Patrick v. Weyerhaeuser Co.

I agree that plaintiff has retired before her diagnsosis with asbestosis and currently is not employed by defendants. I, however, disagee with the majority's attempt to create an exception to Austin based on unsupported argument of counsel. The prerequisites for an order of removal under § 97-61.5(b) are:

Diagnosis of asbestosis or silicosis; and

Current employment that exposes plaintiff to the hazards of asbestosis or silicosis.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5(b); see Austin v. Continental GeneralTire, 141 N.C. App. 397, 540 S.E.2d 824 (2000) (J. Greene, dissenting),reversed and adopting dissenting opinion, 354 N.C. 344, 553 S.E.2d 680 (2001); Abernathy v. Sandoz Chemicals, 151 N.C. App. 252, 565 S.E.2d 218,review denied, 356 N.C. 432, 572 S.E.2d 421 (2002). The award of 104 weeks requires that plaintiff additionally prove a third element:

That the employee is removed from the industry at the directive of the Commission.

Moore v. Standard Mineral Company, 122 N.C. App. 375, 469 S.E.2d 594 (1996); Clark v. ITT Grinnell, 141 N.C. App. 417, 539 S.E.2d 369,remanded for reconsideration in accordance with Austin, 354 N.C. 572,558 S.E.2d 867 (2002); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5(b). Although the parties have stipulated that plaintiff has asbestosis, her claim for § 97-61.5(b) benefits should be denied for failure to meet the second and third elements.

NO EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT EQUITABLE ESTOPPELThe evidence in this case consists of four medical depositions, the deposition of Joseph Wendlick taken in another action, stipulated medical records, and the transcript of the deputy commissioner hearing in this action. No party has asked the Commission to open the record for additional evidence. The majority, however, would have the Commission decide this case on argument of counsel that is not supported by the record.¹ There is no evidence before the Commission in this case to support the findings of the majority made in Findings of Fact Nos. 14, 15, and 16. These "findings" come solely from suggested argument of counsel for plaintiff. No evidence was presented to support the "findings" made by the majority. The argument of counsel is not evidence.

Moreover, there is no evidence, available for review, to suggest that plaintiff exhibited signs of asbestosis in 1990² or at any other times while she was employed by defendant. Plaintiff testified that she left work because of a back injury and that she has seen her own physicians for breathing problems which were diagnosed as asthma. No evidence was submitted to suggest that plaintiff would have been diagnosed with asbestosis while working for defendant. Without medical evidence that plaintiff had diagnosable asbestosis while working for defendant, there is no basis to apply an estoppel theory. Thus, there is no basis to apply the estoppel doctrine under the circumstances of this case.

NECESSARY ELEMENTS FOR ORDER OF REMOVAL/104 WEEKSRemoval from employment under § 97-61.5 requires a finding of at least two conditions: (1) that the plaintiff has a compensable claim for asbestosis; and (2) that plaintiff is currently employed (at the time of the "hearing after first [panel] examination") in a position that causes harmful exposure to asbestos. See Austin v. Continental General Tire,141 N.C. App. 397, 415, 540 S.E.2d 824, 835 (2000) (J. Greene, dissenting), reversed and adopting dissenting opinion, 354 N.C. 334,553 S.E.2d 680 (2001); Moore v. Standard Mineral Company,122 N.C. App. 375, 469 S.E.2d 594 (1996). On the issue of removal, §97-61.5(b) specifically provides:

"If the Industrial Commission finds at the first hearing that the employee has asbestosis or if the parties enter into an agreement to the fact that the employee has asbestosis, it shall by order remove the employee from any occupation which exposes him to the hazards of asbestosis"

[Emphasis added] Plaintiff has not met the second condition, and indeed has presented no evidence to prove that his occupation currently "exposes him to the hazards of asbestosis." Thus, plaintiff has not established that he is entitled to an order of removal. Only an appropriate order of removal, that actually removes plaintiff from his employment in the industry, triggers the payment of 104 weeks of benefits. See Clark v. ITTGrinnell, 141 N.C. App. 417, 539 S.E.2d 369, remanded forreconsideration, 354 N.C. 572, 558 S.E.2d 867 (2002); Austin,141 N.C. App. at 415; Moore, supra (removal from industry by directive of Commission); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b) (if employee is removed from industry ).

The application of the statutory provision regarding removal and subsequent payment of 104 weeks has a practical purpose and historical significance. By way of an explanation, employees in a dusty trade are entitled to a dusty trade card only after passing a chest x-ray examination, and for as long as their yearly chest x-rays remain clear. Upon a finding of asbestosis after clinical examination (the first panel examination), the employee's dusty trade card is revoked, prohibiting his continued employment in the dusty trade industry. The diagnosis of asbestosis and evidence of current hazardous exposure to asbestos thereby trigger an order of removal and the second and third panel examinations during which time the 104 weeks of benefits is paid. The length of the 104-week period is significant in the statutory scheme of the panel examinations. A 52-week period exists between the first and second panel examinations and another 52-week period exists between the second and third panel examinations. This accounts for the 104 weeks of benefits which are provided as a "safety net" for an employee who is suddenly prohibited from further employment in the dusty trade industry where the employee is currently hazardously exposed and whose final disability determination will not be made until after the third panel examination. Although § 97-61.5 has now been extended by the courts to non-dusty trade employment, the same principles apply. The 104 weeks of benefits is intended to compensate the employee who suddenly is prohibited from continuing in his current employment because it exposes him to the hazards of asbestos. Thus, evidence of plaintiff's current exposure to the hazards of asbestos is a critical element to be established prior to an order of removal and payment of 104 weeks of benefits.

Plaintiff has the burden of proof on the issue of current exposure to the hazards of asbestos. While plaintiff is not required to provide scientific proof of his current exposure to asbestos for purposes of § 97-61.5(b), nevertheless he must prove current exposure by the greater weight of the competent evidence. See Austin, 141 N.C. App. at 404. The Austin Court did not hold, as plaintiff suggests in this case, that plaintiff is entitled to removal without establishing that he iscurrently exposed to the hazards of asbestos. Further, § 97-61.5(b) compels removal from "hazardous exposure" to asbestos, not merely because a facility may have asbestos present, but because asbestos is present in such a form as it can be inhaled, i.e. friable. Asbestos that is non-friable, encapsulated, or in other form such that it would not be inhaled and therefore not cause or contribute to asbestosis is not, while in that form, a "hazardous" exposure. Thus, plaintiff must present evidence that there is asbestos in the facility that currently presents a hazardous exposure to him while working. See Austin,141 N.C. App. at 415.

Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that his employment with defendant currently exposes him to the hazards of asbestos. Although plaintiff and Ms. Basnight testfied at the deputy commissioner hearing, neither of these witnesses, nor any other witness testified that plaintiff was currently, hazardously employed by defendant. To the contrary, the undisputed evidence is that plaintiff stopped working for defendant in 1990 and retired in 1992 due to an unrelated back problem. There is no evidence that plaintiff is currently, hazardously employed. The majority finds in Finding of Fact No. 3, "plaintiff was exposed to asbestos containing materials on a regular basis for more than 30 working days or parts thereof inside of seven consecutive months from 1 January 1946 to 30 December 1951 and from 28 April 1972 until 30 April 1992." However, there is no evidence, stipulation, or reasonable inference to support the finding that plaintiff is currently, hazardously exposed to asbestos in employment with defendant. The majority correctly finds that plaintiff is no longer employed by defendant.³ The parties also stipulated that plaintiff was last injuriously exposed (30 work days inside of seven consecutive months) to asbestos while employed by defendant. This finding and stipulation taken together, however, do not support the majority's finding and conclusion that plaintiff was hazardously exposed throughout his employment, or more significantly, at the present time is hazardously exposed in his employment with defendant. The stipulation does not define when during the twenty-some years of employment plaintiff was last exposed to the hazards of asbestos, and more significantly, does not state whether plaintiff iscurrently exposed to the hazards of asbestos. Thus, there is no evidence to support an essential element of plaintiff's claim under §97-61.5(b).

PLAINTIFF'S § 97-57 ARGUMENT IS MISPLACEDRather than presenting evidence of current exposure to the hazards of asbestos in his employment, plaintiff suggests that the stipulation, made pursuant to § 97-57, that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos for 30 days within a seven-month period,⁴ presents an irrebuttable presumption that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos in the last 30 days of his employment. Plaintiff's reliance on § 97-57 to determine current exposure is misplaced because § 97-57 is not applicable for determining current exposure. Section 97-57 determines liability for "last injurious exposure" when there is a series of defendants, all of whom are potentially liable because their employment caused plaintiff to be exposed to the hazards of asbestos. Defendant's stipulation to "last injurious exposure" merely indicates that, should plaintiff successfully establish a compensable claim for § 97-61.5(b) benefits, then defendant is the liable employer. Section 97-57 does not abrogate plaintiff's burden to prove the elements of his case, including but not limited to, the elements for removal and the award of 104 weeks under § 97-61.5(b).

Plaintiff's argument arises from a misinterpretation of the Court of Appeals' decision in Barber v. Babcock Wilcox Construction Company,101 N.C. App. 564, 400 S.E.2d 735 (1991) and the North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Fetner v. Rocky Mount Marble Granite Works,251 N.C. 296, 111 S.E.2d 324 (1959). Both of these cases deal with the issue of "last injurious exposure" for purposes of determining the particular defendant liable for benefits. Plaintiff misapplies § 97-57 to abrogate plaintiff's burden of proof with regard to current exposure when § 97-57 is only applicable after plaintiff has carried all of the threshold burdens of proof for compensability of his disease. Section97-57, in and of itself, does not remove plaintiff's burden to prove a necessary element of his § 97-61.5(b) claim; i.e.: current exposure to the hazards of asbestos. Furthermore, as these cases dealt with dusty trade defendants whose facilities continued to cause current exposure, whether there was "current exposure" was not an issue in controversy and therefore not a litigated issue in these cases.

Plaintiff has misinterpreted the Barber decision. Plaintiff, out of context, quotes Barber to find that § 97-57 "creates an irrebuttable legal presumption that the last 30 days of work is a period of last injurious exposure." See Barber 101 N.C. App. at 565. The issue inBarber was whether plaintiff who was only employed for forty-eight days at the second of two employers nevertheless had to establish that his exposure to asbestos was "injurious." The Court of Appeals correctly applied § 97-57 and explained "[i]n light of the irrebuttable legal presumption that the last thirty days of work subjecting the plaintiff to the hazards of asbestos is the period of last injurious exposure and the Commission's holding that plaintiff was exposed to the inhalation during the forty-eight days he worked for the defendant, such exposure must be deemed injurious." Id. at 566 [emphasis added]. However, contrary to plaintiff's argument in the instant case, the Court of Appeals in Barber did not find that a plaintiff did not have to establish current exposure to asbestos for purposes of removal; rather, the Court of Appeals explained that the plaintiff did not have to prove that his exposure to asbestos was "injurious" because § 97-57 creates a presumption that 30 days of exposure within seven months is "injurious." Id. at 566. Further, the Court in Barber did not find evidence of exposure in the last 30 days of employment based on a presumption. In fact, the Barber court had evidence of record to determine that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos during the forty-eight days that he worked for defendant. Id.

Similarly, the Supreme Court's decision in Fetner does not support plaintiff's argument that a stipulation of "last injurious exposure" is equivalent to a stipulation of current exposure. See Fetner v. RockyMount Marble Granite Works, 251 N.C. 296, 111 S.E.2d 324 (1959). InFetner, a dusty trades case, the issue was whether the exposure with a third employer for whom plaintiff only worked for eleven months was "injurious" when plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis before he went to work for the third employer. In this case, plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis on March 4, 1949, when he was working for the first employer, and his dusty trade card was revoked after his diagnosis. On August 10, 1950, plaintiff requested permission from the Industrial Commission to waive compensation and to go to work for the second employer. Plaintiff worked for the second employer from July 26, 1950 to October 19, 1950. Plaintiff then went to work for a third employer from November 4, 1950 to September 29, 1951. No waiver of compensation was sought for plaintiff's employment with the third employer, thereby raising the issue of whether the eleven-month employment with the third employer was "injurious" in light of the prior diagnosis of silicosis and prior revocation of plaintiff's dusty trade card based on that diagnosis. In examining the liability of the third employer, the Supreme Court held that the Commission may not arbitrarily select any thirty-day period of employment, but must select the last 30 days within a seven-month period during which the plaintiff was last exposed, as the period of "last injurious exposure." Fetner, 251 N.C. at 301. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not relieve plaintiff of the burden to present evidence on the period of hazardous exposure. Id. Competent evidence was presented and findings were made to determine when plaintiff was last exposed to the hazards of silica.

Contrary to the suggestion of plaintiff, the Fetner and Barber decisions do not abrogate the requirement of plaintiff to establish by the greater weight of the competent evidence the period of hazardous exposure. Rather, these decisions hold that § 97-57 creates for purposes of liability among two or more defendants, where plaintiff proved hazardous exposure, an irrebuttable presumption that exposure for at least 30 days during a seven-month period is an "injurious exposure." In light of the stipulation of the parties and the lack of evidence of other hazardous employment, this issue is not present in this case; the defendant has stipulated that plaintiff's "injurious exposure" occurred during his employment with defendant.

Further, the plaintiff's illogical argument that the last thirty days of employment was injurious, without producing evidence of exposure to any asbestos during this thirty-day period, directly violates the Supreme Court's holding in Fetner that the Commission may "not arbitrarily select any thirty days of employment." Fetner, 251 N.C. at 300,111 S.E.2d at 327. The relevant period under § 97-57 is the "last thirty days of employment while exposed to silica [asbestos] dust." Fetner,251 N.C. at 300, 111 S.E.2d at 327. Without evidence of current exposure to asbestos, the Commission cannot find that plaintiff has met the second element of his claim, entitling him to an order of removal, which when accomplished triggers the award of 104 weeks of benefits. See Austin,141 N.C. App. at 145; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b).

Further, the Barber and Fetner cases were only in litigation due to the apparent inequity resulting from the strict application of § 97-57 designating liability on the last hazardous employment and did not arise from any disagreement concerning "current exposure." For example, liability must be placed on the last employer where the plaintiff has been exposed to the hazards of asbestos for as little as 30 days even when a prior employer may have hazardously exposed plaintiff to asbestos for more than twenty years. However, an employer who escapes liability in one case despite long exposure may be the last, short-term employer in the next case. Thus, taken from a broad view, the statute is equitable, and is consistent with the goal of the Legislature to promote judicial economy. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-57.

REMOVAL FROM HAZARDOUS WORKPlaintiff has argued illogically that she is entitled to an order of removal because her employment⁵ involves a hazardous exposure to asbestos, yet suggests that she is able to safely continue in his current employment. If plaintiff is currently hazardously exposed to asbestos, and has a valid diagnosis of asbestosis, we must order her actual removal from employment. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-61.5(b). If she is notcurrently hazardously exposed to asbestos, he is not in an employment that requires removal. Id.; see Austin, 141 N.C. App. at 145. Plaintiff is only entitled to 104 weeks of benefits if she is actually "removed from the industry" following a sufficient order of removal. See Austin,supra; N.C. GEN STAT. § 07-61.5(b).

The question of current exposure to asbestos as a condition precedent to the award of 104 weeks of benefits was recently addressed by the Court of Appeals in Abernathy. See Abernathy v. Sandoz Chemical, 151N.C. App. 252, 565 S.E.2d 218, review denied, 356 N.C. 432, 572 S.E.2d 421 (2002). In Abernathy, the plaintiff was represented by the same firm who represents plaintiff in this case. The Court of Appeals' opinion notes that the parties agreed that the Commission's award of 104 weeks of benefits was in error when the employee had retired and thereby was notcurrently engaged in employment that exposed him to the hazards of asbestos. Despite this concession before the Court of Appeals, plaintiff's counsel has not abandoned this argument before the Industrial Commission in this case, and insists that employees who are retired (such as the instant case), as well as those who are currently employed in positions where there is no evidence of current exposure to the hazards of asbestos, are entitled to removal and the 104 weeks of benefits. Further, plaintiff argues before the Commission that Austin does not require plaintiff to prove current exposure to the hazards of asbestos; however, Judge Greene's dissenting opinion, adopted by the Supreme Court, clearly states:

"An employee who is no longer employed in a position that causes harmful exposure need not be `removed' from his employment."

Austin, 141 N.C. App. at 415, 540 S.E.2d at 835. Judge Greene's statement is consistent with the express language of the Act requiring the Commission to order removal from "any occupation that exposes him to the hazards of asbestos". If the employee is not exposed to the hazards of asbestos, there is no hazardous employment from which to order the removal and the order of removal would be a legal nullity and, hence, could not trigger an award for 104 weeks of compensation.⁶

Saliently, I believe that plaintiff has failed to satisfy the requirements for removal from hazardous employment, and the award of 104 weeks of benefits, for at least two reasons: (1) plaintiff is not currently employed by defendant; and (2) plaintiff has failed to establish that her employment presents a current hazard. Therefore, I find that plaintiff has not established entitlement to § 97-61.5(b) benefits.

104 WEEKS NOT APPROPRIATE COMPENSATION FOR PLAINTIFFPlaintiff also suggests that in order to provide compensation within the intent of the Act, the award of 104 weeks is necessary. Plaintiff's argument, however, fails to recognize that plaintiffs, who though they are not currently exposed to the hazards of asbestos and thus entitled to 104 weeks of benefits because of removal, are afforded relief for their diagnosed disease (assuming that they have a valid diagnosis)⁷ under other statutory provisions. In fact, pursuant to § 97-64, a disabled plaintiff is entitled to recover benefits under §§ 97-29, 97-30, or97-31. Abernathy, supra; Clark, 141 N.C. App. at 428-429; see Honeycuttv. Carolina Asbestos Co., 235 N.C. 471, 70 S.E.2d 426 (1952) (entitled to ordinary compensation under the general provisions of the Act). The fallacy of plaintiff's argument was explained in Clark:

. . . defendants also contend that "most importantly, the payment of one hundred four weeks of compensation is reserved to those employees who are actually removed from their employment." (Emphasis added). This Court addressed the removal requirement in Moore v. Standard Mineral Co., 122 N.C. App. 375, 469 S.E.2d 594 (1996).

[T]he term "removal" as used by G.S. § 97-61.5 presumed medical diagnosis will occur during the hazardous employment. Thus the language regarding "removal from the industry" has specific application only to occasions when . . . identified victims of occupational disease are thereafter "removed" from hazardous industry by a directive of the Commission. However, the phrase is inapposite to instances as that sub justice wherein a claimant is diagnosed at some point subsequent to leaving hazardous employment.

Id. at 378, 469 S.E.2d at 596. . . .

Clark 141 N.C. App. at 428-29. Although Moore and other decisions⁸ have questioned appropriate compensation for employees who are not entitled to removal, the Court, in Clark, explained that the Act, as amended, expressly provides workers' compensation benefits for employees who suffer from the occupational disease of asbestosis:

The general rule for recovery for individuals suffering from asbestosis or asbestos-related disorders is found at N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-64 (1991), which provides:

Except as herein otherwise provided, in case of disablement or death from silicosis and/or asbestosis, compensation shall be payable in accordance with the provisions of the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act.

Clark 141 N.C. App. at 428-29; see Abernathy, supra. Thus, because the Act does in fact provide benefits to disabled plaintiffs with asbestosis who are not currently exposed to the hazards of asbestos and consequently are not entitled to 104 weeks of benefits, and because there is no sound policy reason to extend the application of § 97-61.5 beyond its express and intended purpose, there is no basis to award § 97-61.5(b) benefits in this case.

BENEFITS ARE WEEKLYThe majority further errs in ordering that the 104 weeks of benefits pursuant to § 97-61.5(b) "be paid in a lump sum . . . without commutation." Section 97-61.5(b) expressly refers to "weekly compensation which compensation shall continue for a period of 104 weeks." This provision does not provide for a lump sum payment. As explained, infra, § 97-61.5(b) benefits are intended to sustain the diseased employee who must leave his employment because it causes a current, hazardous exposure to asbestos during the two-year, 104 week, period between the first panel examination and the third panel examination. Further, there would be no need for § 97-61.6 to address the payment of "remaining portion of the 104 weeks specified in G.S. § 97-61.5" if these benefits were intended to be paid in a lump sum. Thus, § 97-61.5(b) appropriately provides for "weekly compensation," rather than payment of benefits in a lump sum.

CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, plaintiff's claim for 104 weeks of benefits pursuant to § 97-61.5(b) must be denied. Therefore, I must respectfully dissent from the majority's opinion affirming the Deputy Commissioner's Opinion and Award.

S/_______________ DIANNE C. SELLERS COMMISSIONER

DCS/gas

1 ¹ In particular Finding of Fact No. 12 reads: "At the hearing before the Full Commission, counsel for plaintiff represented that plaintiff relied upon defendant's representations to him and his fellow employees that defendant's asbestos medical surveillance program would monitor his exposure to asbestos and would medically screen and monitor him for any signs of the development of asbestosis. " 2 ² Although plaintiff retired in 1992, her testimony was that she last worked in 1990 when she went out of work for an unrelated back injury. 3 ³ Plaintiff's actual testimony was that she stopped working for defendant in 1990 because of a back injury, however, retired in 1992. 4 ⁴ The stipulation of the parties reads:

"Plaintiff was last injuriously exposed to asbestos during Plaintiff's employment with Defendant-Employer Weyerhaeuser Company, and specifically, that the Plaintiff-Employee was exposed to asbestos for thirty (30) days within a seven month period, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-57."

5 ⁵ Note that plaintiff stopped working for defendant in 1990 because of a back injury and retired in 1992. 6 ⁶ Plaintiff also suggests that the stipulation of the parties also requires the Commission to enter an order of removal. The stipulation states: "The parties agreed further that should plaintiff be awarded compensation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5(b) the Deputy Commissioner may include language removing plaintiff from further exposure pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5(b)." This stipulation is contingent on a finding that "plaintiff be awarded compensation pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5(b)" and does not otherwise abrogate the requirements of the Commission to comply with § 97-61.5(b) of the Act. 7 ⁷ As discussed, infra, plaintiff does not have a valid diagnosis of asbestosis. 8 ⁸ Even, Judge Greene, in Austin, wrote:

"I acknowledge the `removal' requirement of section 97-61.5(b) raises concerns regarding whether an employee who chooses to remove himself from employment prior to diagnosis of asbestos should be precluded from receiving 104 weeks of compensation under section 97-61.5(b). For example, this statute may encourage employees who are exposed to asbestos to remain in their employment until they receive a diagnosis of asbestosis. These concerns, however, should not be resolved by this Court; rather, the proper forum for addressing these concerns is in the Legislature."

Austin, 540 S.E.2d at 836. This inquiry, however, does not remove the requirement that the removal from hazardous employment must occur at the "directive of the Commission." Moore, 569 S.E.2d at 596.

***********Upon review of the competent evidence of record with reference to the errors assigned, and finding no good grounds to receive further evidence or to rehear the parties or their representatives, the Full Commission upon reconsideration of the evidence reverses the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner.

***********The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner and in a Pre-Trial Agreement as:

STIPULATIONS1. Plaintiff was employed by defendant Weyerhaeuser Company at its facility in Plymouth, North Carolina, from 28 April 1972 until 30 April 1992.

2. Defendant Weyerhaeuser Company was self-insured during the time of plaintiff's employment with defendant.

3. It is stipulated that plaintiff was last injuriously exposed to asbestos during plaintiff's employment with defendant Weyerhaeuser Company, and specifically, that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos for 30 days within a seven month period, as required by N.C. Gen. Stat. §97-57.

4. It is stipulated that defendant manufactures paper and paper products such as paper for crafts, paper bags, boxes and pulp for baby diapers. The approximate size of defendant's plant in Plymouth, North Carolina, is of a mile long. The entire facility is built on approximately 350 acres and encompasses about 20 different buildings. The newest building was built in the 1960's and the vast majority of the insulation used in the original construction of the buildings was asbestos containing. There are steam-producing boilers used at the facility in Plymouth, North Carolina. In addition, there are hundreds of miles of steam pipes that were covered with asbestos insulation. The heat coming off the steam pipes is used, among other things, to dry the wet pulp/paper.

5. It is stipulated that plaintiff's income for 52 weeks prior to her retirement was $37,240.48.

6. The parties are subject to the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, defendant Weyerhaeuser Company employing the requisite number of employees to be bound under the provisions of said act.

7. Should N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-60 through 97-61.7 be declared unconstitutional, plaintiff reserves the right to offer additional testimony on the issues of loss of wage earning capacity and/or disability. Defendant objects thereto.

8. The relevant medical records of plaintiff including documentation from Dr. Anderson, Dr. Curseen, Dr. Grauel, Dr. Dula, Dr. Rao, Dr. Lucas and Dr. Wu have been stipulated into evidence and were stipulated into evidence as Stipulated Exhibit 1.

9. The transcript of Joseph Wendlick's testimony at civil trial, the curriculum vitae of Joseph Wendlick and other documentation produced by defendant in discovery have been stipulated into evidence as Stipulated Exhibit 2.

10. The employment and income records of plaintiff have been stipulated into evidence as Stipulated Exhibit 3.

11. Defendant stipulates all the procedures used in Weyerhaeuser's asbestos medical surveillance program at its facility in Plymouth, North Carolina, were consistent with those outlined as part of the North Carolina Dusty Trades Program which defendant contends is contained in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-60 through 97-61.7. Further, that these procedures were in place during plaintiff's employment at the Plymouth facility.

12. Defendant stipulates the medical monitoring procedures used in its asbestos medical surveillance program in all Weyerhaeuser plants in the State of North Carolina were the same.

13. Defendant stipulates that the Weyerhaeuser facilities to which Mr. Joseph Wendlick referred to in his deposition transcript which has been stipulated into evidence included the facilities in North Carolina.

14. Should plaintiff's claim be found compensable, the deputy commissioner may include in his Opinion and Award the following language:

The parties have resolved plaintiff's claim for an award of a 10% penalty pursuant to G.S. § 97-12 on a compromise basis. Pursuant to the agreement of the parties, defendant shall pay to plaintiff, in addition to the compensation awarded herein, an additional 5% of all such compensation, with the exception of medical compensation pursuant to G.S. § 97-25. As to compensation ordered paid to plaintiff in a lump sum, defendant shall pay an additional 5% of any such lump sum. As to any weekly compensation awarded plaintiff, defendant shall increase the amount of such weekly compensation by 5%. Defendant shall be subjected to a late penalty pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-18.

15. On 24 April 2001, defendant stipulated that plaintiff does suffer from asbestosis on the record during the beginning of the deposition of Dr. Dula rendering is testimony unnecessary. Defendant agreed to stipulate that plaintiff has asbestosis after reviewing the deposition transcript of the Advisory Medical panel Physician, Dr. Linda Anderson. Therefore, this is no longer a contested issue in this case.

***********EVIDENTIARY RULINGSThe objections raised in the depositions of Linda C. Anderson, M.D., Albert F. Curseen, M.D., Phillip H. Lucas, M.D., and John Wen-Wei Wu, M.D., are OVERRULED.

***********Based upon all of the competent evidence of record, the Full Commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT1. This matter came on for hearing before the Commission after plaintiff's first examination and medical reports establishing that he has asbestosis. Plaintiff retired from employment with defendant on 30 April 1992, prior to the date of her diagnosis of asbestosis on 1 September 1999.

2. Plaintiff has contracted asbestosis and asbestosis-related pleural disease as a result of her injurious exposure to the hazards of asbestos while employed by defendant, Weyerhaeuser Company.

3. Based upon the stipulated description of plaintiff's job duties while employed by defendant and other evidence submitted, the Full Commission finds as fact that plaintiff was exposed to asbestos containing materials on a regular basis for more than 30 working days or parts thereof inside of seven consecutive months from 1 January 1946 to 30 December 1951 and from 28 April 1972 until 30 April 1992.

4. Plaintiff was an employee of defendant at its Plymouth, North Carolina facility from 28 April 1972 until 30 April 1992.

5. Plaintiff was exposed to asbestos dust from a variety of sources at defendant's facility in Plymouth, North Carolina. As a utility worker, plaintiff cleaned up the plywood department and would use an air hose to blow down asbestos containing dryers and asbestos insulated stem pipes. She cleaned up after the millwrights with brooms, shovels and air hoses. The millwrights worked on the pipes and left behind asbestos containing debris/insulation from the steam pipes on the floor. She also worked under steam lines in the hydropump area that were insulated with asbestos that appeared to be deteriorated and damaged. Plaintiff was also exposed to the asbestos containing brake pads on the paper cutter machines. She did not wear a respirator for protection against her asbestos exposure.

6. Plaintiff was exposed to asbestos containing materials on a regular basis for more than 30 working days or parts thereof inside of seven consecutive months from 1972 to 1992.

7. Albert Curseen, M.D., diagnosed plaintiff with asbestosis on 1 September 1999. Dr. Curseen's diagnosis was based upon plaintiff's history of asbestos exposure and adequate latency period, her chest radiograph, clubbing of the fingernails, and history of dyspnea on exertion. Dr. Curseen confirmed his diagnosis of asbestosis during his live deposition on 6 March 2000.

8. Linda Anderson, M.D., performed the advisory medical evaluation and determined plaintiff has probable asbestosis given her chest x-ray and high resolution CT changes with very mild reduction in pulmonary function on PFTs and history of exposure compatible with asbestosis. During Dr. Anderson's live deposition on 30 March 2001, she concluded plaintiff suffers from asbestosis with a Class II level AMA respiratory impairment based on plaintiff's symptoms, her PFT findings and her chest x-ray findings. Dr. Anderson recommended yearly chest x-ray surveillance and yearly pulmonary function studies to medically monitor plaintiff's condition.

9. Phillip Lucas, M.D., interpreted plaintiff's chest x-rays dated 28 August 1999, and determined that plaintiff had bilateral interstitial fibrotic changes consistent with asbestosis in a patient who has had an adequate exposure history and latency period. Dr. Lucas confirmed these findings in his live deposition on 10 April 2001.

7. John Wu, M.D., interpreted plaintiff's chest CT scan dated 17 April 2000 and determined there was mild diffuse thickening of the interstitial septations present on the CT scan. During his live deposition of 21 February 2001, Dr. Wu testified that these radiographic findings are consistent with asbestosis given an appropriate exposure history and latency period.

8. Fred Dula, M.D., interpreted plaintiff's CT scan and chest x-ray dated 17 April 2000 and a chest x-ray dated 15 November 1998 and determined there were interstitial changes in the mod and lower lung zones consistent with asbestosis.

9. L. C. Rio, M.D., interpreted plaintiff's chest x-ray dated 28 August 1999 and found irregular and round opacities present in the lower and middle lung zone bilaterally present on the radiograph. He concluded that in the presence of a significant exposure history to asbestos dust, these findings are consistent with diagnosis of bilateral interstitial fibrosis due to asbestosis.

10. George Gruel, M.D., interpreted plaintiff's chest x-ray dated 28 August 1999 and identified within the mid and lower lung zones a find to medium irregular opacity pattern which may be associated with an underlying pneumoconiosis such as asbestosis.

11. Defendant stipulated that plaintiff has developed asbestosis.

12. Plaintiff suffers from asbestos related pleural disease and asbestosis as a result of the many years of exposure to the hazards of asbestos while employed by defendant. Plaintiff's pulmonary impairment is permanent and is likely to progress. Plaintiff would benefit from medical monitoring, evaluation and some treatment in the future as a result of her asbestosis and asbestos related pleural disease. Further, medical monitoring is reasonably necessary due to her increased risk of developing lung and other asbestos related cancers.

13. Defendant's Plymouth facility was found to have high levels of friable asbestos dust by their own Industrial Hygienist, Joseph Wendlick. As a result of Mr. Wendlick's findings, an asbestos medical monitoring program was initiated to comply with the dusty trade provisions of the N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-60 through 97-61.7.

14. Defendant, in lieu of participating in the North Carolina Dusty Trades Program as contained in N.C. Gen Stat. §§ 97-60 through 97-61.7, implemented its own asbestos medical surveillance program, which it asserts was consistent with the dusty trades statutory provisions. Defendant convinced the State of North Carolina that defendant need not be included in the state Dusty Trades Program since defendant's asbestos medical surveillance program served the same purpose. If defendant's medical surveillance program was in place during plaintiff's employment with defendant, then it is likely that plaintiff would have participated in the program by virtue of her employment with defendant.

15. At hearing before the Full Commission, counsel for plaintiff represented that plaintiff relied upon defendant's representations to her and her fellow employees that defendant's asbestos medical surveillance program would monitor her exposure to asbestos and would medically screen and monitor her for any signs of the development of asbestosis. In accordance with such program, plaintiff would have been seen by defendant's doctors on occasions throughout her employment with defendant, raising the possibility of discovery of plaintiff's asbestosis while she was still employed by defendant.

16. Plaintiff asserts that she was not aware of her development of asbestosis until after she retired because defendant's medical surveillance program did not effectively monitor and track her development of asbestosis during her employment with defendant, that had defendant's program provided proper medical screening to inform plaintiff of her development of asbestosis, she would have been diagnosed with asbestosis while still in defendant's employ and thus subject to an order of removal and subsequent award. If plaintiff, to her detriment, relied upon the false representations of defendant in regard to its medical monitoring of plaintiff, then defendant may be equitably estopped from arguing that plaintiff is not entitled to the 104 week award pursuant to an order of removal. Additional evidence as to the elements of equitable estoppel would be required for the Commission to make a determination on the matter.

17. The provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-60 et seq. are not unconstitutional.

18. Plaintiff seeks attorney's fees from defendant in this case on the grounds that defendant defended this claim without reasonable ground. This issue should be reserved for subsequent determination at the final hearing in this matter.

***********Based upon the foregoing stipulations and findings of fact, the Full Commission hereby makes the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW1. Plaintiff was last injuriously exposed to the hazards of asbestos dust while employed by defendant, for as much as 30 working days or parts thereof, within seven consecutive months, which exposure proximately augmented her asbestosis. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-57.

2. Plaintiff contracted the occupational diseases of asbestosis and asbestos related pleural disease while employed by defendant. N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-53(24); 97-62.

3. The provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-60 et seq. are constitutional.

4. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5 provides in pertinent part that following a first hearing determination by the Industrial Commission that a claimant has asbestosis, based upon either medical evidence or by agreement of the parties, the Commission "shall by order remove the employee from any occupation which exposes him to the hazards of asbestosis . . ." and that upon removal the employee shall be entitled to "weekly compensation equal to sixty-six and two-thirds percent of his average weekly wages . . . which compensation shall continue for a period of 104 weeks."

5. The North Carolina Supreme Court determined that a retiree who is no longer employed by the asbestos-exposing industry is not entitled to an order of removal and the subsequent award because he no longer faces the possibility of exposure. See Austin v. General Tire, 354 N.C. 344,553 S.E.2d 680 (2001). However, the instant case may be distinguishable from Austin in that plaintiff has asserted that she was not aware of her development of asbestosis until after she retired because defendant's medical surveillance program did not effectively monitor and track her development of asbestosis during her employment with defendant. Had defendant's program provided proper medical screening to inform plaintiff of her development of asbestosis, she might have been diagnosed with asbestosis while still in defendant's employ and, thus, subject to an order of removal and subsequent award. Plaintiff may have, to her detriment, relied upon the representations of defendant in regard to its medical monitoring of plaintiff. Thus, defendant may be equitably estopped from arguing that plaintiff is not entitled to the 104 week award pursuant to an order of removal.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel is a means of preventing a party from asserting a defense that is inconsistent with its prior conduct.Purser v. Heatherlin Properties, 137 N.C. App. 332, 337, 527 S.E.2d 689,692 (2000), cert. denied, 352 N.C. 676, 545 S.E.2d 428 (2000) (citingGodley v. County of Pitt, 306 N.C. 357, 360, 293 S.E.2d 167, 169 (1982)). In particular, the rule is grounded in the premise that `it offends every principle of equity and morality to permit a party to enjoy the benefits of a transaction and at the same time deny its terms or qualifications.' Id. (quoting Thompson v. Soles, 299 N.C. 484, 487,263 S.E.2d 599, 602 (1980)). The law of estoppel applies in workers' compensation cases, and may be used to ensure coverage of a work-related injury. Id. (citing Carroll v. Daniels and Daniels Constr. Co., Inc.,327 N.C. 616, 620, 398 S.E.2d 325, 328 (1990).

Defendant's argument to the effect that estoppel was raised too late in this case is to no avail. In Purser v. Heatherlin Properties, supra, the doctrine was raised for the first time by the Court of Appeals itself exmeru moto.

In Belfield v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 77 N.C. App. 332, 335 S.E.2d 44 (1985), the North Carolina Court of Appeals held that equitable estoppel was appropriate to prevent an employer from raising a time limitation when the employer misrepresented to the employee that his rights under the Workers' Compensation Act were being exercised on his behalf by the employer. See Id. at 337, 47. The court stated:

The commonest type of case is that in which a claimant, typically not highly educated, contends that he was lulled into a sense of security by statements of employer or carrier representatives that `he will be taken care of' or that his claim has been filed for him or that a claim will not be necessary because he would be paid compensation benefits in any event. When such facts are established by the evidence, the lateness of the claim has ordinarily been excused.

Id. (quoting 3 A. Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation, Section 78.45 at 15-302 through 15-305 (1983)). In the case before the Commission, defendant similarly seeks to argue that the 104 week award pursuant to an order of removal is not timely because plaintiff was not diagnosed until after he retired. However, this Commission will not permit defendant to use a time limitation defense if there is evidence suggesting that defendant's own medical surveillance program failed to detect plaintiff's development of asbestosis while she was still in defendant's employ, or failed to disclose to plaintiff that she had developed asbestosis when defendant had knowledge thereof. Such acts may inequitably prevent plaintiff from receiving an order of removal and subsequent award that she otherwise deserved. For these reasons, defendant may be equitably estopped from arguing as to the timeliness of plaintiff's order or removal and subsequent award. Evidence as to the elements of estoppel is required before the Commission can make a determination on the matter. Therefore, this issue must be held in abeyance pending the presentation of such evidence.

6. Plaintiff is entitled to payment of all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred as a result of her asbestosis and asbestos related pleural disease for so long as such examinations, evaluations and treatments tend to affect a cure, give relief or lessen her disability. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-25; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-59.

7. Plaintiff is entitled to undergo subsequent examinations as provided by law, pursuant to the provisions of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.1 etseq. and is further entitled to any additional benefits due to plaintiff which shall be determined after additional examinations and hearings.

8. Plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees from defendant on the ground that defendant unreasonably defended this claim pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-88.1 is hereby held in abeyance until the final award is issued in this claim.

9. This claim must be remanded to a deputy commissioner for further hearing on the issue of estoppel, and for further hearing (if necessary) following subsequent examinations as required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61 et seq. Plaintiff's eligibility for further compensation in addition to medical and any other issues in controversy are hereby held in abeyance pending the outcome of further hearings.

***********Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, the Full Commission enters the following:

AWARD1. Defendant shall pay all medical expenses incurred or to be incurred by plaintiff as a result of her asbestosis and asbestos related pleural disease for so long as such examinations, evaluations and treatments tend to affect a cure, give relief or lessen her disability.

2. Plaintiff shall undergo additional examinations as provided by law.

3. The Commission hereby retains jurisdiction in this matter to address the issue of permanent impairment, as plaintiff has not undergone the additional panel examination as required by law for such determination. Upon completion of such examinations, should the parties be unable to agree on what additional compensation, if any, is due, the parties may request a hearing before this Commission on this matter.

4. The Commission additionally retains jurisdiction in this matter to address the issue of equitable estoppel, as raised by plaintiff, as a means of awarding to plaintiff the 104 week award pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61.5.

5. Defendant shall pay the costs of this proceeding.

***********ORDER REMANDINGThis claim is hereby remanded to a deputy commissioner for further hearing (if necessary) following subsequent examinations as required under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-61 et seq. Plaintiff's eligibility for further compensation under the Act beyond the medical compensation awarded herein and any other issues in controversy including equitable estoppel, are hereby held in abeyance pending the outcome of further hearings.

This the ___ day of February, 2003.

S/___________________ BERNADINE S. BALLANCE COMMISSIONER

CONCURRING:

S/_____________ THOMAS J. BOLCH COMMISSIONER

DISSENTING:

S/_______________ DIANNE C. SELLERS COMMISSIONER