(After stating the facts). The Code §1826 provides, that “no woman during her coverture, shall be capable of *249 making any contract to affect her real or personal estate, except for her necessary expenses, or for the support of her family, or such as may be necessary in order to. pay her debts existing before marriage, without the written consent of her husband, unless she be a free trader.” Laws of 1871-% ch. 193, §17. A married woman before that act, had the power to charge her separate estate for the benefit of her person or estate, provided it was done in express terms or by necessary implication. The act of 1871-’2 bad no other effect upon her power over her separate estate, than to restrict it, by requiring the consent of her husbaud. Such is the construction given to the act by the Court in the ease of Pippin v. Wesson, 74 N. C., 437, and we think that case and Withers v. Sparrow, 66 N. C., 129, are decisive of this question.

From the former case, the principle is clearly deducible, that a married woman has the power to contract a debt, or to enter into any executory contract, with the consent of her husband, when she charges her separate estate with it, either expressly or by necessary implication arising out of the nature or circumstances of the contract, and that it was for her benefit; and that the written consent of the husband was given, it is sufficient to show that' he signed the contract with her.

And the latter case is authority for submitting to the jury the question whether the contract of the feme covert is for her personal benefit, or some advantage to her separate estate.

Here, by consent of the parties, the question of benefit was submitted to the Court, and it was found as a fact by the Court, that the. mule for which the note was given, was bought by the husband for the purpose of being used by a lessee or cropper on the land of the feme defendant, for the purpose we take it, to make a crop, the one-fourth of which was to be paid to the husband and wife, and the profits of the farm were used jointly by the husband and wife, and if used by them for the support of the family, as we presume was the case, it was a contract for her benefit, as much so as if she had purchased the mule herself, *250 and had the crop made with it on her land and under her own supervision.

The fact as found by his Honor, that the defendants had no contract for the management of the farm, and kept no accounts and had no separate money matters between them, shows that perfect harmony and confidence existed between them as man and wife, and that she confided the management of her separate estate to him, as a trusted agent, for their mutual support and benefit.

The contract we think comes fully up to the requirements of the law, to charge her separate estate, and the judgment of the Court below was fully warranted by the facts as found by his Honor.

The judgment of the Superior Court is affirmed, aud as the judgment against the co-defendant P. H. Bell, not appealed from, stands on the record of that Court, this opinion must be certified to that Court, that the proper executions may be issued upon the judgment.

No error. Affirmed.