(After stating the case as above.) The appointment of a receiver was made by the Judge under sec. 270, C. C. P., and it would seem that this was intended for the benefit of all the judgment creditors of the defendant Martin, or at least of all who had instituted supplemental pro *639 ceedings. The counsel who argued the case seemed to have supposed that sec. 270 used the words “ the Judge or Court, &c.” hut we cannot find that the words “ or Court” have ever been inserted in this section by any act of Assembly. Upon a consideration of sec. 215 and of the first line in sec. 270, and, especially, of the requirement in that section, that “ The receiver of the judgment debtor shall be subject to the direction and control of the Court in which the judgment was obtained upon which the proceedings are founded f it seems plain that the appointment of a receiver under sec. 270 (and it must also be so under sec. 215) is within the power of the Judge alone.

As an execution may issue both from the Court in which judgment is recovered, and from any in which it is docketed,, it would seem to follow that either Court (meaning here the Clerk) mayrequire a discovery from the defendant, or from any person having property of, or being indebted to him, under sections 264-5-6-7-8.. If the property thus or'otherwise discovered, be personal and by its nature capable of being actually taken possession of, the priority between several claims will1 be determined by priority of levy and seizure. In other cases, that is, where the property discovered is not capable of being actually seized, it would seem that the maxims “ qui prior est in tempore potior est in jure,” and “ vigilanti-bus non dormientibus jura subveniunt,” would apply, and. give priority to the party first initiating proceedings. It would seem also, that the same principle would apply when judgments are recovered in different districts, and receivers, appointed by different Judges; the one first appointed would be entitled to take possession of all the property of the-debtor, not previously levied on, or bound; and the fund, would be distributed under the order of the Judge appointing him. How it would be in case an application for a. receiver were first made to one Judge, and the actual appoint *640 ment first made by another, we are not called on to say, but we are inclined to think that the first application would confer priority of jurisdiction, if a receiver were afterwards actually appointed under it.

It follows that the payment by the Clerk to the defendant Sprinkle, without the order of the Judge, was a contempt of his jurisdiction, and without authority of law. We think the Judge should have ordered and compelled the Clerk to pay to the receiver the money in question, to be disposed of according to law. This Opinion will be certified to the Superior Court of Wilkes, and the case be remanded, in order that such other proceedings may be had as are proper.

Pee Curiam. Error.