(after stating the facts as above). We think that the Court gave the jury the proper instruction. In any view of the evidence, negligence on the part of the defendant did not appear from it. The injury the plaintiff sustained was the manifest result of her own misadventure and misfortune, and not of the negligence of the defendant. She was passing towards defendant’s track, at a point where she intended to go on its train as soon as it should arrive, as a passenger, and while crossing the Petersburg Railroad track she “struck her toe against the inner rail” of that track and fell to the ground, breaking her arm by the fall. It does not appear that the fall Avas occasioned by any unevenness of the ground, or a hole in it, or obstructions allowed to be temporarily or permanently at and about the place where she fell. It seems that the surface of the ground was nearly level, except that the inner rail of the track was slightly above the surface, and immediately inside of the track on each side there was a small channel or opening in which the flange of the engine-wheel moved. This opening was necessary and unavoidable. It was easily passed over and without danger, if the person crossing it would give even slight attention to his movements. The track, the rail, the channel inside of and along it, the ground about it, were all plainly to be seen, and interposed slight or no obstacle to an ordinary person passing that way. The plaintiff herself testified that if she had been looking where she was walking, she would have kept from falling, and the witness who had charge of her testified, that “ one looking where he was walking could get over safely.” If she had given slight attention to her steps she would not have encountered the misfortune that befell her.

Railroad companies, as common carriers, are necessarily and justly held to a high measure of care, circumspection and responsibility, especially in respect to the safety of passengers — indeed, of all persons whom they transport — but they are not required to do, or have, or observe such things, as under the circumstances of the matter in question, are unreasonable. In the nature of their *545 business, some things necessarily attended with more or less danger are essential. Such things they are required to make as safe as practicable, to keep them so, and use them properly and cautiously. When they do so, and a passenger, through his lack of caution or his negligence, suffers injury from such dangerous thing, the company is not responsible for such injury. Passengers on their part are required to observe proper caution, to see and avoid danger when they reasonably can, and if they will not they must suffer the consequences of their rashness, the company being free from fault. What is due caution must depend largely upon the nature of the danger encountered and the circumstances of the person endangered at the time.

The channel or opening just inside of the rail of the track, caused the plaintiff, as she incautiously walked along, to strike her toe against the exposed side of the rail, and she fell to the ground and broke her arm as a consequence. She could easily see the rail and the opening and avoid any danger from it. The defendant was in no default — it was not negligence on the part of the company owning the road, or the defendant, to allow it to be there — it was essential. The company could not, in the nature of its use and purpose, dispense- with it and keep it closed, and it was not bound to do so. The plaintiff was bound to take notice of it and avoid danger from it at her pei.il.

We pass by the question, whether the defendant could, in any view of the matter, be held responsible for defects, if such had existed, on and just about the track of the road of the Peters-burg Railroad Company.

No error. Affirmed.