(after stating the facts). The only exceptions to the charge of the Court, were, that there was error in the instructions *957 as to the distinction between positive and negative testimony, and that the instructions as to the difference between these kinds of evidence, was calculated to make an impression upon the minds of the jury, prejudicial to the defendant, and that the Judge laid down an abstract proposition of law, without any specific reference to the case. To that part of the charge in which the abstract proposition was laid down by his Honor, we are unable to see from the record, to what the exception relates. The exception is too indefinite. It is the duty of an appellant to the Supreme Court, to see that the case is so made out, as distinctly to present the points upon whichxthe judgment below is sought to be reviewed. Flaniken v. Lee, 1 Ired., 293; State v. Cowan, 7 Ired., 239.

As to the other exception, we do not concur with the counsel for the defendant, that the instructions given by his Honor, with regard to the distinction between positive and negative testimony, and the case put by him in illustration of the difference, was calculated to have a prejudicial effect upon the jury. For his Honor, after stating the distinction between the different sorts of evidence, refrained from telling the jury that more credit was to be given to postive than to negative testimony, which is the general rule applicable to such a case. Henderson v. Crouse, 7 Jones, 623. But he was careful to tell the jury, that the case put by him of the testimony in regard to the ringing of the bell, was an illustration merely, and he proceeded to qualify the illustration, by telling them that they were the triers of the fact, and it was their province to determine the weight of the evidence, — that they saw the witnesses, and the manner in which they gave in their evidence, and heard the testimony as to their character, and it was for them to say what they believed, and how much they believed. Even if the illustration in the abstract, had been calculated to have the prejudice ascribed to it by the defendant’s counsel, this explanation would certainly have had the effect to remove from the minds of a jury of ordinary intelligence, any erroneous impression.

*958 We do not think the defendant had any reason to complain of the charge. It was more favorable to him than he had any right to expect.

His Honor might have told them, that there was but one witness, and he the defendant, who testified that he did not strike the prosecutrix, while there three witnesses who contradicted him — the one who saw and felt the blows — a second who saw the blows — and a third who heard them, and although the defendant proved a good character, and the two female witnesses were of a sullied character, they were corroberated by their father, whose character was not impeached, and by the physician, who testified to the fact, that there was a gash and knotts upon the'head of the prosecutrix, which it is hardly probable to believe were inflicted otherwise than in the manner described by the State’s witnesses; and then the witness McCall, who was examined by the defendant, and was present and saw it all, does not corroberate the testimony of Taylor. If he could have done so, he certainly would have been examined by the defendant with regard to the fight; but he was only examined as to the presence of Rosa Baker. The State was not called upon to examine him upon that point. The jury were well warranted in finding the defendant guilty.

There is no error. Let this be certified to the Superior Court of Union county, that the case may be proceeded with according to law.

No error. Affirmed.