North Carolina Industrial Commission, 2002

Brown v. N.C. Department of Corrections

Brown v. N.C. Department of Corrections
North Carolina Industrial Commission · Decided January 17, 2002 · <center> AWARD OF COMPENSATION by the Full Commission by RENE C. RIGGSBEE, Commissioner, and DISSENT by LAURA KRANIFELD MAVRETIC, Commissioner.</center>

Counsel

APPEARENCES Plaintiff: Narron Holdford, Attorneys, Wilson, NC; I. Joe Ivey, Counsel of Record. Defendant: The Honorable Roy Cooper, Attorney General, Raleigh, NC; Robert T. Hargett, Counsel of Record.

Brown v. N.C. Department of Corrections

Dissenting Opinion

The only issue on appeal to the Full Commission is whether petitioner is entitled to receive compensation for time spent awaiting trial in the Wilson County jail. I agree with the Special Deputy Commissioner that petitioner is entitled to compensation for the 538 days during which he was held in the Wilson County jail.

Section 148-82 of the General Statutes of North Carolina provides for payment of compensation for erroneous conviction to "[a]ny person who, having been convicted of a felony and having been imprisoned therefor in a State prison of this State" and is then granted a pardon of innocence by the Governor. Section 148-83 of the General Statutes describes the hearing process and compensation payment procedures and provides that the claimant shall be paid $10,000 "for each year or the pro rata amount for the portion of each year of the imprisonment actually served. . . ."(Emphasis added.)

The phrase "of the imprisonment actually served" is not limited by the description of "imprisoned therefor in a State prison of this State" contained in Section 148-82. The General Assembly did not see fit to limit compensation to imprisonment actually served in a State Prison but rather ordered that the Industrial Commission enter an award for the "imprisonment actually served" by the claimant. The time spent by an individual in a county jail awaiting trial for a crime he did not commit is incarceration just as is the time spent serving a sentence in a State prison, and the North Carolina General Assembly meant that this time be included in measuring compensation due. This interpretation is consistent with the fact that every prisoner is given credit for time "spent in commitment prior to the date of judgment" by the North Carolina criminal judgment form in effect at the time of sentencing of claimant, form AOC-CR-301 rev. 3/85. Furthermore, to make a distinction between incarceration in a county jail awaiting trial on a false charge and incarceration in a state prison serving a sentence for conviction on a false charge is violative of the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of both the North Carolina and United States Constitutions. Contrary to the majority's characterization of the 2001 statutory amendment to Section 148-84, the legislative intent in adopting this revision was toclarify that persons who have been erroneously convicted are to be compensated for the entire period of imprisonment, including time spent awaiting trial.

The above analysis of the statutory provisions was adopted by another panel of the Commission in I.C. No. EC000003 filed August 1, 2000 and which has not been appealed. In that case, the petitioner was awarded compensation for 170 days he was incarcerated in the county jail. To deny this petitioner the same benefits for a much longer period of incarceration is unfair and unjust and is the type of inequity the 2001 legislative revision sought to prevent.

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority in this case.

S/________________________ LAURA KRANIFELD MAVRETIC COMMISSIONER

Opinion of the Court

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The Full Commission has reviewed the Special Deputy Commissioner's Award for additional compensation based on the record of the proceedings before the Special Deputy Commissioner; the appealing party has shown good grounds to reconsider the evidence; and having reviewed the competent evidence of record, the Full Commission hereby reverses the June 1, 2001, Award.

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Based on the competent evidence of record, the Full Commission enters the following

FINDINGS OF FACTS
1. Plaintiff was erroneously convicted of the felonies of Second Degree Sex Offense and Second Degree Rape.

2. Plaintiff was incarcerated for four years and twenty-eight days in the North Carolina Department of Corrections for these crimes. The State does not contest compensation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-84 etseq.

3. In addition, plaintiff was incarcerated for a period of 538 days in the Wilson County Jail while awaiting trial, which time was accepted toward his sentence in the referenced offenses.

4. Plaintiff received a Pardon of Innocence from the Governor of the State of North Carolina on the 9th day of July, 1999, because the crime was not committed at all or was not committed by plaintiff.

5. Plaintiff presented no evidence that he sustained any particular pecuniary loss as a result of his erroneous conviction and subsequent incarceration.

6. Under separate order which was not appealed by either party, Plaintiff was compensated for the four years and twenty-eight days that he was in the custody of the Department of Corrections after his conviction in accordance with N.C. Gen. Stat. § 148-82 et seq.

7. The issue in this claim is whether Plaintiff is entitled to compensation for the period of time applied to his sentence which he served in the Wilson County Jail prior to his conviction. The Industrial Commission finds that the applicable provisions of N.C. Gen Stat. §148-82 et seq. do not provide for compensation for time awaiting trial.

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The foregoing Findings of Fact engender the following

CONCLUSION OF LAW
1. Section 148-82 of the General Statutes allows an erroneously convicted person to petition for compensation "sustained by the person through his or her erroneous conviction and imprisonment. . . ." This language requires that the compensation be for imprisonment resulting from the conviction. Although "time served" may be applied to satisfaction of the sentence given for a conviction, such time would have been spent in incarceration because of the arrest, indictment, and failure to post-bond or otherwise secure freedom prior to trial. The time spent in jail could not have been "sustained" or otherwise caused by the conviction when said conviction had not yet occurred. This interpretation is consistent with the general principle expressed by Section 148-82 et seq., that compensation is provided only to erroneously convicted felons who have been pardoned by the Governor, rather than to all persons who have been wrongfully convicted or confined. SeeRobertson v. Huffman, 144 F. Supp. 447, 452 (W.D.N.C. 2001) (claim for erroneous conviction controlled by language of statute). Likewise, the State is not obligated to compensate persons who are confined, but are not subsequently convicted; i.e., there is no compensation for the detained criminally accused who is not subsequently convicted. Finally, the Industrial Commission recognizes that Section 148-84 was amended in 2001 for pardons granted on or after January 1, 2001, to include compensation for "any time spent awaiting trial." Applying the typical rules for statutory construction, there would have been no need for the legislature to expressly add the "time spent awaiting trial" provision if the prior statute, applicable to this case, already contemplated compensation for this time period. Plaintiff's action accrued and is governed by the pre-2001 amendments to Section 148-84; therefore, compensation is not provided for the time period awaiting trial.

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The foregoing Findings of Facts and Conclusion of Law engender the following

AWARD
1. Plaintiff is not entitled to compensation for the period spent in Wilson County Jail pending the trial of this case. Plaintiff's claim for additional benefits for this time period, is therefore, DENIED.

No costs are assessed.

S/________________ RENE C. RIGGSBEE COMMISSIONER

CONCURRING:

S/______________ BUCK LATTIMORE CHAIRMAN

DISSENTING:

S/________________________ LAURA KRANIFELD MAVRETIC COMMISSIONER

Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.