Craver v. Dixie Furniture Company

Plaintiff's estoppel argument is built on a showing that the employer's provision of a simple method for employees to see to payment for their medical needs — i.e., reporting to the plant nurse, who would set in motion evaluation and filing under group medical or workers' compensation — tended to lull or mislead the claimant into believing that taking this step preserved all her rights. However, the courts do not find a defendant estopped from raising the G.S. § 97-24 jurisdictional defense grounded only on actual acceptance of the claim, payment of cash compensation and related medical bills, and negotiations at the time the two-year period runs. Ganttv. Edmos Corp., 56 N.C. App. 408, 409-10, 289 S.E.2d 75 (1982); Reinhardt v. Women's Pavilion, Inc.,102 N.C. App. 83, 84, 401 S.E.2d 138 (1991). Defendants quibble with Finding of Fact #4, based on adequate evidence (Tr. pp. 157-162), that the defendants knew in November of 1986 that plaintiff was being treated for a work-related injury, and by implication, that the three or four days missed from work then (Tr. pp. 164-165) were as well, and thus the failure to file the Form 19 Employers Report of Injury until May of 1987 was an egregious breach of G.S. § 97-92(a). But notwithstanding, the courts have held that the failure to comply with this requirement does not support estoppel. Knight v. Cannon Mills Co., 82 N.C. App. 453,465-66, 347 S.E.2d 832, cert. denied, 318 N.C. 507,349 S.E.2d 861 (1986). Consequently, the Deputy Commissioner's conclusion must be REVERSED.

Parenthetically, at the time of the Knight decision, the filing of the Form 19 would not have resulted in plaintiff receiving specific notice of the two-year limitation of § 97-24, as the Court noted (at 465), although it might have triggered a denial letter (see I.C. Rule 601), which in turn would trigger a form letter from the Commission to that effect. However, as of July 1, 1992, employers are required upon filing to provide a copy to employees of the revised Form 19, which includes this information.

WHEREFORE, the hearing Commissioner's Opinion and Award is affirmed and adopted, excluding Finding of Fact #13, Conclusions of Law #3 and #4, and the order, which are replaced as follows:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

3. The employer is not estopped from raising G.S. § 97-24(a) as a bar to plaintiffs claim, and the Commission is without jurisdiction to award compensation for her injury.

ORDER

Plaintiff's claim must be, and hereby is, DISMISSED.

Each party shall bear its own costs.

S/ _____________ J. RANDOLPH WARD COMMISSIONER

CONCURRING:

S/ ____________ JAMES J. BOOKER CHAIRMAN

DISSENTING:

S/ ____________ J. HAROLD DAVIS COMMISSIONER

I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. The Workers' Compensation Act is to be liberally construed to effectuate the broad intent of the Act to provide compensation for employees sustaining an injury arising out of and in the course of the employment, and no technical or strained construction should be given to defeat this purpose.

The plant nurse testified at the hearing that the employee relied on her to handle all workers' compensation claims. Therefore, when plaintiff reported the injury by accident to the plant nurse, she thought that was all required of her. The plant nurse had in her possession a workers' compensation manual, but never provided workers' compensation information to the employees. The personnel manager also testified that the plant nurse . would "take care of" filing workers' compensation claims for employees. This was a company policy and all employees relied on this policy, and in the case of the plaintiff, she relied on it to her detriment.

It is also well established that "the law of estoppelapplies in worker's compensation proceedings as in all othercases", and an employer, by his conduct, may waived the time for filing a claim. Biddix v. Rex Mills237 NC 660, 75 S.E.2d 777(1953). Estoppel may be applied when intentional deception is found. Belfield v. WeyerhaeuserCo., 77 NC App. 332, 335 S.E.2d 44(1985), and may also be found under less egregious circumstances. Parker v.Thompson-Arthur Paving Co. 100 NC App. 367,296 S.E.2d 626(1990) Neither bad faith, fraud nor intent to deceive is necessary. Id. The essential elements of equitable estoppel which would estop an employer from pleading the two year time limit were set forth by the N.C. Court of Appeals inParker.

In this case, plaintiff did not have the means to understand any written material on the Workers' Compensation Act; the company provided none. She was injured on the job, verbally responded to it, and sought and obtained treatment. The company took care of all her needs in reference to her claim until after the two year statute, then they "pulled the rug out fromunder her."

Based upon the foregoing reasons, I respectfully DISSENT.

S/ ____________ J. HAROLD DAVIS COMMISSIONER