2:22-cv-4461, 2024 WL 1259875, at Nov. 8, 2023) (collecting cases); Samuel *4 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2024) (holding P. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-5881, that a letter recommending that the 2021 WL 5769404, at *6 (W.D. Wash. plaintiff obtain an emotional support Dec. 6, 2021); Langford v. Comm’r of Soc. animal to help alleviate issues with social Sec. Admin., No. 1:22-CV-00665-CEH, interaction, stress, and anxiety and to 2023 WL 3058160, at *26 (N.D. Ohio Apr. enjoy the use of her dwelling was not a 24, 2023); Chiccola v. Comm’r of Soc. medical opinion because it did not Sec., No. 1:18 CV 2940, 2020 WL describe the work functions she could 1031488, at *8 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2020) perform despite her symptoms); Ashley (internal citations omitted) (collecting D. v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., No. CV 22- cases). 11344, 2023 WL 5266849, at *10 (E.D.

Mich. July 17, 2023) (finding no error See Leticia B. v. King, No. CV 24-116 where “Dr. Cousineau’s letter [does not] MV/GJF, 2025 WL 289420, at *10 indicate how the use of an emotional (D.N.M. Jan. 24, 2025) (finding no support dog would bear on Plaintiff’s medical opinion is a statement from a the dwelling unit you own and/or medical source about what you can administer.” (Tr. 426.) She states, still do despite your impairment(s) “My client’s emotional support and whether you have one or more animal helps them deal with the stress impairment-related limitations or and pain associated with their restrictions in [specified] abilities”). disability.” (Tr. 426.)

More specifically, Dr. Holland- The ALJ did not err here. The Kornegay’s letter references generic question of disability is reserved to “mental health conditions,” asserts in the Commissioner and the ALJ a conclusory fashion that Raevin is accurately stated the same. See 20 disabled, and then asserts vaguely C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3). Nor, in light that she is “substantially limit[ed in] of the ample case law cited above, one or more major life activities or supra note 5, and the ALJ’s evaluation major bodily functions, including the of the overall record, did the ALJ err ability to care for [her] self and within in finding this vague, conclusory, and [her] work.” (Tr. 426.) Dr. Holland- unsupported letter unpersuasive, Kornegay then “recommend[s] an especially where there are no emotional support animal” as treatment notes in the record from Dr. “necessary to provide therapeutic Holland-Kornegay. emotional support that alleviates symptoms of [her] client’s Therapist Nizae Phillip’s letter is impairment, and to enhance [her] similar to Dr. Holland-Kornegay’s. client’s ability to function and live Phillip’s letter asserts that “[b]ased on independently and fully use and enjoy my evaluation of [Raevin’s] mental ability to work.”) (citations omitted); 3:19-CV-47, 2019 WL 6257994, at *19 Horne v. Saul, No. 2:19-CV-013-DCP, (N.D.W. Va. Nov. 4, 2019) (“[T]he ALJ 2020 WL 1547068, at *12 (E.D. Tenn. does not need to consider the use of a Mar. 31, 2020) (“[T]he Court finds that service dog in Plaintiff’s RFC as there has Plaintiff has failed to establish that a been no testimony regarding . . . whether service animal was medically necessary. Plaintiff requires the service dog to The referenced letter . . . does not . . . perform work[.]”) (collecting cases); provide an opinion on the impact of a Payano v. Colvin, No. 2:15-cv-00294- service animal on Plaintiff’s ability to RFB-GWF, 2017 WL 4778593, at *4 (D. work.”); Nancy J. M. v. Saul, No. ED CV Nev. Oct. 23, 2017) (finding that a letter 19-01144-RAO, 2020 WL 1975364, at *14 from a VA psychiatrist recommending (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2020) (“[T]he ALJ the use of a service dog when out in gave no weight to Dr. Reid’s opinion that public “alone does not support an Plaintiff requires an emotional support assessment that the dog is necessary for animal because the opinion did not Plaintiff to work, nor describe how she provide specific information regarding would need any dog in a work setting”) [Plaintiff’s] work-related abilities.”) adopted in pertinent part in, 2017 WL (citation omitted); Cordell v. Saul, No. 4778593, at *9 (D. Nev. Oct. 23, 2017). health condition and considering her obligation to determine whether history and functional limitations Raevin’s alleged therapy dog use stemming from emotional/mental qualified as medically necessary. See health barriers, it is evident that [she] supra note 5. Thus, if the medical qualifies as having a disability[.]” (Tr. necessity standard were to apply here, 439.) Phillip notes that Raevin is Raevin’s objection would fail for this “eligible to have an emotional support reason alone. See id. But even if the animal” “[t]o help alleviate [her] medical necessity standard does not challenges and improve her ability to apply here, Raevin’s objection still live independently” and fails in light of the ALJ’s discussion of “recommend[s] an animal [to] assist all of the evidence in the record, [her] in managing her disability.” (Tr. including Raevin’s sparse mental 439.) health treatment, her extensive activities of daily living (including Again, the ALJ did not err here. As going to college and running a noted, the question of disability is business), her mental status reports reserved to the Commissioner. See 20 upon examination, and the medical C.F.R. § 404.1520b(c)(3). Nor, in light opinion evidence. See id. of the authorities cited above, supra note 5, and the ALJ’s evaluation of the In support of her challenge to the overall record, did the ALJ err in ALJ’s decision, Raevin also points to finding this vague, conclusory, and her testimony at the administrative unsupported letter (which does not hearing. Docket Entry 8 at 4-5 reference the workplace or assert any referencing Tr. 49 (“[S]he helps with functional limitation) unpersuasive. my anxiety, depression, the See also Sandra A. v. O’Malley, No. symptoms of my bipolar disorder. She 3:23-CV-417-SLS, 2024 WL 4351441, does help me kind of keep my daily at *8 (E.D. Va. Sept. 30, 2024) needs. She she’ll let me know if it is (finding insufficient “evidence of any time to get up or time to go to bed. need for a service dog in the She’ll let you know that I need to eat workplace” where “Nurse Practitioner sometimes or sit down if my anxiety is Moore-Zierow recommended that getting a little out of whack.”).

Plaintiff use an emotional support However, the ALJ specifically animal in her home and during referenced this testimony as part of aircraft travel to alleviate her his summation of Raevin’s allegations emotional difficulties and enhance (Tr. 23) and then went on to provide her ability to live independently.”). good reasons for not fully crediting all of her purported limitations. Again, Because the ALJ gave good reasons these reasons include Raevin’s sparse for finding the two letters mental health treatment, her recommending a therapy animal extensive activities of daily living unpersuasive, he satisfied any (including going to college and running a business), her mental status words, the Court is not left to guess reports upon examination, and the why the ALJ declined to include a persuasive medical opinion evidence. therapy animal in the RFC. See These are good reasons to partially Mascio v. Colvin, 780 F.3d 632, 637 discount her allegations. (4th Cir. 2015) (observing that a remand is proper where a court if “left The remainder of Raevin’s challenge to guess about how the ALJ arrived at to the ALJ’s decision amounts to a his conclusions”). The ALJ addressed recitation of evidence that if fully all the material evidence on the issue credited in her favor, would render and gave good reasons backed by her disabled. Docket Entry 8 at 5-11. substantial evidence in support of the However, the ALJ evaluated the RFC. For all of these reasons, the relevant and material evidence in this Commissioner’s decision is affirmed. case, reconciled it when necessary, and reasonably concluded that Racvin V. CONCLUSION was not disabled under the Act. While After careful consideration of the Raevin disagrees and points to evidence of record, the Court finds evidence that the ALJ already that the Commissioner’s decision is considered to argue for the inclusion legally correct, supported by of a therapy animal in the RFC, this substantial evidence, and susceptible does not mean that the ALJ’s decision to judicial review. Accordingly, IT IS was erroneous or that she can ask this HEREBY ORDERED that the final Court to reweigh the evidence to decision of the Commissioner is arrive at a different conclusion. upheld.

In the end, remand is not warranted, given that the ALJ already provided a JoAnna Gibsdn McFadden logical bridge connecting substantial United States Magistrate Judge evidence to an RFC that did not include a therapy animal.® In other June 12, 2026 Citing SSR 11-2p, the Commissioner an accommodation, then an ALJ is not contends that “the ALJ was also not permitted to consider any limitations required to consider [Raevin’s] alleged posed by the need for a service animal or need for a service animal,” Docket Entry ESA.”) (collecting cases). However, at 7 citing SSR, 11-2P, 2011 WL because the Fourth Circuit has not 4055665, and there is some support in definitely resolved this issue, Shue, 2024 the caselaw for this, see W.D. v. Dudek, WL 2827936, at *4, the Court has not No. 1:24-CV-00444-SBP, 2025 WL disposed of this case on that ground and 947533, at *6 n.8 (D. Colo. Mar. 28, has instead fully entertained the merits 2025) (“Several courts have entertained of Raevin’s challenge and found them to the notion that if a service animal or be unpersuasive for the reasons [emotional support animal] is considered described herein.