North Carolina Industrial Commission, 2008

Coggins v. N.C. Dept. of Correction

Coggins v. N.C. Dept. of Correction
North Carolina Industrial Commission · Decided July 24, 2008 · DECISION AND ORDER for the Full Commission by<center> LAURA KRANIFELD MAVRETIC, Commissioner, N.C. Industrial Commission, with DIANNE C. SELLERS, Commissioner, Concurring in Part and Dissenting in Part.</center>

Counsel

APPEARANCES Plaintiff: North Carolina Prisoner Legal Services, Raleigh, North Carolina; Michele Luecking-Sunman, appearing. Defendants: The Honorable Roy A. Cooper, Attorney General, State of North Carolina, North Carolina Department of Justice, Raleigh, North Carolina; James Smith, Special Counsel, appearing.

Coggins v. N.C. Dept. of Correction

Dissenting Opinion

I concur with the majority's conclusion that defendant was negligent in adequately supervising plaintiff's cell block. The failure of defendant's employees to adequately supervise plaintiff's cell block resulted in two inmates entering plaintiff's cell block. These inmates were not assigned to plaintiff's cell block, had been previously identified as members of a security threat group, had just acted in a threatening manner towards plaintiff, and the officers on duty were aware of this threat. However, based upon a review of the testimony and evidence, I do not believe there is competent evidence showing that defendant's employees negligently allowed the two assailants into plaintiff's cell.

The majority has found that defendant's employees were negligent in allowing the two assailants entry into plaintiff's cell. However, I believe there is no evidence in the record to support such a finding. There was no testimony or evidence specifying how plaintiff's cell door was unlocked. If plaintiff's testimony is credible in that he locked his cell door, the only way the assailants could have gained access to plaintiff's cell is if Officer Cole unlocked plaintiff's cell door from the control booth. However, there is no testimony or evidence tending to show that Officer Cole unlocked plaintiff's cell door. On the contrary, it would be unreasonable and illogical to find or infer that Officer Cole unlocked plaintiff's cell door when, shortly before the incident, Officer Cole had stepped in to assist plaintiff when he was being followed by the very same inmates that ultimately attacked him. *Page 8

One could just as easily infer that plaintiff, when returning to his cell for a nap, failed to completely close and lock his cell door. Under this scenario, plaintiff would be contributorily negligent given that he had just been approached by the assailants who requested money from plaintiff and had been followed to the sally port area of his unit, requiring plaintiff to report their presence to Officer Cole.

As there is no competent evidence to support a finding of fact that defendant's employee's unlocked plaintiff's cell door, I do not believe we can conclude that defendant's employees were negligent in allowing the two assailants into plaintiff's cell.

For these reasons, I believe plaintiff has failed to show negligence on the part of defendant and lack of contributory negligence on the part of plaintiff.

S/______________________ DIANNE C. SELLERS COMMISSIONER

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Opinion of the Court

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The Full Commission has reviewed the prior Opinion and Award based upon the record of the proceedings before Deputy Commissioner Rideout and the briefs and arguments before the Full Commission. The appealing party has shown good grounds to reconsider the evidence, and upon reconsideration, the Full Commission affirms in part and modifies in part the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner.

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The Full Commission finds as fact and concludes as matter of law the following, which were entered into by the parties at the hearing before the Deputy Commissioner as: *Page 2

STIPULATIONS
1. All parties are properly before the Commission and the Commission has jurisdiction of the parties and the subject matter.

2. On August 27, 2004, plaintiff was an inmate housed in A Block, Unit 1 of Lanesboro Correctional Institution.

3. On August 27, 2004, Jennifer Cole and Pamela Stegale were employees of the North Carolina Department of Correction and all actions taken by them pertinent to this action were in the course of said employment.

4. On August 27, 2004, Anthony Sturdivant and Kevin Brown were inmates at Lanesboro Correctional Institute and were not housed in the same block as plaintiff.

5. The issues before the Full Commission are whether plaintiff's injuries on August 27, 2004 were the result of the negligence of defendant and, if so, what amount of damages plaintiff should recover from defendant.

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Based upon the competent evidence of record herein, the Full Commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On August 27, 2004, plaintiff was housed in A Block, Union Unit at Lanesboro Correctional Institute.

2. Inmates Anthony Sturdivant and Kevin Brown were not housed in A Block, Union Unit at Lanesboro Correctional Institute. *Page 3

3. On August 27, 2004, Officers Jennifer Cole and Pamela Stegale were working in A Block, Union Unit, and were responsible for the ingress and egress of inmates from A Block. Officer Stegale was working for only her third day as a Department of Correction employee.

4. On August 27, 2004, plaintiff was approached by an unknown inmate who asked him for a dollar. Plaintiff told the inmate that he did not have a dollar, and plaintiff continued toward his dorm area. Officer Cole was working the control booth and opened the door for plaintiff to enter the sallyport area of Union Unit. The inmate who asked plaintiff for money followed plaintiff into the sallyport. The door was opened for plaintiff to enter A Block and the door was closed behind plaintiff. The other inmate did not enter A Block. Plaintiff then went to his cell, locked his door by closing it, and lay down to sleep. Approximately 20 to 30 minutes later, plaintiff awoke to the sound of a "pop" and the lock on his door being released. Inmates Sturdivant and Brown entered plaintiff's cell and Inmate Sturdivant robbed plaintiff and stabbed him once in each thigh.

5. After the attack, Officer Steagle was in the control booth and Officer Cole was working the floor and stopped Inmates Sturdivant and Brown, who had run out of the cellblock area and into the sallyport.

6. Plaintiff suffered various injuries from the assault, including a deep stab wound to his upper thigh. As a result of the assault, plaintiff suffered substantial pain and was treated with bandages and medication.

7. Since the assault, plaintiff has continued to receive medication for pain from the stab wound. He also has to wear a knee brace and use a cane due to the pain and problems associated with the stabbing. *Page 4

8. Inmates Sturdivant and Brown were charged and found guilty of disciplinary violations for the robbery and assault.

9. Officer Stegale testified that she did not know who belonged in the cellblock and who did not because it was her third day on the job. Officer Stegale also testified that it is an officer's duty to be aware of who belongs in a cell block and that it is contrary to defendant's policy for inmates to be in a cellblock other than the one they are housed in.

10. Officer Cole did not testify before the Deputy Commissioner.

11. Lieutenant Christopher Covington testified that both assailants had been identified as members of a security threat group and that security threat group members require an additional level of supervision because of their tendency to create dangerous situations.

12. Based on the evidence of record, the Commission finds that Inmates Sturdivant and Brown were not housed in A Block, Union Unit and should have never been admitted into the Unit. The presence of Inmates Sturdivant and Brown in Union Unit is a breach of the standard of care defendant owed to every individual housed in the Unit.

13. Based upon the greater weight of the evidence, the Commission finds that plaintiff's injuries are a direct result of the negligence of defendant's employees, who failed to adequately supervise plaintiff's cellblock and allowed the assailants entry to his cell. Further, the Commission finds plaintiff's injuries are the direct and proximate cause of defendant's negligence.

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Based upon the foregoing stipulations and findings of fact, the Full Commission makes the following: *Page 5

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291(a) confers the North Carolina Industrial Commission with jurisdiction to hear tort claims against the State Board of Education, the Board of Transportation, and all other departments, institutions and agencies of the State.

2. Under the provisions of the Tort Claims Act, negligence is determined by the same rules applicable to private parties. Bolkhir v.N.C. State University, 321 N.C. 706, 709, 365 S.E.2d 898, 900 (1988).

3. The Tort Claims Act provides that the State is liable for the negligent acts of its employees. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291 et seq.

4. North Carolina Department of Correction had a duty of reasonable care to protect plaintiff from reasonably foreseeable harm. Failure to do so constitutes negligence. Taylor v. North Carolina Dept. ofCorrection, 88 N.C.App. 446, 451, 363 S.E.2d 868, 871 (1988).

5. The greater weight of the evidence shows that defendant's employees were negligent in the manner in which they supervised plaintiff's dorm area and in allowing Inmates Sturdivant and Brown to enter plaintiff's cell. As a direct result of this negligence, plaintiff was assaulted and suffered an injury with long-term effects. Williams v. Adams,288 N.C. 501, 219 S.E.2d 198 (1975).

6. The greater weight of the evidence fails to show that plaintiff was contributorily negligent in any manner that may have resulted in his injuries. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 143-291(a).

7. The assault by Inmates Sturdivant and Brown was the proximate cause of plaintiff's deep stab wound, which required continuing pain management and assistive devices.

8. Given the nature and extent of plaintiff's injuries, as well as plaintiff's need for future medical treatment, $5,000.00 is a reasonable sum for plaintiff's loss. *Page 6

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Based upon the foregoing stipulations, findings of fact, and conclusions of law, the Full Commission enters the following:

ORDER
1. Plaintiff shall have and recover the sum of FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($5,000.00) from defendant for the injuries he suffered August 27, 2004. Defendant shall pay plaintiff this sum as money damages. 2. No costs are taxed as plaintiff was permitted to file this civil action in formapauperis.

This 1st day of July, 2008.

S/___________________ LAURA KRANIFELD MAVRETIC COMMISSIONER

CONCURRING:

S/___________________ BERNADINE S. BALLANCE COMMISSIONER

CONCURRING IN PART AND DISSENTING IN PART:

S/___________________ DIANNE C. SELLERS COMMISSIONER

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Case-law data current through December 31, 2025. Source: CourtListener bulk data.