(After stating the case as above.) We can not undertake to decide any differences between the counsel,, as to what was their agreement. The Judge, before whom a judgment is alleged to have been confessed, alone (in the first instance, at least,) ean say whether the judgment appearing of record in his Court, was entered in the terms of *636 ■the confession. We understand the question presented to us, to be, whether, upon the facts admitted in the pleadings, and independent of any agreement of the attorneys, the plaintiffs were entitled, in law, to recover as damages the full ■amount paid by them to Sharpe, or only so much as they would have been liable to pay if the scale for Confederate money had been applied to the judgment recovered in 1864. This involves the question, whether the plaintiffs were compelled to pay the full amount of the judgment. We think they were not, but, by a proper application to the Court, they were entitled to, and could, have obtained an entry of satisfaction on the judgment, upon 'a payment of so much as it would have amounted to after the application of the legislative scale to the note at its date. The case of a judgment ¡recovered during the war, upon a note given during the war, and remaining unpaid at the enactment of the Ordinance of the Convention in 1865, is clearly within the mischief intended to be remedied, and it is the duty of the Court to apply it to all cases coming within its principle. This being •so, the payment by the plaintiffs of any excess over that sum was officious, and no request by the defendants to make such payment for their use, can be implied. Consequently the plaintiffs have entered judgment for more than they were ■entitled to, and in the absence of any binding agreement by the defendants to confess judgment for a larger amount, the present judgment should be modified in accordance with these views. The judgment below is reversed, and this opinion will be certified to the Superior Court of Iredell, in order that further proceedings may be had herein according to law.

Per Curiam. Judgment reversed.