delivered the opinion of the Court: It is the province of the Court to expound to the Jury the law connected with the facts under discussion, but not to express an opinion on the facts, much less to decide them. The boundaries of deeds and grants are questions of fací, or at least, of law and fact combined, and belong exclusively to the Jury. It was an error therefore in the Judge to undertake to decide that the second line of the lessor of the Plaintiff’s patent run from B. to I: and if it was a conclusion of law drawn from the facts, it does not appear that even those subordinate facts were either admitted or found by the Jury. Besides, were we here to act the part of the Judge below, we have not the evidence which the. case no doubt affords. It is not shewn whether there are marked trees from B. to I, and if there be, at what time and on what account made ; whether they correspond with the date of Orbison’s deed, whether there is a post oak marked as a corner at I. its date, &c. whether there are marked trees between L and H. whether there are marked trees on the- dotted line from C. to where it intersects M’Korkle’s line, whether there is a post oak marked at its intersection, and whether Nesbit’s line B. C. was openly and notoriously known in the neighborhood, when Orbison obtained his grant, or if it had only that notoriety which ordinary wood lines have. All these are facts bearing on the question, “ how does Orbison’s second line run ?” which we have no means of knowing, and which the Judge, below, and of course wo, have no right to pass on. It is by an adherence to tlie.se artificial rules found in our books, and considering them as fixed laws, and applying them indiscriminately.to all cases, whether they fit them or not, that such monstrous injustice has been done in our boundary decisions ; at many times embracing several thousand acres, when only a few hundred were contemplated by the parties. The fact is, that questions of boundary, like all other questions of fact, depend each on their own particular circumstances, where every shade *556 of evidence, and every the most minute circumstance, pro-^uces ^cs effect 5 and we might almost as well attempt to lay down rules of presumption to guide the conscience of a Jury, as rules by which boundary shall be ascertained. The sole question is, where do the lines called for in the deed or patent, actually run ? I am far from saying that I, as a Juror, would have decided even from the evidence appearing upon the case that is sent here, differently from what the Judge did; but I think he had no right to decide at all — The rule for a new trial must be made absolute.