Kesler v. Brawley
Kesler v. Brawley
Concurring Opinion
.concurring, there w'as judgment for the petitioner.
Opinion of the Court
-“From and after the passage of this .act, all white men, residents of the Confederate States, between tlie ages of seventeen and fifty, shall be in the military service of the Confederate States for"the war." — Act of Congress, 17th Feb., 1864, sec. 1.
. One of two’eonstruetions must be adopted : 1st. It applies to individuals who arc, at the date of the passage of the act, between the ages of 17 and 50, as dcscripiió per-sonarían, the same, in legal cfiect. as if the persons answering the. description were named, and puts them in the military service '‘for (that is, during)'the war." This meaning can he given by adding the words “who- are now’' so as ifiake it read “all white’men" residents of the Confederate States ivho are itnw'between the ages of 17 and 50 shall he in the service of the Confederate States for (that is, during) the war." “This act shall taire effect from and after its passage." According to tins construction, all white men, rvho are, at the date of the passage of the act, under the age of fifty, would be liable tp .military service during the war, notwithstanding ’they afterward'' arrive at that age, because they are embraced by the description, and all white men who are, at the date of the passage of the act, under tké-age of 1-7, would not be-liable to military service, beeause the;» do not answer the description. So,that if this construction he adopted, and judgment is .therefore rendered against the petitioner, the Courts apd Judges will he hound, as a matter of course, upon the authority of this decision, to discharge every one who has been, or may he, put in the military service, who was not, at the nassage of the act, 17 years ef age. ' .
There are two fatal objections to this construction : 1st, in order to express the ■ meaning it is necessary to add
Th; second construction is that the. section applies to a class composed oí .all white men-between the ages of 11 and 58, without regard to the time wbe/i they may he between those age¡., and puts them iiito military service as a clat'-s fox (that is, during),the war. This meaning cam he given, simply by changing the po-'tiou of ¡ha words. C! for the war,” so as to mate the section road-, for (that is, during) the war, all white met), residents of the Confederate States, between the ages of l'J and f-0, shall he in the military service of the Confederate Sute.-.' ‘‘This act shall take effect from and after Cii passage." The Court is,authorized, by a well-soitled 5 ule of construction, to change the position of words. S¿<¡ jliiv.irris on Ctafcuios.
Indeed, this, change in.the position of words in this instance, is only ior the purpose of making fin' cense clearer. For if persone 'are conscripted an a, claw;, it follows, of course, that they cease to ho liable .when they pass out of the class,-and become liable when they outer cite class. When no time is. fixed at which they are to lie between the ages, designated, the conscription is necessarily asa class ; the distinction being, when a time is fixed the con
According to this construction, ali persons under the age of se\enteen, for the time to cómo,-on arriving at -that age, enter into the class, and are liable to Military sér-viGe ; and all persons- under the ago of fifty, from time to time, on arriving at that age, pass out of the class, and are no longer liable to military service : the ride working both ways, unless, some provision be made to the contrary.
It may be objected td this construction, that it lots out of the military service all who arrive at the ago of fifty. The reply is, there is nothing in the act tenijiug to show that it was not the intentipn to let men-, who were over forty-five when conscripted, go'out of the service on arriving at the age of fifty ; and there is reason to suppose' such
. A perusal of the whole act, will tend to support this-construction. Mr. Winston, who argued for the government, referred to the 5th section as tending to support the first construction. It seems to. us that this, section - sustains the conclusion to which wo have arrived. The provision, that persons failing to enrol themselves at the time required u shall be placed in'tjie service-in the field, for the war, in the same manner as though they were* between the ages of eighteen- and forty-five,” is imposed as a penalty diUsuch as are recusant; in respect to whom, the term of service is fixed, and excludes the idea of a general liability of all to serve for the tear. ■ The sugges
Our conclusion is also strengthened by‘reference to the other conscription acts. íhe act of April, 1862, conscripts, as a ddss. those between the ages of 18 and 35, for three years, or the war. The act of September, 1862, conscripts, as a'class, for three years or the war, and the'effect of passing out of this class, to relieve from further liability .to service, is prevented by a proviso, “when 'once enrolled all persons, between the ages of 18 and 45 shall serve the full Um,c.” This proviso was necessary, to .show an intention that, although the conscription was as a class, still, in respect to persons who should, after being enrolled, arrive at the age of forty-five, it was deemed important to retain them in service for the full time. The act under consideration in like manner conscripts for*(that is, during) the war, asli class, those between the ages of 17 and 50.' There is no proviso to continue in the service those who arrive at the age of fifty and pass out of the class. Whether a proviso to prevent this effect was left out on purpose, because it was not deemed expedient to keep senior reserves in service after they became fifty years of age, or was ,an oversight, We have no means of deciding. ' Our duty is to expound the law according to the sense of the words used by the law-makers ; and, in the absence of a proviso to the emtrary, it follows, of course, that when a ‘£ senior reserve ’' arrives at the age of fifty, he passes out of the class, and is no longer liable to military service.
There is no error in the judgment below.
Dissenting Opinion
dissenting. Not concurring-m the opinion of a majority of the Court, I will state briefly the reasons of my non-concurrence.
. The military bill of February, 1884, under which the ■ service of the petitioner is claimed, prescribes the term of service' “for the war” too plainly and positively to admit of abridgment by implications in favor of any persons embraced within its provisions. ’ ' •
The part of the bill directly bearing upon the question is the first section, and is in the following words : “That from and after the passage-of tin’s act all white men, residents of the Confederate States, between the'ages of 17 and 50, shall be in the military service of the Confederate States, for the war.” ■
Here, manifestly, all persons between the ages of 17 and 50 are declared to belong to the military forces of the country, for the war. That tho Congress.in this conscription of persons was regarding them as a class seems to he probable. A proper cxeyesii; of the statute, according to the view which I talro of if, requires this conce.;,noil. But it does not follow that a continuous application of the law •to the-class would enlarge or let out any one -embraced within its folds. The obligation to service under it is not during their continuance in the class, but during fita, war,
A prescribed ago is an anomalous and novel limitation to .military service ; for a term of years, for the war, or for art expedition,'ir> more usual and convenient. In. our country, whore there is no provision for beeping a register of births, and where, consequently, these records are very irregularly kept, and in most cases soon lost or destroyed, there is no fact move liable to controversy, and which, may sbe affected by a greater variety of proof, than the age -of a person. How arc questions of ago to he determined?
My inference is, that Congress could not have intended to prescribe such "a limit to tho service of' the senior reserves, and I think it did not,
The true and reasonable interpretation of tjjS law, then,_ is, that it places in tbe military service of the Confederate States, all persons within tbe prescribed ages for the. war. .There is no other iuterpetratiOn which' will give the ordinary signification to the words used. And, as thp intention of this, as well as ail other laws on the subject, is to raise an army for fall and complete service in tbe field, it is believed to oe within the purview of the law, that from time-to time, as the junior reserves arrive at the age of 18, they may be conscribad for general service. When once so conscripted suri classed, there is no provision of the law. and no rule of the military service, I take it, whereby they beeo*me entitled at any time to ho subordinated or discharged, except for disability.
The fifth section of the bill (11th February) has been referred to as throwing some light on the question before us. I perceive but little in it to aid us. It seems to be an instance,'not unfrequently occurring in legislation, where a proviso is ma;le to’emasculate completely the section or part of the law to which it is appended. This is all.
The words, for the war, or any similar words in any other connexion in the section, might be of ambiguous import. But in the connection in which they ntand, they prescribe a -term of -service, aw already stated, too plainly to be mistaken, and which I do not feel at liberty,to abridge, from anything which I find of apparent inconsistency. in the law, or from any. considerations of public, policy.
My opinion is, that the petitioner is rightfully under the control of the military authorities, and is not entitled to be discharged. *. i
Reference
- Full Case Name
- JACOB KESLER v. JOHN M. BRAWLEY
- Status
- Published